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ABSTRACT
An analysis was made of what determines the capacity of
different types of development assistance agencies to
assess and mitigate the environmental effects of their
funding programs. The analysis concentrates on the
influence of the political and financial structure of
bilateral aid programs, multilateral development banks and
UN specialized agencies on the incentives and constraints
facing the agency st 4ff. The key to understanding how this
relationship affects environmental policy is the
accountability system that prevails within each agency.
The accountability system is the configuration of pressures
and mechanisms by which various actors hold the agency
accountable for compliance with different policy objectives
relative to different elements of the agency's program.
Environmental assessment of development assistance
activities is one of a set of policies that development
assistance agencies have difficulty implementing because
they modify rather than expand the output of the agency -
and this conflicts with the underlying reward system within
agencies. The extent to which it can be successfully
implemented depends on how the political and financial
structure of the agency shapes the incentives and
constraints facing the staff via accountability system.
This can either inhibit or encourage the review of
environmental effects of projects and their modification,
if appropriate.
The accountability system of bilateral agencies was
found to be dominated by domestic political pressures and
mechanisms for monitoring their output. Multilateral
development banks are mainly accountable for their
financial responsibilities and for ensuring
creditworthiness. Owing to their political and financial
structure, UN specialized agencies are relatively
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autonomous to pursue activities designed to strengthen and
enhance their programs. It is in this context that
agencies' capacity to implement environmental assessment
policies can be understood a;.d influenced.
The analysis illustrates how development agencies
respond to political, financial and developmental policy
objectives and what opportunities exist for securing the
implementation of specific policies in different types of
agencies.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The national and International organizations that
provide funds to developing countries for economic
development projects operate in two kinds of environments.
One Is the bio-physical environment of the project or
program being funded - the watershed surrounding a dam, the
tropical forest being cleared for agriculture or the
coastal zone within which a harbor is built. The other is
the political and Institutional environment within which
the organization performs its task of administering the
flows of development assistance - the political actors that
have influence over its policies and decisions, the
institutions with which it has to cooperate and the various
participants on whom the implementation of the projects
depend.
This study Is about how policies for protection of the
physical environment fare within the different political
and institutional environments in which these organizations
operate. I shall call this latter environment the
"task-environment" - a term used In organizational theory
to refer to the relationships an organization has with
external actors and processes in the course of performing
-9-
its ias . However, the purpose of this study is not to
test whether organizations have to take account of their
task-environment, but to investigate how the political and
financial structure of the organization equips it to change
its output in relation to its task-environment.
The organizations I shall discuss are called
development assistance agencies. They include national
government agencies in wealthy countries whose job is to
disburse funds directly to developing countries for
projects or programs - this form of assistance is
conventionally called bilateral assistance and the national
agencies will be referred to in this study as bilateral
agencies. They also include international agencies, to
which a number of n<' ans belong and which receive
contributions or loan guarantees from wealthy countries and
provide funds to poor countries in various forms. I shall
be dealing with two main categories of international agency
- multilateral development banks and United Nations
organizations.
The policy issue in question is how can development
assistance agencies ensure that their programs do not have
harmful effects on the bio-physical environment. In one
sense, this issue is particular to the relationships
be tween different types of development project and the
natural resource systems on which they depend and the
- 10 -
environment In which they are located. But, it is also an
issue common to other policies that concern the
"developmental objectives" of assistance programs. To put
it simply, there are alternative frames for analyzing the
efforts of development assistance agencies - political,
financial or developmental - that have very different
implications for policy making and organizational reform.
The political frame concerns the goals of governments
and intergovernmental organizations in providing and
allocating the assistance. The financial frame encompasses
the overall flows of assistance and the terms on which it
is lent or granted. The developmental frame focusses on
the effects of the assistance on economic growth, income
distribution, employment, health, nutrition, population,
education, rural development, social organization, cultural
values and the state of the environment - not necessarily
In that order.
Policies that are designed to affect the developmental
account, so to speak, often embody criteria for achieving
good outcomes and suggest procedures or methods for
ensuring that projects meet these criteria. The question I
shall organize this study around is what determines the
capacity of a development assistance agency to follow these
procedures and meet these criteria effectively. The
importance of this question is that it seems much easier
- 11 -
for an agency to adopt a policy intended to satisfy a
specific developmental objective than to ensure that the
program meets that objective. In the case of environmental
protection, many agencies have declared themselves
committed to assessing the environmental effects of their
programs and taking steps to minimize damage, but very few
have convincingly reformed their operations and performance
as a result. The Issue is, at this point, less one of the
merits of the particular policy and more what structural
and organizational features influence the implementation of
developmental policies.
My initial approach to this question is to suggest that
because development assistance agencies are political and
financial bodies, one must look to their political and
financial structure for an explanation of how policies are
adopted and transmitted to the organization. Also, because
development assistance agencies are large organizations,
one must look to their organizational processes and
behavior to explain how they implement the policies. It
seems reasonable to expect that bureaucracies do not always
Implement policies quite as their political masters propose
or their financial status requires. Some of the reasons
for this are that the organization has to cope with Its
task-environment and make sure It gets its job done despite
barriers and uncertainties.
- 12 -
However, I think the Issue is more complex. The reason
Is that the way an organization copes with its
task-environment is to a large extent determined by its
political and financial structure. For, the structure
defines many of the Incentives and constraints facing the
staff of the organization. The structure determines how
policies are enforced or how the performance of the program
is evaluated. The organization can try to influence its
task-environment - including the mechanisms by which the
political and financial structure exercises control over
the operations of the organization - but mainly it is
reacting to how its responsibilities and reward system are
shaped from above in relation to the problems it faces in
getting its task done.
Because I think that the fate of a policy such as
environmental assessment depends on the interaction between
the political and financial structure of the agency and the
organizational Incentives and constraints facing the staff,
I have proposed an analytical "handle" with which to
Investigate this relationship. This is the "accountability
system" by which the organization is held accountable to
the political members, sources of funds, leadership and
other participants for its performance. The nature of the
accountability system - how strict It is, what criteria it
focusses on, how far It can penetrate into the operations
- 13 -
of the agency and so on - determines the relationship of
policy making with the operations of the agency.
So, my analysis will focus on the capacity of
development assistance agencies to assess the environmental
effects of their programs in terms of the accountability
system prevailing in different types of agency -
distinguishable by their political and financial
structure. The question is what does the accountability
system imply for a new policy objective and how can the
accountability system be brought to bear on a particular
policy objective.
I give an account in the next chapter of the
development assistance system and the various theoretical
perspectives that have contributed to my view of the
importance of a conceptual linkage between the political
and financial structure of the agencies and the
organizational processes that embrace their day-to-day
operations.
Then, I show in chapter 3 that development assistance
agencies have become quite concerned with environmental
issues. Over the past decade or so, they have adopted
Policies for the environmental review of their funding
programs, have allocated some of their funds to projects
designed to manage environmental problems and have provided
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technical assistance and funds to the governments of
developing countries to strengthen their environmental
policies and institutions. I shall also point out that
environmental lobbies and non-governmental organizations
continue to criticize these agencies for not following
these policies through and for still causing environmental
problems through their regular funding programs.
This leads to a discussion in Chapter 4 of how to
analyze the determinants of the response, or lack of it, of
different types of agencies to environmental problems their
projects may cause. At this point, I lay out my arguments
for using the accountability system to organize the
analysis.
The underlying question is whether the policy makers
and advocates who are worried by environmental problems in
developing countries are justified in focussing their
attention on development assistance agencies and whether
their efforts to elicit a more vigorous or effective
response from the agencies are likely to succeed. Are
these agencies able to deliver what is being demanded of
them - taking into account their political and financial
structure and the task-environment they face?
This question is not exclusive to environmental
policies. It is equally relevant to other developmental
- 15 -
objectives that development assistance agencies are
expected to achieve. Whether the issue Is alleviating
poverty, achieving better nutrition levels, promoting the
Interests of women In development or avoiding social or
cultural disruption, development agencIes can hardly make a
case that such objectives are undesirable. However, when
it comes to reforming their procedures and operations in
order to satisfy these objectives, one needs to ask whether
the reforms needed are compatible with the nature of the
organization, Its political and financial status and the
dominant organizational Incentives governing its day-to-day
operations. Organizations do resist new policies, changed
procedures and additional objectives. Sometimes, it is
obvious why they resist, and steps can be taken to address
the reasons directly; other times, it is not clear what
accounts for poor implementation of new policies.
If the demands being made of development agencies are
unreasonable or difficult to implement, it would benefit
the advocates of new policies to understand why. If policy
makers can discern the limited influence of development
agencies over the implementation of their program or the
incompatibility of certain.objectives expected of them,
then they should be able to advocate other measures
designed to complement the actions of agencies or to avoid
conflicts within their programs. If the agencies simply
- 16 -
cannot make Luch difference, then policy makers can look
for ways of influencing the actors or activities that do
make a difference.
If, on the other hand, the policies are reasonable and
the agencies have the capacity to achieve the objectives in
question, then policy advocates should know how to
stimulate the response required and how to enforce the
policy objectives most effectively. An understanding of
the sources of resistance and the incentives facing agency
staff are indispensable for furthering the interests the
particular policies represent.
In order to distinguish policies that development
assistance agencies are equipped to implement and to
improve policy mechanisms and procedures accordingly, it is
necessary to analyze what determines the capacity for
development agencies to respond to the policies asked of
them - what is the relationship is between the sources of
policy and the operations of the organization and what are
the mechanisms by which the leaders and managers of the
agency ensure the desired performance within the program?
Within the development assistance system, there are
types of agency that have very different political and
financial structure - bilateral agencies, multilateral
development banks and UN specialized agencies. In chapters
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5, 6 and 7, 1 have taken one case from each group and
examined in detail the response of the agency in question
to a policy for the environmental assessment of its funding
program in relation to the accountability system that
prevails within the agency. Because the political and
financial structure of each agency is so different and
produces quite distinct accountability systems, it is
possible to make comparisons about how that structure
determines the agency's environmental responsiveness.
From these comparisons, and from evidence from other
cases that I have accumulated, I shall draw some general
conclusions about the role of the accountability system in
shaping the response of an agency to policy initiatives
designed to improve the developmental effects of its
program. Ultimately, the value of this analysis is that it
allows a better understanding of why policies that seem
reasonable and desirable are not always implemented
effectively. It should provide the basis for judging
strategies for improving the performance of development
assistance agencies and offer some insight into how to
influence them in relation to specific policy objectives.
- 18 -
CHAPTER Z
International Organization and Development Assistance
Introduc-t-ion
This chapter and the next review the literature and
historical experience relevant to the question of what
determines the response of development assistance agencies
to the environmental effects of their funding programs. In
this chapter, I start by describing the development
assistance agencies that are the subject of this study.
Second, I discuss some of the perspectives on the goals and
performance of international organizations, trying to
extract insights that are relevant to development
assistance agencies. Third, I address in more depth the
question of how development assistance agencies satisfy the
policy demands of the participating actors and satisfy
their own organizational interests in relation to specific
efforts to improve the outcomes of their programs. In the
next chapter, I discuss the relationship of development
assistance to the bio-physical environment.
At the outset, it must be said that not all
international organizations are development assistance
- 19 -
agencies, and not all development assistance agencies are
international organizations. Bilateral development
assistance agencies are not, of course, intergovernmental
organizations. However, they are engaged in activities
that involve other states, both donors and recipients, and
are key actors within the community of international
organizations providing and administering the flow of
development assistance to developing countries. Also, some
of the literature on international organizations has little
relevance to development assistance agencies and will not
be considered here. On the other hand, some literature on
how large organizations behave stems from an analysis of
national organizations but is relevant to my
investigation.
I am concerned with the question of why development
assistance agencies do not always implement policies that
appear to offer developmental benefits and have been
adopted by the leadership and management of the agencies.
It seems to me that there are two main themes worth
exploring in the literature. One concerns the implications
of the political nature of development assistance agencies
on how they behave, what priorities they have and how they
are controlled. The other focusses on the procedures,
mechanisms and practices that are at work within the
organizations and shape the day-to-day implementation of
- 20 -
their task. Both these themes should offer some ideas
about how the output of the organizations compares with the
desired policy outcomes. I also think it is necessary to
integrate these themes in order to understand what
determines the capacity of a development assistance agency
to, in this case, carry out environmental assessments of
its program.
Deve-lopment Assistance Agencies
The context of this study is the apparatus for
providing funds for "official development assistance" to
poorer countries.1 Essentially all such funds originate
from the governments of wealthy governments - either
Western members of the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
1. The OECD defines "official development assistance" as
grants or loans undertaken by the official sector, with
promotion of economic development and welfare as main
objectives, at concessional financial terms. QOD,
Development Cooerationn :Efforts and Policies of the
Members of the Development Assistance Commit tee. 1983
Bnview, Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. 1983, P.176.
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Development (QECD), Eastern block members of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) or members of OPEC. 2
Almost all funds are eventually made available to the
governments of poorer countries, or agencies and
institutions responsible for economic development within
those countries. However there are a variety of channels,
institutions and mechanisms whereby funds are made
available by donors, allocated to recipients and disbursed
for programs or projects.
In my case studies, I shall examine development
assistance agencies that represent the three main
categories of development assistance provided by DAC
members: namely 1 bilateral assistance provided directly
from an agency of the donor government to recipient
government or institution, and multilateral assistance,
which is channeled via international agencies in two forms
- 23 as contributions to multilateral development banks and
the EEC, and 3) as contributions to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the specialized agencies
of 1e LN zystem. Since my analysis hinges on the
different political and financial structures that govern
the policies, procedures and organizational dynamics
affecting the provision of assistance in these three cases.
2. ..ii. p.49-56.
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I shall devote some space to discussing these categories of
development assistance agencies.
In 1982, total net disbursements of official
development assistance from DAC members was US$27,853
millions, which amounted to 74% of official development
assistance from all donors. Of DAC assistance, 66% was in
the form of bilateral assistance, 25% in the form of
concessional contributions to multilateral development
banks and the EEC, and 8% to the UN system.3 Historically
there has been a growth in the share of development
assistance channeled through multilateral agencies, (from
an average of 15.7% of DAC official development assistance
during 1971-1973 to 25.3% in 1982. The share channeled
through the UN system has remained fairly constant (a
modest increase from 6.7% of DAC official development
assistance in 1971-1973 to 8.1% in 1982) as the combined
total of the budgets of the UNDP and specialized agencies
have kept pace with overall assistance flows. However, in
the last 2-3 years major donors have resisted this trend
and placed more emphasis on bilateral assistance. The rate
of expansion of contributions by DAC members to
multilateral and UN organizations has slowed since the late
3. Figures calculated from J±bid., p.179.
4. ikid., p.241.
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1970's, except for European Community members'
contributions to the European Development Fund (EDF) which
have risen faster than multilateral official development
assistance as a whole.5 There has been a reluctance to
replenish the International Development Association (IDA),
the concessional window of the World Bank Group and the
funds contributed to UNDP have dropped off significantly in
real terms. 6
The DAC, in reporting the current stagnation in
contributions to multilateral and UN organizations,
considers the implications. Members face severe budgetary
constraints but increasing demands from a growing number of
international organizations. But there appears to be an
attitude among some donors that multilateral organizations
are less responsive to their preferences than they would
wish, while UN organizations are inefficient and hard to
influence.8 Nevertheless, the DAC asserts that members do
not dispute the traditional grounds for supporting
multilateral agencies - namely that the assistance is less
5. ibid.. p.77.
6. ibid.,pp.105-108 & pp.100-101.
7. IbId.., p.98.
8. See for instance United States Treasury Department, .L.
Participation in the Multilateral Develooment Banks in the
1980sf~a Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982.
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TABLE I
TOTAL FLOW OF RESOURCES FROM DAC COUNTRIES BY MAJOR CATEGORIES
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
a) S billion, net, current prices
Official Development Assistance .................. 6.9 7.6 9.2 9.1 11.6 13.8 14.0 15.7 20.0 22.8 27.3 25.6Grants by private voluntary agencies .............. 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.0
Non-concessional flows ........................... 8.1 8.9 10.0 11.9 9.7 29.7 30.6 34.3 48.9 50.6 45.7 60.4Total flow of resources............................ 15.9 17.4 20.2 22.4 22.5 44.8 46.0 51.5 70.6 75.4 75.4 88.0
b)S billion, 1981 prices and exchange rates
Official Development Assistance .................. 17.8 18.4 20.1 17.7 20.5 21.1 20.8 21.6 23.9 24.1 26.5 25.6Grants by private voluntary agencies .............. 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.0
Non-concessional flows .......................... 20.9 21.6 21.8 23.2 17.1 45.4 45.4 47.1 58.3 53.5 44.3 60.4
Total flow of resources ........................... 41.1 42.2 44.1 43.7 39.7 68.5 68.2 70.7 84.2 79.8 73.1 88.0
e) Asuper cent orGNP
Official Development Assistance .................. 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.35Grants by private voluntary agencies..............0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03Non-concessional flows....................... 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.86 0.79 0.63 0.83Total flow of resources ........................... 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.65 1.17 1.10 1.09 1.24 1.17 1.04 1.21
Source: OECD, Development Coooeration: Efforts and Policies
of the Members of the DleveloDment Assistance Committee
1982 Review, Parls, 1982.
TABLE 2
THE NET FLOW OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES FROM DAC COUNTRIES
Net disbursements
S million Percentages
1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981
1. Orncial Development Assistance ................................. 6949 13846 22820 27264 25635 44 31 30 36 29
1. Bilateral grants and grant like flows....................... 3 321 6268 11 704 14 123 13 184 21 14 15 19 15
of which: Technical cooperation.............. . ........ 1524 2922 4685 5477 5249 10 . 7 6 7 6
2. Bilateral loans at concessional terms......................2 351 3 53 4 628 3 985 5 099 15 8 6 5 6
3. Contribution to multilateral institutions ....................... 1277 4039 6488 9 156 7352 8 9 9 12 8
of which to: UN ......................................... 371 1 197 1699 2170 2228 2 3 2 3 2
EEC ........................................ 158 673 1 216 1 575 1 561 1 2 2 2 2
IDA ........................................ 582 1316 1996 3101 2434 4 3 3 4 3
Regional Development Banks .................. 101 418 918 1 717 753 1 1 1 2 1
II. Otherofficial flows.............................................. 1 122 3912 2894 5272 6607 7 9 4 7 8
1. Bilateral.................................................... 845 3833 3138 5378 6470 5 9 4 7 7
2. M ultilateral ................................................ 276 79 -244 - 106 137 2 x x x I
l1l. Private flows ................................................... 7018 25706 47690 40430 53780 44 57 63 54 61
1. Direct investment ........................................... 3690 10344 12745 9769 14639 23 23 17 13 17
2. Bilateral portfolio ........................................... 697 9291 23450 17702 24712 4 21 31 23 28
3. Multilatcral portfolio ........................................ 474 2553 2087 1469 3836 3 5 3 2 4
4. Export credits .............................................. 2157 3518 9408 11490 10593 14 8 12 15 12
IV. Grants by private voluntary agencies .............................. 860 1 346 1 997 2 386 2018 5 3 3 3 2
Total net flow .................................................. 15948 44810 75401 75352 88040 100 100 100 100 100
Total netflow in 1981 prices .................................... 41 103 68 517 79789 73086 88040 - - - - -
Source: OECD, DeveloPment CooDeration: Efforts and Policies
of the Members of the fDevelonment Assistance Committee
1982_Re-v ew, Paris, 1982.
TABLE 3
COMPOSITION OF EXTERNAL FINANCIAL RECEIPTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
BY TYPE OF FLOW 1970-1981
Net disbursements Percentage shares in total receipts
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Official Development Assistance .................. 42.5 44.2 43.1 38.6 45.5 36.9 33.8 31.9 32.7 35.8 38.0 (34.1)
a) DAC bilateral ............................. 29.8 29.9 26.4 22.0 22.8 18.3 16.3 15.8 15.8 18.6 18.8 17.6
b) OPEC bilateral ............................ 2.0 2.1 2.8 6.3 11.5 10.4 8.9 8.3 8.3 7.7 8.6 6.6
c) CMEA countries, bilateral .................. 5.1 6.0 5.9 4.2 3.5 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.0 2.0
d) Other countries, bilateral.................... .. .. 0.. 0.. 0.. .1 0.1 0. 1 0.12 (0.2)
e) Multilateral agencies ....................... 5.6 6.3 6.0 6.1 7.8 7.1 6.6 7.2 7.2 7.3 8.4 (7.7)
e of which: OPEC financed ............... - - - - 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Non-concessional flows .......................... 57.5 55.8 56.9 61.4 54.5 63.1 66.2 67.3 67.3 64.2 62.0 65.9
a) Multilateral agencies ....................... 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.0 5.1 4.7 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.9 5.3 (4.8)
of which: OPEC financed............... - - - 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
b) Direct investment .......................... 19.4 15.6 18.1 14.7 5.2 21.2 14.8 14.2 14.2 15.7 10.8 (14.1)
c) Bank sector ................................ 15.8 15.6 20.6 30.1 27.6 22.0 25.8 27.5 27.5 23.0 20.6 (24.0)
d) Bond lending .............................. 1.6' 1.4 2.2 1.8 0.8 0.8 2.1 3.2 3.2 1.3 3.4 (2.4)
e) Private export credits ....................... 11.0 12.8 6.2 3.6 6.6 8.1 12.4 12.3 12.3 11.1 12.7 (10.2)
f) Official export credits ...................... 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.7 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.0 2.6 (2.)
g) DAC - other oficial ....................... 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.8 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.3 (1.9)
h) OPEC bilateral ............................ 1.1 0.9 - 0.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 1.2 1.2) (1.1) (2.9)
z) CMEA countries .......................... 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
J) Other..................................... 0.5 - - - - 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.0 3.7 (3.4) (2.9)
Total receipts ................................... 00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD, Develooment CooperatIon: Efforts and Policies
of the Members.of the Develooment Assistance Committe
1982 Review, Paris, 1982.
TABLE 4
ODA FROM DAC COUNTRIES TO MULTILATERAL AGENCIES 1981
$ million
IBRD and militated IDB Asian development bank EECinstitutions African
Countries Ordi. Ordi- develop- UN Other TotalCountriesen aenieIBRD8 IDA Total nary a Total nary C Total n EDF Other Total agencies
capital capital frund
Australia.................... - 0.1 0.1 - - - 8.6 28.4 37.0 - - - - 48.3 16.7 102.0
Austria ..................... -3.1 43.3 40.2 0.1 - 0.1 3.4 - 3.4 - - - - 12.8 2.3 58.8
Belgium .................... 2.0 51.6 53.6 - - - 0.6 3.8 4.4 6.1 38.3 53.8 92.1 47.3 2.1 205.7
Canada ..................... 3.5 146.9 150.4 5.9 16.2 22.1 7.6 47.3 54.9 25.0 - - - 154.8 35.3 442.5
Denmark ................... 19.2 34.8 54.0 0.5 3.8 4.3 0.3 3.2 3.5 7.3 14.8 18.9 33.7 93.4 4.5 200.6
Finland .................... 5.7 20.7 26.4 0.3 2.3 2.6 0.2 3.5 3.7 3.6 - - - 20.1 - 56.4
France ..................... 10.9 163.9 174.8 2.3 18.1 20.4 2.3 22.4 24.7 6.1 157.3 192.4 349.7 55.9 0.5 632.1
Germany ................... 5.6 295.2 300.8 14.8 6.6 21.4 3.3 - 3.3 24.9 162.2 274.3 436.5 135.9 14.4 937.1
Italy ....................... 0.1 112.1 112.2 25.5 10.3 35.8 - 28.6 28.6 8.5 72.0 137.0 209.0 88.2 11.0 493.4
Japan ...................... 9.1 452.4 461.5 -6.3 - -6.3 18.7 176.2 194.9 - - - - 242.5 17.9 910.5
Netherlands................. 2.2 81.8 84.0 0.8 3.9 4.7 0.6 - 0.6 5.9 49.1 69.8 118.9 145.9 6.5 366.6
NewZealand ............... 2.7 3.3 6.0 - - - 2.3 1.8 4.1 - - - - 4.3 2.9 17.2
Norway .................... 0.7 40.9 41.6 - - - 0.6 3.5 4.1 12.2 - - - 136.8 12.0 206.7
Sweden..................... - 90.8 90.8 - - - 0.2 6.0 6.2 14.2 - - - 198.6 7.4 317.3
Switzerland ................. - - - 0.3 3.7 4.0 1.2 5.1 6.3 13.7 - - - 41.2 8.6 73.8
United Kingdom ............ - 375.7 375.7 -1.0 - -1.0 2.8 30.1 32.9 12.5 113.6 207.1 320.7 96.6 28.5 865.9
United States ............... 44.0 520.0 564.0 - - - 25.0 3.0 28.0 42.0 - - - 705.9 126.0 1 465.9
Total DAC countries ...... 102.6 2 433.5 2 536.1 43.2 64.9 108.1 77.7 362.9 440.6 182.0 607.3 953.3 1 560.6 2 228.5 296.7 7 352.5
a) including IFC.
Source: OECD, Develoopment Cooperation: Efforts and Policies
of the Members of the Develooment Assistance Committee
1982 Review, Paris, 1982.
Net disbursements
W
TABLE 5
LOAN AND GRANT DISBURSEMENTS BY MULTILATERAL AGENCIES
$ million
Concessional flows Non-concessional flows
Agencies 1970 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1970 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
IBRD'...... ... net - 16 39 76 107 107 88 508 1724 1833 2104 2846 3166 3603
gross - 16 39 76 107 107 88 810 2279 2501 2900 3786 4 310 5015
IDA ................... net 163 1310 1 132 1007 1278 1543 1918 - - - - - - -
gross 163 1 326 1 158 1 038 1 303 1 584 1 963 - - - - - - -
IFC .................... net - - - - - - - 68 193 98 58 108 295 510
gross - - - - - - 77 252 174 169 244 465 645
IDB . .................. net 224 282 299 332 335 326 438 84 285 388 375 447 567 643
gross 245 362 392 433 461 468 .. 150 398 552 560 613 813
ofwhich: ............. grants - 12 - - - 17 .. - - - - - - -
African D.B. and Fund net - 11 26 39 55 96 91 2 44 66 83 92 97 70
gross - 11 26 44 57 96 93 2 51 73 93 108 117 99
Asian D.B. ............. net 1 62 89 161 116 149 .. 15 232 225 229 278 328
gross 1 63 100 161 124 159 .. 16 263 272 294 361 429
of which:..............grants - - 8 - - 8 .. - - - - - - -
Car. D.B. ............... net - 14 12 20 25 43 6 11 * 7 13
EEC/EIIB...............net 210 501 549 805 1 124 1013 1440 11 58 49 78 162 257 241
gross 210 512 558 815 1 137 1 028 1 453 (11) 68 67 :04 194 294 275
of which: ............. grants 174 396 473r 729' 848 900 .. - - - - - - -
IMF Trust Fund.........net - 175 864 680 1636 434 - - - - - - -
lFAD .................. net - - 3 45 75 - - - - - - -
United Nations .......... grants 498 1 252 1404 1730 2214 2487 .. - - - - - - -
Arab OPEC Funds....... net - 419 1 107 973 265 294 415 - - 20 157 219 128 265
ofwhich:..............grants - 8 13 19 19 28 42 - - - - - -- -
Total ................ net 1096 3867 4832 6007 6202 7759 (8000) 688 2542 2690 3084 4159 4849
gross 1117 3975 5090 6147 6375 7936 .. 1066 3469 3953 4277 5700 6583
of which: ........... grants 672 1668 1898 2478 3077 3505 .. - - - - - - -
a) Excluding loans transferred to IFC.
b) Including funds channelled through other multilateral organisations,
c) Including STABEX.
Note: Loas unless otherwise stated. For abbreviations see page 173.
1982 Review, Paris, 1982.
Net disbursements
wi
Source: OECD, Develonment Cooperation: Eiforts and Policies
of the Members of the Dlevelopment Assistance Committee
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governed by individual donors' political interests or tied
to particular goods and services and that these agencies
play an indispensable role as repositories of erperience
and fora for discussing the policy framework for
assistance. Also, while UNDP contributions have dropped
off, there has been an increase in contributions to other
UN operational activities that provide resources to
developing countries. 1 0
Thea Po2l It il -and Financ1a1-S t ruc t ur-e o.f 1Deve l opMen
Assistance Agencies.
There are important differences in political and
economic structure among the types of development
assistance agencies that can help explain how different
agencies respond to policy initiatives and what capacity
they have for reviewing their assistance programs.
A. Bilateral Agencies.
9. OECD, on i. p.99.
10. .LkIU.., p.101.
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Almost all donor governments disburse the bulk of their
foreign assistance through their bilateral agencies,
directly to the governments or institutions of recipient
countries.
Bilateral agencies are parts of national governmental
machinery, disbursing funds provided by the government's
treasury and following the political and economic
objectives that the government holds as part of its foreign
and domestic policies. For instance, assistance may be
allocated in order to secure political alliances or trade
relationships. Bilateral agencies also pursue
developmental objectives in allocating and guiding the
disbursement of the funds at their disposal. For instance,
they may target their assistance to poor rural farmers or
to meeting basic needs or raising nutrition levels. The
agencies are subject to the directives and pressures of
government, parliament and the electorate in carrying out
their program. While a bilateral assistance program is
usually administered by a single agency, the national
policy for that program is normally the responsibility of
several government departments. 11
The activities of the OECD, an international
11. White, John, Thmoltc1oorinAid, New York, St .
Martins Press, 1974, p.46.
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organization to which the Western developed countries
belong, include the work of the DAC. The members have
agreed to increase and improve the effectiveness of the
flows of resources made available to developing countries.
The purpose of the DAC is provide a mechanism for members
to coordinate, monitor and discuss their bilateral aid
programs in the light of this agreement. Thus members are
loosely committed to temper their individual political and
economic policies with the developmental objectives agreed
among themselves concerning the quantity, terms, mechanisms
and priorities of development assistance. The remainder of
bilateral assistance is coordinated to some extent by the
CMEA and OPEC, representing the Socialist and oil-exporting
countries respectively.
Bilateral aid is a mix of concessionary loans and
grants; much of it is tied to the purchase of the donors
goods and services and channeled to countries which are of
foreign policy, security or trading interest to the donor.
Nevertheless, bilateral aid can also be allocated to much
poorer countries than development bank loans and ear-marked
for particular developmental objectives if the donor
government chooses and the recipient government agrees.
Needless to say, the levels, destinations and
objectives of national foreign assistance programs are
- 32 -
determined by donor government policy and the political,
economic and developmental pressures facing a particular
donor.12 However, bilateral aid donors do coordinate to
some extent both in general via the DAC and at the country
level either Informally or through coordinating
mechanisms. Bilateral donors also often cooperate with
multilateral agencies at a country level and provide
co-financing for large projects. 1 3
B. Multilateral Development Banks.
Multilateral development banks, including the World
Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Development Association, the
International Finance Corporation), the Asian Development
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, the Carribean Development Bank and Arab
Bank for Economic Development in Africa, have global or
12. See, in the US case for instance, Congressional Budget
Office, Assistina the Develovino Countries: Forelan Aid and
Trade Policies of the United States, Washington D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1980; Hough, Richard, E.conomLc
Assistance and Security: Re thinkina US Policy, Washington
D.C., National Defense University Press, 1982.
13. See recent Issues of OECD, Development Coeration:
Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Develoament
Assistance Commit tee, (Annual Report by the Chairman of the
Development Assistance Commit tee), Paris, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
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regional membership divided into donor and recipient
members. There are other multilateral financing
institutions such as the International Fund for
Agricultural Development and various OPEC funds that are
not discussed here.
Also, other multilateral organizations exist which do
not conform exactly to the model of a development bank.
The European Development Fund is discussed in this section,
although it is a really a European Community-wide bilateral
program. The European Investment Bank is increasing its
funding outside the European Community, but this is still a
minor part of its lending program. The Organization of
American States is a regional technical assistance agency,
usually included among multilaterals.
UN organizations are, of course, multilateral but I
treat them in a separate category, because of their
distinct political and financial structure. Formally, the
World Bank is affiliated to the UN system, but in practice
it is politically and financially distinct, and does not
share those features that 1 use to distinguish the UN
organizations.
Within multilateral development banks, voting is
welghted according to the capital contribution of the
members. They have two-tier governing bodies; a Board of
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Governors comprising the Finance ministers of members,
which meets annually to review the broadest policy issues,
and a Board of Executive Directors, permanently posted at
the bank, who represent the members in approving
disbursements and matters of policy and operations.
Most of the funds that the multilateral banks disburse
are borrowed on the International capital markets on the
strength of the capital contributions of the members, both
paid in and callable. These funds are lent to borrowing
governments or agents thereof at interest rates that are
normally below those available from commercial banks. Most
lending is for economically productive projects and
programs in the public sector for which alternative sources
of funds are unavailable. The multilaterals, in
particular, the International Development Association of
the World Bank Group, do also raise concessionary funds
from their developed members, to provide soft-loans to
poorer borrowers and less financially remunerative
sectors.
The constitutional and financial policies of the
multilateral banks are governed by the major donors, but
they are, in theory, free from the political or economic
pressures of individual members. The management and
professional staff are able to take a more independent line
than in bilateral or UNk agencies on the financial,
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operational and developmental policies they follow. The
banks have instituted relatively rigorous feasibility and
appraisal studies that need to be undertaken before loans
are approved; they have considerable leverage over the
design of ProJects and can attach conditions to loans.
They also come to influence the economic policies of the
borrowing governments on a wider, longer term basis than
most bilateral and UN agencies. Traditionally, most
lending by multilateral development banks was allocated to
capital projects, such as transportation, power generation
and industry, but over the past decade an increasing
proportion of loans have been in the agricultural, urban,
health and education sectors.14
The World Bank is preeminent among multilaterals in
size, influence and experience. It also plays a more
prominent role in researching, analyzing and forming
economic development policy.5 The regional development
banks, although they all stem from roughly the same model -
smaller versions of the World Bank responsive to the
specific economic and developmental conditions of the
14. See Mason, Edward and Robert Asher, The World Rank
Since Bret ton.Woods, Washington D.C., The Brookings
Institution, 1973, pp.62-86, 191-294 and White, .os.. cit.,
pp. 54-58.
15. Ayres, Robert, Bankino on the Poor: the World Rank and
World Poverty, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983, pP.17-50.
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region - vary considerably in their response to the
particular interests regional members, in the role of the
main donors and the economic development policies that they
promote. 16
White and, more recently, Krasner note that the
Inter-American Development Bank has been most regionally
responsive and has substantial resources. The Asian
Development Bank has enjoyed plentiful resources but has
not adapted to the interests of regional members, while the
African Development Bank has remained closely in tune with
regional needs but has failed to acquire substantial
resources. These differences are explained partly in terms
of their history and the structural relationships of donors
and recipients within the frame of the institution. For
instance, the members established the inter-American
Development Bank in the hope of providing an alternative to
the World Bank; the major donor, the United States, saw an
opportunity to pursue more hegemonic, long-term objectives
that allowed the regional members greater participation and
influence in the bank than in the World Bank. The other two
regional banks were established without such a clear
objective, and with less conviction about the convergence
1 6. Wh it e, J oh n, atLona.llevelonmentRnsteAin
African and Inter-American Develonment Ranks. New York,
Praeger, 1972, pp.11-32, 1t9-199.
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of interests between donors and recipients. In the Asian
case, Japan came to dominate but pursued traditional
short-term economic interests, and sought to replicate the
operations of the World Bank in a way that suppressed any
reqional expression. In the African case, the Western
donors were excluded from membership, thus severely
restricting the availability of funds to respond to the
regional needs.1 7
The total development assistance funds provided by OPEC
countries peaked during mid-1970's, (29% of total official
development assistance in 1975), and have declined markedly
in recent years, (18% in 1982).18 However, most of this
decline is accounted for by OPEC bilateral assistance.
OPEC contributions both to their own and to other
multilateral agencies has been more buoyant. OPEC/Arab
multilateral institutions consist of the Arab Fund for
Social and Economic Development, the Islamic Development
Bank, the OPEC rund and the Arab Bank for Economic
Development in Africa. Much of the assistance has been
targeted towards the poorer Arab or Islamic nations.
17. WhIte, on...i., pp.189-197; Krasner, Stephen, "Power
Structures and Regional Development Banks", in
International Organization, 35:2, Spring 1981, pp.303-305.
18. OECD, ot. cit., p.87.
19. jfbjid., pp.89-91.
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The European Development Fund (EDF) is the major
instrument for the development assistance provided by the
European Community, and is administered by the
Directorate-General for Development, Commission of the
European Communities. The European Investment Bank, the
development bank of the European Community, only makes
about 15% of its loans outside the Community, which
amounted to about 480 million ECU's in 1983, (approximately
US$400 million). 2 0
The EDF is provided by member states separately from
the Community budget and is distributed mostly in the form
of grants to the African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP)
countries that are parties to the Lome Convention, under
similar contractual agreements to Mediterranean countries
and to "non-associated" states in Latin America and Asia.
There is a strong bias towards ex-colonies of the Community
members and an explicit policy of making the assistance
conditional on trade agreements as set out in each
successive Lome Convention.21
20. European Investment Bank, "Information", No.37,
Feb.1984.
21. Stevens, Christopher, ed. EEC and the Third World A
&unvey, V.ols.1 & 2, Overseas Development
Institute/Institute for Development Studies, London, Holmes
and Meier, 1981 & 1982, passim. Commission of the European
Communities, "Memorandum on the Community's Development
Policy", COM(82) 640 Final, Brussels, 5 October, 1982,
pp. 18-40.
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There are several notable features of the European
Community's development assistance. The Lome Convention,
which is a 5-year agreement negotiated within the ACP-EEC
Council of Ministers and Consultative Assembly, embodies
the policies, protocols and procedures that will govern the
disbursement of the funds, and it indicates a broad program
of assistance for each ACP recipient. It also sets out
explicitly the trade preferences and agreements that are
contingent on the disbursement of the EDF. Once the Lome
Convention is agreed, the ACP countries have considerable
autonomy in selecting and requesting specific projects to
be approved by the Commission. Indeed, their sovereign
right to determine their own priorities In enshrined in the
agreement.
The negotiation of Lome and other agreements governing
the EDF are influenced by other parts of the Commission,
particularly the Directorate-General for Foreign Policy, by
the Council of Ministers of the European Community and to a
limited extent by the European Parliament. However, since
the EDF is not funded from the main Community budget but
directly from members' multilateral contributions, there is
more direct influence from the members' national ministry
of foreign affairs or development cooperation than would
otherwise be expected. The Commission appears to enjoy
considerable autonomy from member governments in the
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day-to-day operations of the EDF.
Ultimately, the EDF and its administration is a mixture
of bilateral and multilateral assistance, bound by an
unusual legal agreement between donors and recipients.2 2
C. The UN System.
The UNDP raises funds from members of the United
Nations by voluntary contributions. These funds are
allocated for pre-investment studies and technical
assistance and other forms of non-capital assistance, in
the form of grants rather than loans. The UNDP appoints an
executing agency to implement the project, such as the
World Bank or one of the specialized UN organizations.
The UNDP is controlled by the UN General Assembly and
the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It has a
decentralized structure, with Resident Representatives in
developing countries enjoying considerable responsibility
for negotiating country programs. In practice, the UNDP
allows the recipient government much discretion about the
content of country programs, exercising some review of
overall development strategies and the economic and social
22. See Commission of the European Communities, oap~.scit.,
pass im.
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benefits expected from individual projects. Once the grant
is agreed, the executing agency has most of the
responsibility for technical content and implementation.
The main executing agencies such as FAO, Unesco, WHO
and UNIDO are organizations with their own structure,
membership, programs and constituencies. They are global
in membership and have equal voting - in many cases, they
are dominated by the more numerous developing country
members, rather than the developed countries that provide
most of the budget. However, the flow of UNDP and other
extra-budgetary funds has enabled them to establish
extensive field operations, and, since these funds are not
directly controlled by these organizations' own members,
they offer the organizations some degree of autonomy not
available within the regular programs. In recent years,
UNDP and other extra-budgetary funds have amounted to over
50% of the total funds available to specialized
agencies.23 However, since 1980 there has been a decline
in the funds available to UNDP, and the growth in other
extra-budgetary contributions to UN agencies has begun to
23. For instance, the extra-budgetary funds available to
the TAO in during the 1982-1983 biennium were US$515
million compared to the regular budget during the same
period of US$368 millions. TAO, "Review of the Field
Programmes 1982-1983", Rome, 1983, statistical index, table
1.
24. OECD, .ot..scit., p.101.
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tail off. 2 4
The DAC notes that the support of some donors for the
UN system as a channel for development assistance funds is
weak in the face of claims by other multilateral
organizations.2 It is less easy for donors to influence
the UN system owing to the political structure and the
widespread view of recipients that donors are diverting
attention from the need for increased funding.26 Thus
funding support for the UNDP is diminishing and calls from
donors for more efficient administration produce little
response. What is important to note here is that the
recipient countries, in the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC
or the governing bodies of the UNDP and the specialized
agencies have greater influence over formal decisions, if
not over levels of funding, than in any other development
assistance forum. Commonly, their position is to demand
increased resources, reserve their right to define their
own priorities for funding, to have full participation in
the programs funded and to resist any conditions attached
to funds by donors. 2 7
Cox and Jacobson, in their important study of how
25. .±., PP.101-103.
26. l.tLd., p.103.
27. .LkJ4., P.104.
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decisions are made in international organizations, arrive
at some relevant conclusions about the sources of influence
in relation to certain kinds of decisions in UN specialized
agencies as these agencies have become more concerned with
development and more universal in membership. These
conclusions are based on a comparative study of how
decisions are taken in eight international organizations
and what are the patterns of influence relevant to
different types of decisions. First, the donor nations
still exercise more influence than strict voting strength
would suggest, even in organizations devoted to providing
services to developing countries. Second, there has been a
growing bureaucratization of decision-making with a
corresponding decline in the influence of actors outside
the organization. Thus the organization itself perceives a
strong Interest in its survival and growth. Next, the
organizations concerned with development were those in
which the participant subsystems - that is, delegates,
secretariat staff, associated officials and experts - have
achieved some autonomy from their task-environment
including from the representatives of member states. The
authors note that the influence of participant subsystems
was highest in organizations whose output was of least
salience to Powerful member states. They suggest that in
UN agencies that provide services and channel funds to
developing countries there are two main factors to take
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into account. One is that the donor members still have
more influence relative to developing country members over
the programs and operations than the number of their votes
would suggest; but the second is that the secretariats and
other internal subsystems have achieved considerable
autonomy from the members as a whole.2 8
Perspectives on International Oroanizations.
There are two dominant perspectives on international
organizations involved in development assistance that are
important to my analysis. One is that they are political
organizations, governed by the member states and affected
by complex webs of political relations among members,
between members and the staff, between members, the staff
and other participants and so on. The other is that they
are large bureaucracies, the policies and tasks of which
are set by members and management, and within which there
are procedures and rules for decisions and action. The
staffs of such large hierarchical organizations are aware
28. Con, Robert and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy of
influence :iDecision Making in International Oraanization,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, pp.423-428.
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that the organizations operate within a task-environment
that may or may not facilitate their performance and
consequently the staffs develop their own interests and
priorities intended mainly to ensure the organizations'
survival and growth. International organizations are no
more "black boxes" than other large organizations,
experiencing political and technical divisions and
interactions within themselves that affect relationships
with their members and their clients.
I am interested here in what affects the output of
these organizations - or more particularly what determines
the degree to which a special policy, such as environmental
assessment, is promulgated and implemented once the members
and leadership of an organization have decided to adopt
it. There are different levels of analysis that contribute
some degree of insight to this this question. What
motivates nations to establish and join international
organizations influences the goals they hope the
organizations will pursue. How the members and other
participants make decisions and exercise control over the
organization's activities affects the pattern of influence
among actors in relation to different activities. Whether
members have effective control over the organization or
whether the organization enjoys some autonomy affects how
participants behave in relation to the operations of the
- 46 -
organization and especially the implementation of certain
policy objectives. What other factors contribute to the
"effectiveness" of organizations relative to the policies
set by the members or the services they are asked to
provide clearly pertains to how a policy is implemented.
Finally, the organizational incentives and constraints that
stem from the task-environment Influence the decisions that
staff members take and their judgements about what deserves
to be vigorously implemented or not.
What follows is not a comprehensive review of the
political and organizational theory of International
organizations but a selection of perspectives that have
some bearing on the approach that I am taking to the
question of the environmental policies of development
assistance agencies.
The Purpose of International Organizations
There are two main perspectives on why nations
establish and join international organizations. One is
that international organizations are "functional". The
other is that international organizations are the
instruments of politically and economically dominant
states.
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The functionalist perspective is that the creation of
international organizations is hastened by the growing
technological and economic interdependence of nations.
Managing the technological developments and the economic
system cannot be achieved without cooperation between
states. Interests within states tend to recognize the
advantages of cooperation and put pressure on governments
to participate in international organizations despite the
necessary constraints on the exercise of sovereignty that
are implied. Ultimately this trend leads to greater
political integration and economic welfare. Following this
argument, functionalism has played the part not only of a
theory but of a strategy of action and a normative test of
the behavior of international organizations. 2 9
This perspective emphasizes the technical functions of
international organizations and minimizes the political
aspects of their behavior. It has influenced some of the
approaches that I shall mention shortly which try to assess
the influence of structural and organizational features of
international organizations on how they perform. But, it
tends to obscure the fact that international organizations
29. See Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, Chicago,
Quadrangle, 1966; Jacobson, Harold, Networks of
Interdeoend~ence: International Oroanizations and the Global
PoliticatlSystem, New Yo r k, A lf r ed Kno pf , 2n d E dit io n ,
1984.
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are political bodies, however much their functions are
believed to be technically defined.
The most starkly contrasting perspective to
functionalism is that of the Marxist and "dependency"
theorists who view the purpose of international
organizations as an effort by Western powers to stifle
revolution and the spread of Socialism throughout the world
and to maintain the supremacy of the capitalist system by
exploiting the third world. While I do not Intend to
explore this perspective in depth, it is worth noting the
emphasis this perspective places on the political
objectives of members or groups of members and how
organizations have different structures of influence that
affect the priorities of the governing bodies and the fate
of policy objectives. 3 0
1 shall not dwell on these approaches, but start with
the assumption that the implementation of a policy within a
development assistance agency is influenced both by the
political structure and orientation of the agency and the
functional role and responsibilities of the organization in
relation to the interdependence of the member states. In
other words, development assistance agencies are likely to
30. Jacobson, .os.._si., pp.68-72; see also Caporaso, James,
ed., "Dependence and Dependency in the Global System",
International flraanization, 32, Winter 1978.
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be influenced by the political alignments and interests of
donors and recipients depending on the political and
financial basis for the assistance flows. Also, their
capacity to address the developmental issues involved in
managing these flows of resources depends in part on how
the members define and delegate the necessary technical
functions.
Both as Political bodies and as technical agencies,
international organizations have limited power, restricted
functions and scarce resources compared to national
governments. They are dependent on the member nations for
their resources, or the authority to raise funds from
international sources, and they are directed by their
members on how they can allocate those resources _ even
though some have more independence and power than others.
It is important to bear this in mind when considering what
influences their capacity to implement certain policies or
solve certain Problems that are associated with their
functions.31
Decision-Making in International Organizations
One of the most obvious factors that influences the
31. Jacobson, on i. pp.77-81.
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adoption and implementation of policies in development
assistance agencies is how decisions are made and what is
the basis of the patterns of influence over the activities
of the organization.
Cox and Jacobson address the decision-making process
across a range of international organizations,
differentiating between different types of decisions, modes
of decision making, and the roles of different actors in
relation to their sources of influence. They conclude that
decision making and action is influenced by the following
features:
- the political membership: is the membership global,
regional, limited to developed countries? What part
of the national government is represented and how is
its policy determined?
- the decision making bodies and process: how often does
the governing body meet and what does it decide? Are
there different levels of representation with
different degrees of decision making responsibility?
Are there permanent representatives to the
organization and how much responsibility do they
have? Is the voting system weighted or equal? If
equal, do the rich countries find ways of retaining
control or do developing countries exert more
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influence? How much decision making is retained by
the Secretariat?
- the budgeting process: how is the budget raised and
which members are the main contributors? How much of
the budget is independent of the members?
- the participation of different sets of actors: what is
the participation of governments' representatives, the
secretariat, the executive head, other international
bureaucracies and outside groups or interests and what
is their source of influence?
- the nature of the decisions: are the decisions
symbolic, about boundaries, about the program, about
rules, about operations? What is the interest and
influence of different actors concerning these types
of decisions? 3 2
What emerges from the analysis of decision-making is
that the relative power of different member states is far
from the only factor that determines whether international
organizations make give priority to a certain policy or
not. Many of the actors in decision-making processes can
act independently of member states, such as secretariat
heads, the staff, representatives of other international
32. Cox and Jacobson, at..csit., pp,371-436.
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organizations and individual participants. Also, weak or
poor states, depending on the structure of the
organization, can exercise more Influence within than
outside international organizations. Cox and Jacobson
emphasize the distinction between actors who play a
representational role and those who are participants. In
organizations whose decisions have Immediate consequences
for the more powerful member states, the representative
actors will play a more significant role in making those
decisions. International organizations that provide
development assistance, In the view of Jacobson and Kay,
make decisions that have more remote consequences for the
major member states and consequently the participant actors
play a more important role in making those decisions. In
other words, the secretariats and their associates or
contractors have more influence in international
development assistance agencies than in other kinds of
international organization.33
Autonomy and Effectiveness.
A number of observers of international organizations
have been concerned with the question of how effectively
they perform and to what extent they are controlled by
their members. There is not necessarily a direct
33. ibid..
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relationship between these two factors, but members
sometimes complain that international organizations are not
responsive to their needs or are immune to attempts to make
them more effective. Of course, when some members think
organizations are not responsive to their needs, other
members may be very content with how the organizations are
performing. Similarly, definitions of effectiveness are
likely to depend on what different members demand from the
organization. One can expect that, in the face of
conflicting demands, the secretariats make choices about
what deserves priority and how to increase their freedom of
action.
In the case of development assistance agencies, one can
imagine that donor and recipient members will have
differing views about whether the organization is
performing effectively or whether it is sufficiently
responsive to the needs of members. Furthermore, the
capacity of an agency to implement a particular policy
objective is clearly affected by the autonomy of the agency
in relation to the proponent of the policy. Also, the
desired outcomes of the policy may or may not reinforce the
view of the members about the agency's effectiveness. In
other words, it is not only the relative political power of
members that determines the response of the agency to a
policy decision, just as there were other factors tha
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influenced the decision itself. Indeed, the agency itself
may have some capacity to define what is effective and what
is not.
Skolnikoff proposes a set of criteria, some political
and some organizational, by which governments judge whether
an international organization is being effective, noting
that the general attitude of governments is "characterized
by a jealous guardianship of national prerogatives." The
factors that determine a government's confidence in an
international organization are:
- control: the ability of a government to veto proposed
actions or ensure the fulfillment of their policies.
- influence: different from formal control, influence
over an international organization can come from many
sources, especially providing the budget, but also
technical competence and other factors.
- secretariat quality and attitude: the technical and
managerial competence of the secretariat, the
competence and attitude of its executive head in
relation to a government's policies, the independence
and perceived efficiency of the secretariat greatly
influence the confidence of governments.
- significance of issues: the more politically important
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the issue, the more reluctant a government will be to
surrender its influence. However, Increased saliency
of an issue also means increased visibility a.nd public
interest which may keep the bureaucracy on its toes.
- size and clarity of purpose: limited membership and
close agreement about objectives encourages efficiency
and confidence of the members. In large
organizations, the clarity of purpose is very
Important in securing the confidence of members.
- benefits: the expectation of benefits by participating
countries affects the confidence they have In the
international organization. 34
Kay and Jacobson, in a study of the environmental
protection activities of international organizations, also
suggest a number of factors relevant to whether
International programs are effective or not that include
the structural elements governing membership and
decsion-making and the organizational aspects of the task
and how the secretariat Is equipped to perform it. 3 5
34. Skolnikoff, E. B., The International Imperatives of
Technolnav, Institute of International Studies, University
of California, Berkeley, 1972, PP.117-123.
35. Jacobson, H. K. and D.A. Kay, "The Environmental
Protection Activities of International Organizations: An
Appraisal and Some Suggestions," paper for American
Political Science AssociatIon, Sept. 1979, pp.14-19, 47-52.
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It is a complex issue to separate the Influence of a
number of variables on whether the members feel the
international organization is effective or responsive to
their needs. For the purpose of my analysis, it is
sufficient to establish that the power and interests of
different members within the governing bodies of
development assistance agencies will certainly Influence
the priority given to policies intended to increase the
effectiveness of the agencies' programs. But, one cannot
ignore the degree of autonomy that the organization itself
enjoys from its members and how the staff of the
organization defines its own effectiveness and manages its
task. If the organization has some autonomy, then my
analysis must encompass the factors that govern the
incentives facing the staff when asked to implement a
certain policy.
Organization Theory and International Organization
Having started with a perspective that stems from what
nations intend by establishing and participating in
international organizations, I am concluding this section
with a perspective of the organizational processes and
dynamics that shape their output. Clearly, the
organization is not simply an instrument of political
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actors but a complex entity that has to manage Itself and
perform its task under conditions that derive both from its
institutional surroundings and Its own Internal make-up.
An organization, amd Its various components, embraces its
own interests and system of Incentivt a that govern how the
individuals working within it give priority to certain
objectives or make decisions about taking action.
J. D. Thompson wrote that "uncertainty appears as the
fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping
with uncertainty, as the essence of the administrative
process." The "task-environment" of an organization is
uncertain because of the general condition of imperfect
understanding of cause and effect relationships in the
outside world and the specific lack of cooperation or even
hostility of other elements of the task-environment. Thus
the output of an organization is partly determined by the
need to cope with this uncertainty and thereby ensure the
survival and growth of the organization. Part of the
response of an organization to Its task-environment is to
try to extend its boundaries to control uncertain sets of
transactions. But, to the extent that this process is
rarely complete, the orga- ization must retain some
decentralization of Its components 
- allowing
semi-autonomous subsystems. So, not only does the
organization In part devote Itself to pursuing goals that
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stem from the uncertainty of the task-environment, not its
stated goals, but It must endure the semi-autonomy of some
of its components, further reducing its ability to achieve
its original objectives. 3 6
Haas, in his Investigation of functionalism and
international organization, is probably the first analyst
of International organization to make use of organizational
theory and to focus attention on the internal dynamics of
the organizations themselves. His main concern is to
analyze the contribution of international organization to
international integration and to propose the kind of
organization, defined by functional analysis, that will
maximize integration. His perspective of organizational
theory starts from the likely contradiction between an
organization's official goals, stemming from demands by
governments and other international actors, and its own
objectives of survival and expansion. What is functional
for the organization may not be functional for
international integration. Thus the objectives that an
organization derives from the demands made of it yield to
pressures from the task-environment. Haas goes further and
explores the role of leadership in transforming the
task-environment and thereby altering the relationship
36. Thompson, James, Organizations in Action, New York,
Mcgraw Hill, 1967, pp.159-162.
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between primary objectives and the task-environment so that
the organization can contribute to international
integration.37
International organizations do not simply react to
their task-environment but seek to transform it in order to
achieve their goal and integrate the actors with whom they
have to cooperate into their own system. Development
assistance agencies do this to some extent by trying to
persuade recipients to adopt policies that ensure a more
congenial setting for implementing economic development
projects or by trying to gain control over the process of
identifying and preparing projects so that they conform to
the specific policy preferences of the agency. This is
bound to have an effect on how the agency reacts to policy
demands from its members or leadership. Some writers have
explicitly analyzed development assistance agencies through
the lens of organizational theory, and I mention them below
briefly before examining more thoroughly the policies and
operations of these agencies in the next section.
Tendler, in her study of the United States Agency for
International Development, amplifies this approach in
explaining why aid donors appear to disappoint their
37. Haas, E.B. , Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1964, pp.86-119.
- 60 -
critics so regularly. She argues that the primary policy
goals and the professional judgement of staff are often
overriden by the organization's need to deiend Itself from
an uncooperative and sometimes hostile task-environment and
to cope with uncertainty. The organizational output owes
more to these responses to its task-environment than to
strategies for achieving developmental objectives - the
equivalent of Has's International integration. So, the
organizational task-environment plays a central role in
determining the content of development assistance programs,
to a greater extent than policy directives, staff training,
project analysis techniques and so on. To understand why
the agency behaves as it does, one must investigate the
organization's task, task-environment and organizational
design.38 She makes the case that certain aspects of AID's
output, such as excessively large projects, emphasis on
foreign exchange inputs, concern for export benefits,
alienation by staff members from the host country
surroundings, all of which could be perceived as "bad"
development, were rational organizational responses to the
task-environment. The organization is obliged to protect
itself from the hostility of other organizations and to
38. Tendler, J., Inside Foreigin Aid, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975, p.2.
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gain control over the uncertain task-environment in which
it strives to implement its program.39
Ascher, discussing the World Bank, also makes use of
organizational theory in explaining why the staff of the
Bank tend to resist demands made of it by the leadership to
introduce new policy objectives. Coping with uncertainty
again appears to be the key factor governing the actions of
the professional staff. The level of uncertainty
associated with development assistance programs generates
divisions about how to operate that can deflect policy
initiatives. The staff, because of its role in absorbing
uncertainty, gains some autonomy that allows it to resist
demands from leadership. Also, staff members are reluctant
to accept changes in their operational procedures or the
definition of their task that increases the uncertainty
they face by adding elusive objectives that cannot be
easily measured or implemented. 40
The Need for an Integrated Perspective
If one is to understand how development assistance
39. £jLdA.., PP.102-103.
40. Ascher, William, "New Development Approaches and the
Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case of the
World Bank", International Orpanization, 37:3, 1983, p.417.
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agencies respond to specific policy objectives, I would
argue that one needs to integrate the notion of
International organizations as being political bodies
making decisions and adopting policies, according to
certain principles and in pursuit of certain goals, with a
notion of them as large organizations whose staff members
try to reconcile the conflicts of policy demands and
task-environment. It is not realistic to separate the
political goals from the technical aspects of managing the
task of the organization - often the technical indicators
of the developmc-jt assistance task are the political goals
of some participants. In addition, the political
perspective of development assistance has to encompass the
limitations to the control of political actors over the
organizations.
The Policies and ODerations of Development Assistance
A&gencies.
The policies that govern the allocation and disbursal
of development assistance stem firstly from the objectives
of donor governments In relation to the expectations of
recipient governments. Donor governments seek political
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and economic advantages for their countries in addition to
responding to the poorer countries' needs for funds and
technical assistance on humanitarian and global economic
grounds.
White discusses the relationship between the political,
economic and humanitarian motives of donor governments, and
argues that it is illegitimate to separate the
self-interest of governments from the altruistic objectives
of economic development. He proposes four reasons:
- donors have economic interests in providing assistance
as well as political, while recipients see potential
political benefits as well as economic ones.
- political factors may be equally significant as
economic ones in determining how beneficial the
assistance is.
- the economic and political components of assistance
programs are invariably linked.
- there are other actors, with economic and political
interests, in addition to the governments giving and
receiving the assistance, whose actions and influence
need to be taken into account. 41
41. White, Th~e Politics of Foreign Aid, p.7.
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In response to the critics who argue that donors are
deliberately causing harm to recipients through pursuing
their own political and economic objectives, White says:
"It is certainly true that the rich
countries' motives are mixed, and that foreign
policy and export motives play their part. One
would be amazed if it. were otherwise. Unless one
is to assume an exercise in international
hypocrisy of unprecedented complexity, it is
clear that developmental interests also play
their part. The question, surely, is not whether
the aid-givers motives are entirely pure, but
whether in any given situation the combination of
interests at work will promote trends which are
advantageous or disadvantageous to those whom t 4
critical observer would like to see benefited."
Not only do donor governments put forward complicated
and sometimes conflicting justifications for assistance
programs, but different parts of national governments
emphasize different policy objectives, relating either to
domestic or foreign interests.43 These various policy
objectives concern different aspects of development
assistance programs such as overall volume, country
allocation, sector allocation, trade or procurement
42. .idem, p. 21.
43. See Congressional Budget Office, Assisting the
Deyelopino Countries: Forelan Aid and Trade Policies of the
United States, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office,
1980, passim; White, .±.c.it., pp.34-45; Tendler, Judith,
Inside Forelan Aid, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1975. pp.43-50.
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conditions, procedures for review and approval and measures
for control or evaluation. 44
The recipient governments share a detire for additional
resources and a resistance to having to accept conditions -
they prefer to establish their own priorities for
assistance, to spend the funds as they like, to implement
the projects In their own way and to avoid changing their
financial, economic or social policies to suit the donor.
White discusses some of the recipient governments'
policy concerns in seeking development assistance: their
own foreign policies, concerning alignments with developed
countries, trade interests, financial needs and development
priorities. He also notes that some recipient governments
have been more successful at obtaining assistance, either
because of their political alignments, such as Vietnam in
the late 1960's, or because of developmental policies that
were favored by donors, such as Pakistan in the early
1960's. But it is clear that many recipients resent the
dependence implicit in development assistance. 4 5
As In the case of donor governments, recipient
44. The United States Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.,
explicitly sets out an array of policy objectives affecting
most aspects of the U.S. foreign assistance programs.
45. WhIte, aop.sci±., pp.78-82.
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governments are made of institutions that have different
roles and interests. Relationships within recipient
governments become important as a source of influence on
development assistance policies. Finance and planning
ministries tend to play important roles In the processing
and coordination of requests for assistance, while sectoral
ministries play the lead role in the design and
implementation of projects. Attitudes towards donors and
assistance agencies can be very different depending on the
perceived benefits of receiving assistance. 4 6
The task of a development assistance agency is,
therefore, to negotiate ways of disbursing development
assistance that are acceptable both to donor governments
and recipients, and to manage this task on a continuing
basis so that flows are maintained in the face of
considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty results from
changing donor government policies, changing recipient
government policies and the practical difficulties of
disbursing funds for activities that take place overseas,
mainly administered by foreign nationals and usually hard
to implement successfully.
White refers to the position of a development
assistance agency between the donor government and the
46. .ibUd., pp.83-88.
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recipient as the "administrator's dilemma". An agency has
to protect the assistance program from critics and from the
immediate interests of other agencies within the donor
government. An agency's response to this dilemma can
either be to adopt a technocratic approach to managing the
program, independent of any policy debate, or to emphasize
the priorities of recipients or by greater integration into
an international framework for development assistance
policy.47 Tendler makes a similar point, arguing that the
agency needs to follow strategies designed to ensure the
survival of the agency in the face of conflicting demands
and the uncertainty of its environment which may actually
displace the original developmental goals. 4 8
White says:
"Thus the question of donors' objectives has
changed out of all recognition. It is no longer
a question about donor countries, but about donor
agencies. It is no longer a question about these
agencies' objectives, but about the circumstances
that dictate their behavior. What sort of
situations elicit an active response from aid
agencies? What are the rules and constraints
that govern these responses? What power do aid
agencies have to determine the form of their own
respont5s, and in what ways will they use this
power?
47. LLUJ., pp.50-54.
48. Tendler, op.cit., pp.38-45.
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Thus, the agencies themselves, not being the sole
source of development assistance policies, are responsible
for fulfilling the policies of other actors. In so doing,
they inevitably perceive bureaucratic interests of their
own - to maintain or expand their own program, to defend
themselves within their own task-environment and to manage
the uncertainty they face. These interests may conflict
with policy demands from other actors.
The other major source of development assistance
policies comes from the academics and professionals who are
concerned with applying the theories of development
assistance and the practice of allocating, disbursing and
implementing the programs. These actors, whose involvement
as critics, pressure groups, contractors and staff of
development agencies is of considerable importance to the
agencies, are pursuing policies and objectives that are, in
theory, Independent of the direct political and economic
interests of donor or recipient governments. However, they
are able to influence the policies and practices of the
donor governments, the agencies and the recipients and can
thereby shape the various assistance programs to some
extent. Indeed many of the staff of development assistance
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agencies identify professionally and intellectually with
this community more than with other bureaucrats.3 0
Within this community, there has been extensive debate
about the the underlying theories of development assistance
that has had a major impact on assistance policies. The
early emphasis on capital investment, especially industry
and infrastructure, has over time given way to an emphasis
on income redistribution, poverty alleviation and ensuring
the basic needs of the poorest sectors of the
population.5 More recently, there has been pressure on
the agencies to allocate resources to special interests or
sectors, whether it is women in development, population
control, nutrition, human settlements, environmental
protection, education or health.
White discusses the major economic and political
50. Ascher, William, "New Development Approaches and the
Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case of the
World Bank", International Organization, 37:3, 1983,
pp426-428.
S1. See, for example, Chenery, Hollis et al.,
Redistribution with Growth. London, Oxford University
Press, 1974; Myrdal, Gunner, Asian Drama, New York, The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1968; McHale, John and Magda
McHale, Basic Human Needs: A Framework for Action, New
Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1978; Streeten, Paul,
et al., First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in
the Develovino Countries, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1981; Mathieson, John, Basic Needs and the New
Economic International Order, Washington D.C., Overseas
Development Council, 1981; Brandt Commission, North-South:
A Prooram for Survival, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980.
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theories of development and their influence on aid policy,
noting that these theories have responded to the intent of
the donor or recipient governments to influence the flows
of resources.52 The academic and practitioner communities
are interlocked, and some agencies such as the World Bank
devote much effort to analyzing the issues and problems of
development assistance and consequently generate new
theories and modes of operation that influence the
development assistance process overall. Adler provides an
account of the World Bank's thinking, if not action, about
economic development theory and practice.53 Ayres
discusses in detail the World Bank's role in reviewing
development policy, with particular reference to the
emergence of a theory of poverty alleviation.54
To sum up, development assistance agencies are expected
to follow policies set by their political masters -
policies that are not always consistent. They are also
urged to follow policies formulated by the academic and
professional communities concerned with development. But
52. White _ja-±sit., P.104-109.
53. Adler, J.H., "The World Bank's Concept of Development -
An In-House Doomenaeschichte", in Bhagwati, 3. and R.
Eckaus, eds., Development and Plannino, London, Allen and
Unwin, 1972.
54. Ayres, Robert, Banking on__t~e Poor:__The WorldBank and
World Poverty, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983, pp.ZZ-.41,
76-91.
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the agencies tend to perceive their own interests In terms
of their survival and the need to manage and expand their
programs in the face of the expectations and priorities of
recipients over which they have limited control and the
considerable uncertainty of the task they are expected to
perform. Those actors that set the policies of agencies
rarely take into account the limited Influence that
agencies have over the identification and implementation of
projects. Nor do they recognize the uncertainties inherent
in economic development activities. 55
Hoben, in a paper explaining the organizational
environment within the United States Agency for
International Development and how it affects the
anthropological analysis of rural development projects,
reaches the following conclusions that are applicable to
most development agencies:
- the external task-environment in which agencies
operate generate internal organizational objectives
that often conflict with official policies and
professional judgement
55. See Grindle, Merilee, "Anticipating railure: the
Implementation of Rural Development Programs", P.ublic
PolJjsx, 29:1, 1981, pp.51-74; HIrschman, Albert,
flevelanment Proiects Observed. Washington D.C., Brookings
Institution, 1967.
- 72 -
- the most enduring organizational objective is to
manage the program - to obtain funds and obligate them
to recipients
- additional project analysis will be undertaken only to
the extent that it contributes to managing the program
- organizations are not unitary, and the incentives for
following certain policy initiatives vary depending on
the location of decision-makers within the
organization
- central policy units have greater incentives to follow
special policy initiatives than do operational units
- most decisions about projects are made on the basis of
unpredictable opportunities and project analysis
serves to package these decisions for approval
- changes in project design are regarded as costly and
threatening to relations with recipients. 5 6
It is reasonable to expect that the influence of
different sources of development assistance policies and
the way these policies are implemented within the agencies
will vary according to the political and financial
56. Hoben, Allen, "Agricultural Decision-Making in Foreign
Assistance: An Anthropological Analysis", manuscript, 1980,
pp. 3-5.
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structure of the agency.
Tendler, White and Hoben all treat bilateral agencies
as their major cases and go on to generalize some of their
conclusions to other development agencies. For instance,
Tendler, in her study of AID, emphasizes that a bilateral
agency Is predominately affected by the policy interests of
other agencies within the national government and the
concern of politicians for the unpopularity of foreign
assistance with the electorate.5 Bilateral agencies are
also more vulnerable to specific domestic economic
interests or foreign policy relations than other
development agencies. Changes in government, specific
Institutional arrangements, and the shifts in power of
domestic interest groups can have dramatic effects on
bilateral agencies. White, also, argues that bilaterals
cannot protect themselves easily from conflictIng policy
demands and need to devote much of their resources to
ensuring their survival.58 Hoben, on the same theme,
emphasizes the role of Congress in establishing and
changing AID's mandate and amount of effort that the agency
has to devote to demonstrating compliance each year.59
57. Tendler, .ap_..ct., p.38-53.
58. White, o.LcitL., pp.50-54.
59. Hoben, (op. citE., pp.24-37.
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Arnold reviews the relationships of European bilateral
agencies with their government's policies and
administration in the course of an analysis of their
approach to basic needs.60 They all share, to some extent,
a vunerability to their critics and the extreme uncertainty
of the domestic and foreign task-environment in which they
operate.
Multilateral development banks are distinctive on
account of their wide membership, weighted voting and their
need to obtain financial resources from capital markets and
donor contributions. Weighted voting does give the major
subscribers a majority and their combined influence over
matters of bank financial policies and practice is very
strong. But the capacity of an individual subscriber to
Impose its will is limited by the voting power of the other
major subscribers and by the principles of multilateral
assistance, which recipient members and other actors are
likely to protect.61 White points out that multilaterals
are, in principle, autonomous from national policy
objectives, but that they lack effective political power.
Thus their authority to gather resources and pursue
60. Arnold, Steven, Imolementina Develooment Assistance:
rurooean Aoroaches to Basic Needs, Boulder, Westview
Press, 198Z.
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economic development policies depends on maintaining their
reputation as more efficient and professional agencies and
being seen to avoid Individual political goals. However,
White points out that they have to compete for resources
with other agencies, they eaperience similar incentives to
extend and defend their programs and they are vulnerable to
any criticisms of performance or misjudged development
objectives. As a result, the World Bank, especially, and
some regional development banks tend to adopt a
technocratic mode of operation and foster the impression
that they are financially and professionally infallible, at
least, in comparison to other agencies. 6 2
Underlying the Ideology of multilateral development
bank lending, that of objective and professional practice,
the banks subject to the constraints of the financial basis
on which they operate. They have to be very conscious of
their creditworthiness and the financial soundness of their
activities. This reinforces the technocratic approach and
generates a pronounced emphasis on objective economic
criteria for their decisions and actions. 63
Even though multilaterals have more autonomy from
62. White, o.g gpitj~., pp.54-56.
63. Mason and Asher, The World Bank Since Bre tton Woods
1973, pp. 247-254.
- 76 -
national political objectives, they do depend on their main
donor members for financial support and consequently have
to appeal to these contributors on the basis of the
functions they perform. Once again, their technical
competence and command of overall economic development
issues is crucial.64 This produces a curious dilemma.
They need to be at the forefront of the analysis and
response to current economic development problems but they
are reluctant to take risks that might undermine their
financial or professional reputation.
Ayres, in his study of the World Bank's poverty
alleviation policy, asserts that there is a discrepancy
between the Bank's contribution to development theory and
its practice within its own lending program. The Bank's
efforts to implement a poverty alleviation strategy were
constrained by the reluctance of the staff to promote
activities that are hard to implement and more uncertain
than traditional sectors. The dominant preoccupation with
64 . Wh it e, a..s..i±t.1, pp .58-59 .
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hard economic criteria and financial soundness does not
easily yield to the implementation of developmental
objectives.65 Crane and Finkle make very similar
observations about the Bank's population program.66
Ascher, in an article about the resistance of the Bank
to new policy initiatives, points out that multilaterals do
enjoy considerable autonomy from their members and that the
staff have the capacity to resist policy initiatives that
might undermine their capacity to manage uncertainty or to
maintain technical control of their activities. In
addition, the professional and intellectual standing of
Bank staff allows them to resist policy initiatives more
easily than in other types of agencies. He also notes that
the pattern of resistance to change conforms to the
ideology of strict economic criteria, technical certainty
and managerial control. Staff asked to sacrifice this
ideology for a new policy initiative will resist. 6 7
The United Nations and its specialized agencies are, of
65. Ayres, op.D.cit., pp.51-75.
66. Crane, B. and J. Finkle, "Organizational Impediments to
Development Assistance: the World Bank's Population
Program", World Politics, 33:4, 1981, pp.516-553.
67. Ascher, William, "New Development Approaches and the
Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case of the
World Bank", International Organization, 37:3, Summer 1983,
pp.415-439.
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course, much more than a system for providing development
assistance. The UN system is a political forum and a
system of providing political and technical services to
members that also incorporates the UNDP and the agencies
used by the UNDP to execute its projects. Because of the
equal voting principle, the major donors have less chance
to impose their priorities or policies on UN development
assistance. Recipient governments, at the global level,
can insist on their own priorities and the obligation of
donors to provide more resources. They can also gain
control of the country programming function of the UNDP and
thereby influence the selection of projects for funding
better than with other donors. But it is also the case
that the Secretariats of the executing agencies enjoy
considerable autonomy from the recipients of the assistance
at an operational level. 6 8
The importance to UN agencies of extra-budgetary funds,
from UNDP and other sources, has been mentioned earlier in
this chapter. The Secretariats have a strong incentive to
expand their development assistance programs, but are
relatively independent in its execution. Although, the UN
system agrees on broad development policy strategies and
goals in the context of global conferences and action plans
68. White, aon- cit., p.63: Cox and Jacobson, O.tCsf.,
pp. 423-436.
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or General Assembly resolutions, these goals rarely are
transformed into specific objectives or operating
principles. Programmatic goals are the basis for judging
performance and secretariat staff have an incentive to meet
targets and process disbursements. But the mechanisms for
technical review or evaluation of UN development assistance
projects are not strong and more stringent procedures are
resisted by the majority of developing countries. 6 9
69. White, .a. .Jit., p.62.
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CHAPTER 3
Development Assistance and the Environment
Introduc tion
The previous chapter addressed the issue of how
development assistance agencies function In relation to
their political and organizational environment. This
chapter discusses the relationship between development
assistance and the physical and biological environment.
The first part considers how the flows of development
assistance affect environmental quality and environmental
policy-making in developing countries. The second part
reviews the response of development assistance agencies to
the issues identified in the first part.
The Effects of Development Assistance on the Environment
Developing countries face a wider range of
environmental problems than developed countries, but have
less experience and money for dealing with them.
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Industries and vehicles generate pollution, waste needs to
be disposed of and physical development encroaches on
unspoilt land in developing countries - but governments
often place less value on solving these problems compared
to other priorities or they lack the mechanisms for
controlling the responsible actors. However, these
problems are only a part of the critical environmental
concerns facing developing countries. The need for
economic development has a more extensive and fundamental
relationship with the state of natural systems and
renewable resources.
First, the need for economic development means that a
greater part of the economy and the population is dependent
on primary resources, either in terms of producing food and
agricultural products for consumption or exporting raw or
processed natural products. On the one hand, low levels of
income and productivity force populations to put stress on
the natural resource base - by bringing marginal land into
cultivation or cutting down trees for firewood - without
the possibility of ensuring the long-term productivity of
natural systems. On the other hand, every effort to
intensify production and increase the utilization of
natural resources risks upsetting the ecological balance on
which productivity depends. New farming systems dependent
on chemical inputs, land clearance, harnessing of
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hydro-power and more intense harvesting of forests can all
be undermined by Inadequate attention to the sustainable
use of natural systems.
Planned economic development, much of which is funded
by development assistance agencies, can influence the
relationship between less developed economies and natural
resources in several ways. First, these efforts often take
the form of rural development projects aimed at increasing
incomes and levels of production in areas where
environmental stress is already evident. Unless, these
projects specifically take account of the relationship
between rural populations and the natural systems they are
often forced to overuse, there is a risk of increasing the
pressure on marginal lands, depleted sources of woodfuel
and inadequate water supply. Second, development projects
often explicitly modify or intensify the way natural
systems are used - especially when introducing
infrastructure such as irrigation or clearing land for
cultivation or when intensifying farming systems with new
seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Unless these
interventions take account of the ecological balance of
natural systems, there is a risk that increased
productivity cannot be sustained or that resources become
exhausted and depleted. Third, development projects have
the capacity in almost all cases to impose environmental
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impacts on other development sectors or other resource
users, whether in the form of Pollution or interruption of
natural processes or loss of access to productive
resources. When these impacts occur, they impose costs on
other actors or sectors. Often, those sustaining the
impacts are the least able to benefit from the development
that causes it and least able to correct the situation.
In any of these relationships, it seems clear that the
benefits of economic development are diminished by
inadequate environmental planning. In the first case,
development projects risk reducing the productive resource
base on which rural populations depend. In the second
case, the investment itself is put at risk by the
possibility of extensive loss of natural resource
productivity - for instance, when forest is cleared for
crops or livestock but cannot sustain intense uSe. In the
third case, costs are imposed on other sectors or parts of
the population that may be inequitable and irreversible.
In terms of achieving developmental benefits, I would
argue that environmental planning pays off both in the
short- and long-term. The issue that I shall be focussing
on is what influences the response of development
assistance agencies to the potential benefits of improved
environmental planning. I have already discussed, in the
previous chapter, how developmental objectives are not the
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only target of development assistance agency policies and
how the agencies themselves do not always behave in ways
that maximize developmental benefits. What follows is a
more detailed examination of the relationship of
development assistance agencies and environmental
policies.
1. Environmental Damage and Degradation.
Probably the first significant scientific assertion of
the environmental damage caused by development projects was
.rovided by the "Careless Technology" conference in 1968,
sponsored by the Conservation Foundation and Washington
University, St. Louis, held at Airlie House, Virginia, and
the subsequent publication of the proceedings. The volume
presented a large number of case studies of the effects of
development projects on health and nutrition, of the
environmental problems of irrigation and water davelopment,
the intensification of plant and animal productivity and of
special problems of environmental degradation.1
Barry Commoner, in his summary of the conference, says:
"The conference has recorded a long roster of
1. Farvar, M.T., and J.P. Milton, eds., The Careless
Technology: Ecoloov and International Development, New
York, Doubleday, Natural History Press, 1972.
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ecological mistakes which have accompanied the
introduction of new technological advances into
underdeveloped countries. Some of the problems
have been small, transitory and remediable...
Other problems, however, such as the shoreline
erosion caused by dam projects on the Nile, have
been massive and essentially irreversible...
Are these difficulties, large or small, only
the accidents of progress...? If so, little more
need be said about them. For, given the enormous
benefits that have accrued from the new power
plants, irrigation systems and health programs, a
further recitation of accidents would be
graceless. On the other hand, if these
widespread ecological mistakes are not the random
accidents of progress, but rather the systematic
consequences of some deep fault in our approach
to technological development, the matter becomes
more serious...
In my view, the ecological mistakes that have
been reported in this conference reflect a grave
and systematic fault in the overall approach
which has thus far guided most international
development programs. Although each new
technology that is introduced into an
underdeveloped country impinges on a complex
natural system, we have generally failed to take
into account the effects of this technological
intrusion on the properties - indeed the very
stability - of the system as a whole... In some
cases, such ecological backlash has destroyed Pe
effectiveness of the intended program itself."
As one of the outcomes of this conference, the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN) and the Conservation Foundation, sponsored
a book that examined more closely the impact of development
projects on the environment, particularly on those
2. Commoner, Barry, "Summary of the Conference: On the
Meaning of Ecological Failures in International
Development", in Farvar and Milton, oap~.s.it., pp.xxi-xxii.
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ecosystems subject to heavy development pressure, and
proposed ecological principles for avoiding such problems
in the course of economic development.3
During the preparation of UN Conference on the Human
Environment at Stockholm, the issue of environmental damage
caused by development was a matter of some political
debate. There was a special meeting on environment and
development, convened at Founex in Switzerland, at which
the serious concerns of the developing countries became
evident. The poorer countries did not want environmental
standards imposed on them by developed countries, fearing
that such standards would hamper their economic development
opportunities. Nor did they want their trade prospects
further compromised by forcing up their production costs.
However they did allow an important distinction between the
pollution of affluence and the pollution of poverty.
Provided the standards applied to the pollution of
affluence should not be imposed on them, and provided the
attention to the pollution of poverty should be funded
additionally to existing development programs, then they
recognized the environmental problems associated with
development assistance. The meetings produced a rough
3. Dasmann, R., J.P. Milton and P.H. Freeman, Ecological
Principles for Economic Develonment, London, John Wiley and
Sons, 1973.
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typology of environmental degradation and the categories of
development activities that tended to cause environmental
problems.4
Since the Stockholm Conference, there has been a
continuous stream of literature about the environmental
damage of economic development and the severe environmental
degradation problems experienced by developing countries.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has
published an annual State of the Environment Report. UNEP
also has published an array of reports and guidelines in
conjunction with other UN and international organizations
on this subject. The IUCN, Unesco Man and the Biosphere
Program, the International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED) via its Earthscan operation and the
Worldwatch Institute have each published their own series
of reports on the environmental problems of development.
In addition books by Dworkin, Eckholm, Goudie, Myers,
Brown, Ruddle and Manshard, the OECD and the National
Research Council have repeated the message that economic
4. United Nations, "Re;Qrt of a Panel of Experts Convened
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Human
Environment", (The Founex Report), Annex I, U.N.
Doc.A/CQNF.48/1O, 1971. See also Ward, Barbara and Rene
Dubos, Onlyv Qns Earth, New York, Norton, 1972; Lee, James,
"Environmental Considerations in Development Finance" in
David Kay and Eugene Skolnikoff, eds., Work! Eco-Crisis:
international Oraantzation in Response., Madison, University
of Wisconsin Press, 1972, pp.171-182.
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development causes direct environmental damages or fails to
ensure the long-term productivity of natural systems. 5
The problems most frequently cited are:
desertification, soil erosion, deforestation, pollution
from pesticides and fertilizers, salinity associated with
irrigation, inadequate watershed protection, damage to
coastal ecosystems, especially mangroves, exhaustion of
tropical soils, loss of genetic resources and health risks,
such as waterborne diseases. 6
The extent of this literature and the continued reports
of the depletion of natural resources and incidence of
environmental impacts from economic development activities
S. Dworkin, D.M., ed., Environment and DleveloDment,
Indianapolis, SCOPE Miscellaneous Publication, 1974;
Eckholm, Eric, Down to Earth: Environment and Human Needs,
New York, Norton, 1982; idam, Losing.Ground, New York,
Norton, 1976; tdem, The Picture of Health, New York,
Norton, 1977; Goudie, Andrew, TheHuman Impatt, Cambridge,
Mass., MIT Press, 1982; Myers, Norman, the Conversion of
Trpoical.Moist rorests, Washington D.C., National Academy
of Sciences, 1980; idem, The Sinking Ark, New York,
Pergamon, 1979; Brown, Lester, Building a Sustainable
Soci.etv, New York, Norton, 1981; Ruddle, Kenneth and
Walther Manshard, Renewable Natural Resources-an
Environment, Dublin, Tycooly International, 1981; OECD,
Economic and Ecological Interdenendence, Paris,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1982; National Research Council, Ecological Asects of
Develospment in the Humid Tropics, Washington D.C., National
Academy Press, 1982.
6. Eckholm, o.citsf.; H-oldgate, Martin, Mohammed Kassas anf
Gilbert White, The World Environment 1972-1982, Dublin,
Tycooly International, 1982.
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prompts a question. How can development assistance
agencies whose manifest purpose is to promote development
that is sustainable and equitable continue to allocate
large amounts of financial resources to projects that
suffer from environmental problems and that cause
environmental impacts? Development assistance agencies
continue to finance land colonization schemes that are
ecologically unsustainable, Irrigation projects that become
saline, hydroelectric projects that pose health risks and
fail to prevent deforestation and soil erosion within their
catchment area and agricultural schemes that require
increasing amounts of fertilizer and pesticide from year to
year. Such projects deplete the resource base for future
development, impose costs and burdens on parts of the
population and can undermine the financial and technical
basis of the investment Itself. This is the question that
I am trying to answer throughout this study
It is not that the problem has gone unnoticed, either
on the part of the environmental staff of development
agencies or the environmental lobbies that put pressure on
the agencies to strengthen their environmental policies.
For the past decade, environmental staff members of some
development assistance agencies have taken a spe'ific
interest in the state of the environment in developing
countries, and have examined closely the types of
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development projects that risk causing specific
environmental damage or the sectors where environmental
degradation is most serious. This has resulted in the
publication of a considerable amount of material on the
environmental problems of development assistance,
guidelines for environmental planning or management and
studies of particular sectors or ecological zones.7.
However, the evidence on the contribution of actual
projects to environmental damage and stress is less well
documented. Development assistance agencies are reluctant
to "name names" and possibly cause embarrassment to
themselves or the recipient governments. Environmental
organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense
Council, JUON, IIED, National Wildlife Federation and
Environmental Policy Institute have tried to document
specific examples. They have accumulated evidence about
particular sectors, such as the exploitation of tropical
forests, destruction of mangroves and environmental hazards
of large dams - however this type of evidence tends to
focus on the aggregate environmental damages of development
in a particular area rather than attributing damage to
specific projects. In 1983, environmental lobbies h&d the
7. See Horberry, John, Environmental Guidelines Survey: An
Analysis of the Environmental Procedures and Guidelines
Governing Develoiment Aid, London, Joint Environmental
Service of lIED and IUCN, 1983.
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opportunity to testify to the United States Congress, House
Banking Committee on the subject of the environmental
effects of multilateral development bank lending. On this
occasion, the environmental organizations marshalled their
evidence on the impact of specific projects and set in
motion a process for investigating this issue more
systematically. 8
But it Is also difficult to identify the precise
environmental effects of individual projects after their
implementation. Much of the agencies' project evaluation
work does not focus on environmental problems and what does
is not easily available outside the agencies.
Environmental organizations have collected some evidence
from agencies' own evaluations of projects that have had
undesirable impacts. One result of the hearings mentioned
above was that the U.S. Treasury Department requested the
U.S. Executive Directors of multilateral development banks
to respond to the testimony. Both the formal and informal
response provided more data on the environmental effects on
specific projects than had previously been available. For
instance, several World Bank project evaluation reports
8. United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on
International Development Institutions and Finance of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
Environmental Impact of Multilateral Dlevelopment
Bank-runded Projtects. Hearings, 97-3?, 98 Cong. 1st sess.
Washington D.C., Government Printing OffIce, 1983.
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that identified specific environmental impacts were
released from the Bank; the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank formally described examples of projects
with undesirable impacts in response to requests for
further information.9 In Chapters 5,6, & 7, 1 examine some
of the evidence of environmental impacts from AID, World
Bank and FAQ projects in detail.
In my experience from talking to staff members of
different development assistance agencies, most are aware
of the overall problem of the relationship between economic
development and the environment. They are also aware of
specific cases where the activities of their funding agency
have encountered environmental problems. Their views on
whether the environmental policies of their agency are
strong enough or adequately implemented vary considerably,
depending in part on their role within the organization.
ly concern is that despite policies for environmental
planning and assessment, development assistance agencies
9. World Bank, "Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy:
Response to Statements of Environmental Organizations Sent
by the U.S Executive Director", Washington D.C, JanuaryI1th, 1984; Asian Development Bank, "Memo on U.S.
Congressional Hearings on MDB Environmental Policy: Request
for Additional Information", Manila, Infrastructure
Department, 10 November, 1983; See also Hanson A.,
"Environmental Considerations in Foreign-Donor-Supported
Projects: Some Experiences in Indonesia", Research Report
1, East-West Environment and Policy Institute, 1981.
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continue to fund projects without adequate environmental
analysis or mitigation. Later in this chapter, I shall
discuss some of the efforts agencies have made and what
environmental organizations have proposed to improve the
situation. Finally, I shall try to link this material to
the previous chapter to suggest a way to understand what
determines the environmental response of development
assistance agencies.
2. Environmental Policy, Planning and Management.
The other major aspect of the relationship between
development assistance and tt- environment concerns the
weakness of environmental policies and institutions for
environmental planning and management in developing
countries. Starting from the Stockholm Conference in 1972,
UNEP and other international organizations have urged the
development assistance organizations to examine and respond
to the policy-making and institutional needs of developing
countries. The Declaration on the Human Environment and
the Action Plan, the main products of the Stockholm
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Conference, both propose that development assistance
agencies allocate resources to the efforts of nations to
address their own environmental problems. 1 0
There is a limited amount of literature on difficulties
that developing countries face in establishing
environmental policies and institutions. It is commonly
assumed that governments neglect environmental problems In
favor of immediate economic objectives, that there is
little public support for environmental policies and that
those who suffer from environmental damage have almost no
political power. When environmental institutions are
created, they have great difficulty in influencing powerful
sectoral agencies and rarely have the authority to enforce
legislation or regulations.
A study by the East-West Environment and Policy
Institute cites a number of problems facing developing
10. See United Nations, "Report of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment", U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.48/14, 1972.
11. See Shane, Jeffrey, "Environmental Law in -the
Developing Countries of Southeast Asia", in Colin
MacAndrews and Chia Lin Sien, eds., Develooina Economies
and the Environment: The Southeast Asian Exerience,
Singapore, McGraw-H1Iill Southeast Asia Series, 1979; Morell
D. , and H.J. Leonard, "Emergence of Environmental Concern
In Developing Countries: A Political Perspective", StanIford
Journal of International Law. June 1981; Leonard, H.J.,
Divestina Nature's Caoital: The Political Economy of
Environmental Abuse in the Third World, New York, Holmes
and Meier, 1984.
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countries In this context, including:
- Inadequate monitoring and enforcement of existing
environmental protection laws and regulations
- the urgency of current Income-producing activities at
the expense of long-term protection of natural systems
- difficulties in controlling the environmental effects
of private and public sector developments
- shortage of technical and administrative expertise
- widespread market failures
- minimal participation in environmental planning by the
public or other government agencies.12
In contrast, Abel and Stocking blame Western policies,
project appraisal methods and planning approaches for the
difficulties developing countries face in addressing
environmental damages. They assert that policies and
project appraisal methods imported from the West reflect
the preoccupation of planners with economic efficiency and
technology and their "functionalist" view of society. As a
result development projects fail to respond to local needs
12. Hufschmidt et al., Environment. Natural Systems and
DleveloDpment, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983, pp.6-7.
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and complex patterns of interests within society. Among
the costs of this state of affairs is the environmental
degradation that persists in developing countries. 1 3
James, however, argues that the failure of decision-makers
in developing countries to take account of environmental
effects reflects both the distribution of political power
In favor of those likely to benefit from environmental
impacts and also the lack of interdisciplinary analysis
necessary to encompass the complex interactions of natural
systems. 14
Several of the major development assistance agencies
have contributed to the analysis of the problems of
environmental policy in developing countries. For
instance, the World Health Organization organized a
symposium on "environmental quality planning and policy in
developing countries" in 1977 which found similar
explanations of weak environmental policy as those put
13. Abel, Nick and Michael Stocking, "The Experience of
Underdeveloped Countries", in T. O'Riordan and W.R.D.
Sewell, ProJLctLAnoraial and.PolicyReview New York, John
Wiley and Sons, 1981, pp.253-296.
14. James, Jeffrey, "Growth, Technology and the Environment
in Less Developed Countries: A Survey", World Develoment,
Vol. 6, P.949.
IS. WHO, "Environmental Quality Planning and Policy in
Developing Countries: Report on an Interregional
Symposium", Geneva, World Health Organization, DIS/77.1,
1977.
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furward by the East-West Environment and Policy
Institute.1 The United States Agency for International
Development (AID) prepared a report for Congress in 1979 on
"environmental and natural resource management in
developing countries" which concluded that:
"The governments of many developing nations
have begun to recognize the importance of these
issues, but the inability of indigenous
government institutions to manage resources and
protect environmenlgl quality often precludes
effective action."
The report discusses the prerequisites to an effective
institutional response to environmental problems:
government commitment to addressing the conflicts between
economic development and sustainable utilization of natural
resources; a government agency structure and administration
that can coordinate the actions of different sectoral
agencies and monitor and evaluate the effects on the
environment; linkage between the environmental focal point
and the planning and budgeting function so that
environmental considerations are taken into account;
environmental law to define and allow enforcement of
responsibilities for environmental protection; data about
the vulnerability of natural resources, implications of
16. United States. Agency for International Development,
"Environmental and Natural Resource Management in
Developing Countries: A Report to Congress", Washington
D.C., 1979, p.ix.
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alternative uses and risks from pollution sources;
appropriate training and environmental education for
professionals and the public. It concludes that
development assistance should provide resources and
technical assistance for institution strengthening for
environmental policy in developing countries.17
AID subsequently sponsored a study comprising four
cases of the legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of
environmental and natural resources management in
developing countries. This study, carried out by IIED,
indicated that the key variables governing the success of
environmental policy are interdepartmental coordination,
consensus about objectives and communication with the
public. Too much fragmentation of governmental
responsibilities, too little authority for environmental
institutions and too few coordinating mechanisms all
contributed to poor performance by environmental agencies.
The report proposes environmental management strategies for
both very poor countries and middle-income developing
countries.
17. £ijtd.., pp7-24.
18. lIED, "Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Aspects of
Environmental and Natural Resource Management in Developing
Countries", (AID/NPS Natural Resources Project), Washington
D.C., International Institute for Environment and
Development, 1981, pp.141-186.
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The Ministry of Development Cooperation of the Federal
Republic of Germany recently sponsored an extensive survey
oi the experience of developing countries with formal
environmental planning methods, in particular environmental
impact assessment, in order to identify needs to which the
development assistance community could respond. 9 The
conclusions of this report were that formal assessment
methods were unlikely to be effective without the
appropriate legislation, administrative authority and
capacity to integrate the results into decision-making
procedures. Development assistance agencies should provide
resources for improving the institutional capacity of
developing country governments rather than produce more
methodological and technical guidance.
In my view, the overall goal of environmental
protection and sustainable management of natural resources
in developing countries cannot be achieved without national
policy making and implementation capacity. There is
clearly a role for development assistance agencies in
supporting the growth of this capacity among their other
program goals. In the context of this study, I do not
think this objective poses any serious problem for
19. Horberry, John, "Status and Application of
Environmental Impact Assessment for Development", Gland,
Conservation for Development Centre, IUCNJ, 1984.
- 100 -
development assistance agencies to the extent that they
have the latitude to allocate resources to institutional
strengthening and technical assistance as a whole. What
limits their response is the interest on the part of
developing countries for this type of support.
The Institutional Response
The response of the development assistance agencies to
the two sets of problems discussed above - namely the
environmental impact of development projects and the need
for better environmental policy-making and planning in
developing countries - is highlighted by three events that,
if they do not directly account for changes in the
priorities and policies of these agencies, are symbolic of
changes within the international machinery for
development.
rirst, there was the Stockholm Conference, with its
extensive preparatory efforts, and the establishment of
UNEP following the Conference. This initiative widened the
concern of international organizations for environmental
problems to Include the distinctive environmental problems
of developing countries - the pollution of poverty. It
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also asserted the responsibility of the UN system and
development assistance organizations for providing
additional resources to address the problems of
environmental degradation and to support the efforts of
developing countries to find their own solutions. 2 0
Second, the publication of the World Conservation
Strategy by the IUCN in 1980 marked a convergence between
the environmental organizations which had promoted the
issue of environmental protection and resource
conservation, first in the developed world and later
globally, and the development community. Many
environmental groups had regarded the development
assistance agencies and their clients as the cause of the
depletion and destruction of natural resources and
wildlife. The World Conservation Strategy explicitly
argued that the sustainable utilization of natural
resources was essential for successful economic development
and that economic development provided opportunities for
better resource management and conservation . The IUCN,
with financial support from UNEP and the World Wildlife
Fund, and in cooperation with the FAO and Unesco, addressed
20. See Juda, Lawrence, "International Environmental
Concern: Perspectives of and Implications for Developing
States", 'in David Qrr and Marvin Soroos, eds., TheGlobal
Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order, Chapel
Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1979,
pp. 90-107.
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the persistent conflict between conservation organizations,
which supported environmental protection and natural
resource conservation, and the development practitioners,
whose priority was to promote economic development
production, albeit with some attempt to avoid environmental
damage. While the strategy is essentially a clarion call
for "sustainable development", the IUCN has promoted its
endorsement by international organizations, development
assistance agencies and governments. Currently, the IUCN
is promoting the implementation of National Conservation
Strategies by governments in all parts of the world. 21
Third, in 1980 the major multilateral development
finding agencies, led by the World Bank, signed a
"Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures
Relating to Economic Development", under the auspices of
UNEP.22 At the time of signing, only the World Bank, and to
21. IUCN, World Conservation Strateoy, Gland, International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
1980; idem, "National Conservation Strategies: A Report to
Development Assistance Agencies on Progress and Priorities
in Planning for Sustainable Development", Gland,
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, 1983.
22. UNEP, "Declaration of Environmental Policies and
Procedures Relating to Economic Development", Nairobi,
UNEP/WG.31/2, 1979.
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a much lesser extent the Inter-American Development Bank,
the Organization of American States and the UNDP, had any
policy for the environmental review of their funding
programs.23 The Declaration formally committed the
signatories to adopt or continue systematic review of
development activities under consideration for finance to
ensure environmental protection and sustainable development
and to provide support for environmental management
projects and for technical assistance designed to improve
the indigenous capacity for environmental policy and
planning.24 UNEP also established a Committee of
International Development Institutions on the Environment
(CIDIE), composed of the environmental staff of the
Declaration signatories who meet annually to review the
implementation of the Declaration.25 Within the bilateral
community, the DAC, the committee of bilateral development
assistance agencies of OECD members, in cooperation with
the Environment Committee of OECD have discussed the
23. See Stein, Robert and Brian Johnson, Banking on the
Biosphere? Environmental Practices and Procedures of Nine
Multilateral Development Agencies., Lexington, Lexington
Books, 1979.
24. UNEP, op. cit., pp.1-2.
25. UNEP, "First Session of the Commit tee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment: Report of the
Meeting", Nairobi, UNEP/WG.S0/1, 1980.
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possibility of a parallel commitment by members but have
not taken such a step. 2 6
The specific responses of individual development
assistance agencies are varied. Almost all agencies have
an office or focal point for environmental affairs. Their
activities are essentially of two sorts. First, the
agencies formulate policy statements, introduce formal
procedures and prepare appropriate methods and technical
guidance for the environmental review of projects they
intend to finance. Second, they expand or reorientate
their funding programs to include environmental sector
projects, technical assistance and institutional
strengthening.27
The first set of activities are preventative. The
principle is that if the agency can ensure the examination
of project proposals early enough, potential environmental
problems can be predicted and the necessary modifications
to project design and implementation can be secured. For
26. OECD, DevelopmentCQooceration: The Efforts and Policies
of the Membersn of the D.JeveloQpMent Assistance CoQmmit tee.
1982 Review, Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1982, pp.I01-109.
27. See Stein and Johnson, op... cit..; Johnson, Brian and
Robert Blake, The. Environment and Bilateral Development
&Id, London and Washington D.C., International Institute
for Environment and Development, 1980; Horberry,
Environmental Guidelines Survev. pp.13-19.
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this to happen, the environmental staff needs the authority
or influence to intervene in the project cycle and bring
about changes. They also need procedures and methods of
analysis that allow them to predict environmental effects.
Finally, they need technical information and guidelines
relating to the environmental problems of different sectors
or types of projects. 2 8
To integrate environmental analysis into the regular
project cycle is not only technically demanding, requiring
methods of predicting the effects of what is always an
uncertain undertaking, but it is an activity that often
complicates and sometimes delays the process of preparing
and approving projects for funding. In organizations which
place a premium on extending their programs and sustaining
their volume of disbursals, it is likely that the staff
responsible for managing the project cycle will resist
additional layers of project analysis, particularly one
28. Rees, Colin, "Environmental Management in Relation to
the Project Cycle", paper submitted to the Fourth Meeting
of CIDIE, New York, 1983, UNEP/CIDIE/83.3. See also
Horberry, John and Brian Johnson, "Recommendations on the
Use of Procedures and Guidelines for Environmental Planning
and Assessment within the European Development Fund",
London, Joint Environmental Service of IIED and IUCN, 1983;
Luke, Robert, "The Environmental Practices of the United
Nations Development Programme: Critique and
Recommendations", New York, United Nations Development
Programme, 1980; FAQ, "Report of the Ad-Hoc Sub-Group of
the IDWG on Environment and Energy on Environmental
Assessment of Field Projects", Rome, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, 1983.
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that explicitly looks for the negative effects of
projects.
In addition to institutional resistance to
environmental analysis, often the project staff of
development agencies consist mainly of economists,
engineers and agronomists, who are not always
professionally sympathetic to environmental issues. The
economists' job usually consists of calculating the
expected rate of return of a project, which is difficult
enough withou oeing required to take account of damages
that cannot easily be quantified or economically
evaluated. Engineers and ;gronoiaists tend to be trained to
change the environment in ordtr to increase production, and
are not prone to consider the systemic interactions within
and between natural systems.
The environmental staffs of development assistance
agencies have certain strategies open to them in trying to
influence the project cycle. First, they can try to gain
access to the earliest stages in order to influence the
identification and initial preparation of projects where
resistance is likely to be less. Second, they can prepare
checklists and analysis routines for project staff to
follow and they can prepare guidelines for environmental
planning and management that anticipate the most serious
types of damage. Third, they can try to educate and
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TABLE 6 THE PROJECT CYCLE
World Bank
Project Identification
Referral,* | Rpetern
LSector MissionI Economic Minion
Preparatio
Studies Alternatives]
Preliminariy Financial Analy sis
Appra"s
OL anraIona u.*il ew
Review
VMnaGemenrPI5t I E HA'
Negotiations
Asian Devlopment Bank
Project identification
Contact Mission Economic Mion
Project identification Mission
Negtiations
Board Approval
Implementat ion
ConstructionI
Prcrement E nslantI
Suprvis zon
Borrower Reports Bank Minions
Compteion
Post Audit
--- Supervision and E xecution -
Borr Reort Bank Miaw.ns
Procurement Costruction Consultants
Completion
LPost Audit
Sources: Adapted from Baum, Warren C., "The Project Cycle" in Finance and Development
(Washington, IBRD, June 1970), and Asian Development Bank, "Questions and Answers"
(Manila, AsDB, April 1977).
'Referral projects are those brought forward by new borrowers interested in having bank
assistance.
bRepeater loans are given to a past borrower for subsequent stages of development of the
same or a similar project.
cContact missions are sent regularly to developing member countries for discussions with
the authorities concerned.
dLTAC is the Loan and Technical Assistance Coordinating Committee.
VOEHA is the Office of Environmental and Health Affairs.
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Bard Approval
TABLE 7 THE WORLD DANK'S PROJECT CYCLE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
Operations evaluation
Department: Post-Audit
o rOg tunity- for environ- Etages of thr projact cycle
,Source: World Bank, "Environmental Requirements of the
World Bank", Washington D.C., 1982.
WId Baak-2370
SOI.
imnpaco uevio
' Montitoring lSpevso
TABLE 8 ENVIRONMENTAL INPUT INTO THE PROJECT CYCLE
Project Statls0
t. ldentifition
Selettion by Lank and borrowers of projects that support national
and sectoral development strategies and are feasible according .to
Bank standards. These projects are them incorporated inte the
lending program of the lank for a particular Country. /
2. Preparation
Barrowing country or agency examines technical, instttional,
economic and financial aspects of proposed project. Rank
providen guidance, and makes financial assistance available for
preparatis, or helps borrower obtain assistance froe other
cources. Thi takes typically one to two years.
3. Araisal
Vank staff review comprehensively and systematically all aspects
of the prdject. This may take three to five weeks in the field
and covers four major aspectai technical, financial. An
appraisal report is prepared on the return of Bank staff to
heamquearere and is reviewed extensively. This report serves as
the basis for negotiations with the borrower.
4. Negotations.
Thits tage Involves discassicns with the borrower on time measuree
nedcied to ensusre succeess for the project. Thu agretmenre reached
are emsheomied in loan documents. Tim project is then presented to
the Execetive Directors of thie Bank for approval. After approval
the loan agreement is signed. The project than goem into Its
ispleentatlon tage-
5. Implementation amid Seupervislon
The iorrower Is reuionsihle for implementation of the project
that Ias boon agreed with the Bink. The sBank is responsibLe toe
supervisinp, that impeientation, through progress reports from
the burrnwr and periodic fild visits. A six-month review of
Rank asuiervislon experienco on all projects underway continually
Improves policles AmNi procedares.
6. Evaluation
This Js the) ant etage. It follows the final diahursnmnnt of
Rank funds for the projmct. An independent departmenmt of the
Bank, Lite Operations Evaluiatiun Department, reviews the
cuspletione report (PCt) of tho lank'a projects staff, nnd
prep.res ita own assdit of the project, often by reviewing
materials at headquarters, and oe-site where needemi. This
ex-post evaluation provides lessons of experience wihich are built
into subsequent identificatlon, preparation or appraisal work.
Levitoamnatal input
Economic and secto: work containing envIronmental
aialyim aind natural resource assessments Improve
the mix of projects. Envitonmental reconnAissance
miss to . by Bank or consultants scopes work
needed.
Pre-teasibility and fesi'bility studies address
all major environsental aspects and integrate thea
into project design. Bank assists with terms of
reference (TOR's) and revievs reports is draft
from time country of their consultants.
iwtailed design includes preventive measures for
potontially adverse envirommental impacts.
OEA formally reviews appraisal report.
Environmental agreements are reached during
negotiations. This loan document may include
covenants on environmental progress.
Environanntal measures are implemented during
construction. Supervision ensures that such
measures function adequately. Ketrofitting or
adjustment to environmental measures made when
necessary.
Environmental problems and mitigatory measures
implemnuted are examined in this ex-post
evaluation. The accuracy of pro-project problem
identification and the efficacy of mitIgatory
measures are evaluated. The results serve as
important 'feedback" for future work.
Source:'World Bank, "Environmental Requirements of the
0
I
sensitize project staff to environmental concerns,
promoting such concepts as sustainable development,
carrying capacity and the economic costs of environmental
damage, so that policing the project cycle becomes less
29
necessary.
It seems to me from the published material and from
observation of the efforts of CDIE and the DAC to
coordinate the environmental policies of agencies that very
few agencies have given their environmental staff the
authority to enforce the integration of environmental
analysis into the project cycle. Furthermore, development
assistance agencies do not have complete control over the
projects they finance, particularly during implementation.
It also seems clear from talking to environmental officers
in the agencies that the recipient governments resist
requirements to perform environmental analysis prior to
submitting project proposals or conditions governing their
implementation. The difficulties of persuading recipient
29. See the annual progress reports of CIDIE members in
UNEP, "Meeting of the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment: Summary
Record", Nairobi, 1981, 1982, 1983. See also Inter-American
Development Bank, "The Inter-American Development Bank and
the Environment", Washington D.C., 1983: Joint Nordic
Committee of Senior Officials for Development Assistance
Questions, "Miljo och bistand: Ymparisto ja Kehitysapu",
Stockholm, NU 1982:9; Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau,
"Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment of Pro jects
Promoted under Financial Cooperation", Frankfurt, 1983.
- 111-
governments to follow up on environmental planning efforts
are very clear to agency environmental staff.
The second set of activities are likely to meet less
resistance within development assistance agencies.
Initiating new lending sectors, such as environmental
management or pollution control, or finding new
institutional clients for technical assistance activities,
such as environmental agencies in recipient countries, can
help to expand the agency's program without conflict with
its operational principles and procedures.
Over the past few years development agencies have
devoted increasing amounts of resources to funding
environmental sector projects, such as pollution control,
reforestation and forest management, soil conservation,
erosion control, and conservation areas.30 They have also
provided funds and technical assistance to recipient
30. See, for instance, World Bank, "Wildland Management in
World Bank Projects: A Policy Proposal", Office of
Environmental And Scientific Affairs, Washington D.C.,
1984, Annex I.
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governments for strengthening environmental agencies,
policy analysis, environmental profiles, training and
information management.31 They have initiated
environmental planning and management programs in
developing countries and have assisted governments to
address the environmental hazards and conflicts that have
plagued the implementation of certain development
programs.32 In fact, most development assistance agencies
place more emphasis in their publications and reports on
31 Recently, the UNDP sponsored an "environmental sector
review" for the Indonesian government - MKLH,
"Environmental Sector Review", Indonesian State Ministry of
Population and Environment, 1983. AID recently commissioned
a review of its environmental profile program from IIED -
Dickinson, Joshua, "The Country Environmental Profile
Process and Product", Washington D.C., Agency for
International Development, 1984. UNEP and other donors have
supported the preparation of National Conservation
Strategies by IUCN in a number of countries.
32. See progress reports of CIDIE members in UNEP, nt.
it. ; also Stein and Johnson, D.--t. and Johnson and
Blake, op. .. fcitt6L. review hese activities for multilaterals
and bilaterals. See Horberry, John, "international
Organization and EIA In Developing Countries",
Environmental Imp~act Assessment Revietw, forthcoming, for a
review of efforts by development assistance agencies to
support formal environmental planning in developing
countries.
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these activities than on the results of environmental
analysis of their lending programs. 3 3
UNEP has recently initiated a program designed to
process and improve the quality of requests from recipient
governments for environmental projects or technical
assistance and to stimulate the response of donors to such
requests. This program, the "clearing house facility", has
initially been financed by three bilateral donors but UNEP
hopes that its scope will widen to include the development
assistance community as a whole. 3 4
It seems to me that, provided a development assistance
agency can allocate resources to institutional
strengthening and technical assistance, it can channel
those resources to environmental institutions and programs
- when the recipient governments request such support. In
33. See World Bank, "Environmental Requirements of the
World Bank", Washington D.C., Office of Environmental
Affairs, 1982; Inter-American Development Bank, &o.sit.;
Rees, Colin, "Environmental Considerations in Asian
Development Bank Operations", Manila, Asian Development
Bank, 1982; McPherson, Peter, "Prepared Statement of the
Administrator. Agency for International Development" in
United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Review of- the a 0Gloal nionet10Yas fe
Stockholm. Hearings., 97 Cong. 2nd Sess. Washington D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1982.
34. UNEP, "Fourth Mee ting of the Commit tee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment. Summary
Record," Nairobi, UNEP/CIDIEI83.8 (Final), 1983, pp.7-8.
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fact, agencies sometimes take steps to stimulate that
demand.
Critiques and Proposals.
Having suggested that development assistance agencies
continue to fund projects that cause environmental
problems, and that that their policies for reviewing the
environmental effects of their programs are inadequate, I
shall discuss some of the studies that have been made of
the environmental performance of agencies and the proposals
for improvement.
IIED carried out reviews of the environmental policies
and activities of both multilateral and bilateral
development agencies during 1977-79.35 Referring to
multilaterals, the authors conclude that "the need for
environmental protection is no longer subject to widespread
debate, though there is still a good deal of practical
resistance". The staffs of these agencies have a limited
view of environmental issues, confined mainly to pollution
control and wildlife conservation. Those who do accept the
importance of environmental protection hesitate to assign
35. Stein and Johnson, .opt.cit. and Johnson and Blake, 2.n..
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it sufficient priority to have a significant practical
impact on their work. 36
"A wide gap remains between the increasingly
alert concern of individuals and the official
response of most institutions... The World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank have
developed greater environmental awareness than
other development organizations studied. The
Organization of American States has, in specific
sectors, also demonstrated a keen awareness of
environmental problems In its work. The U.N.
Development Programme, though headquartered in
New York, and the European Development Fund,
headquartered in Brussels, experience a far
greater diffusion of government control, while
their decentralized organization appears to have
diffused the influence of donor country
environmental concern. The other institutions
studied, which are headquartered in developing
countries, appear to be equally or more remote
from developed countries' environmental
consciousness, even though developed countries
are in most cases represented on their boards." 3 7
The authors highlighted four main deficiencies in the
agencies' environmental practices: a lack of clear
procedures for environmental assessment of their projects,
a lack of technical criteria for assessing environmental
impacts, a lack of integration of environmental analysis
into formal project appraisal and a lack of environmental
expertise among the staff. 3 8
The study of the environmental practices of six
36. Stein and Johnson, aao..p.ci±., PP.6-?.
3?. .Lbid., P.133.
38. ±b.,.. P.135-136.
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bilateral agencies also identified a general consensus
about the significance of environmental problems in
development assistance, but concluded that "this view has
still made too little impact on the orientation and design
of the projects or practical development policies of the
agencies studied." The reaction of agency staffs to
environmental policies has been to resist calls for
environmental assessments or to claim that recipients are
not sympathetic to any environmental planning inputs. 39
The study reports on the specific measures and
activities of the six agencies and indicates that with the
exception of the United States Agency for International
Development the limited procedures and guidelines for
screening, assessing or evaluating projects were
40ineffectual. The authors advocate environmental focal
points within the agencies, stricter procedures for
environmental assessment, more environmentally sensitive
sector policies and more assistance for environmental
projects and institutional support. 41
IIED and the more environmentally active of the
agencies have advocated a package of measures to ensure the
39. Johnson and Blake, .op. c~i., pp.iii, 14-15.
40. ibid., pp.26-37.
41. .Ld., pp.iv-v.
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environmental quality of funding programs: stricter
procedures for the review of project proposals, more
comprehensive guidelines and criteria for environmental
assessment, integration of environmental damages and
benefits into economic appraisal of projects, integration
of environmental factors into project evaluation and more
effort to raise environmental sensitivity of agency staff.
Taking these suggestions in turn, there has been
conoiderable pressure from various environmental groups to
urge agencies to adopt firmer policies and establish
stricter procedures. The Declaration, signed by the major
multilaterals, appeared to respond to this issue but,
observing the CIDIE meetings, it seems clear that
multilateral agencies have made limited progress in
achieving this objective. Bilaterals have no corresponding
commitment and, with the exception of the US and to a
lesser extent West Germany, national governments have not
established binding procedures.
In the course of testimony to the House Banking
Committee hearings, the Joint Environmental Service of IIED
and IUCN recommended that agencies should give
environmental offices more authority to intervene in the
project cycle, should allocate more resources to
environmental review of project proposals and should
incorporate environmental planning into project preparation
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rather than carry out reactive assessments.42 Other U.S.
environmental organizations giving testimony advocated
amendments to the legislation authorizing U.S.
participation in multilateral development banks that
instruct the U.S. Executive Directors to promote stronger
environmental procedures and to oppose all projects that
"clearly will result in unnecessary or unacceptable
environmental destruction".43 However, according to the
Treasury staff members involved in these hearings and the
investigations that surrounded them, it is unlikely that
multilaterals can be pressured into tinding procedures in
this way.
The Joint Environmental Service of IIED and IUCN
carried out a comprehensive study of the procedures and
guidelines for environmental assessment among development
agencies. It concluded that, with the exception of the US
bilateral agency, environmental procedures tend to be weak
and fail to ensure that projects are adequately screened
and analyzed. As for environmental guidelines, the same
report noted that their proliferation has little direct
impact on the preparation of projects because the agencies
42. United States Congress, oa.p.ctA., p.213.
43. ..bid. p.881-83.
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do not require their use. Better guidelines or more
carefully formulated criteria, the study concludes, will
not improve the situation without measures to ensure that
they are employed.44 In the course of this study, it
became obvious that many sectoral or project guidelines
contained useful information about what environmental
problems are associated with certain sectors, what
questions to ask in assessing the environmental effects of
a project and what are the criteria for adequate
environmental protection in certain cases. The abundance
of this information did not, however, ensure that
environmental analysis was carried out.
The question of the economic evaluation of
environmental effects directly concerns the project
appraisal methods employed by agencies before they commit
funds to projects. UNEP and the East-West Environment and
Policy Institute in Hawaii have devoted considerable effort
to formulating an acceptable methodology for incorporating
environmental damages and benefits into economic
cost-benefit analysis. They hope this will encourage the
development agencies to include environmental factors into
44. Horberry, Environmental Guidelines Survev. pp.1-13;
ide~m, "Establishing Environmental Guidelines for
Development Aid Projects: the Institutional Factor",
Environmental Imoact Assessment Review, 4:1, 1983,
pp. 98-102.
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their routine project appraisal. It seems clear from the
publications on this topic that there are no theoretical
objections nor any insurmountable practical impediments. 45
What is not clear is whether the agencies can be
convinced that the expense and additional effort of
economic evaluation will be justified in terms of better
projects. I suggested In the last chapter that agencies
tend to resist additional layers of analysis which will
increase the burden and uncertainty of project
46
appraisal. The desire to "move money" is as great, if
not greater, than the desire to capture the economic
benefits of environmental planning - which are often
long-term and non-monetary. My view is that only when
environmental factors regularly threaten the short-term
feasibility of an investment will economic analysis of
environmental factors appeal to project staff as a useful
tool for project preparation and decision-making.
There are no substantial technical barriers to
45. See Cooper, Charles, Economic Evaluation and the
Environment, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981;
Hufschmidt, M. J. et al., Environment. Natural Systems and
Dfeveloment: AM Economic Valuation Guide. Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1983.
46. Ascher, William, "New Development Approaches and the
Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case of the
World Bank", International Oranization, 37:3, 1983,
P.428-430.
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including environmental factors in project evaluation or to
increasing environmental training activities. If these
activities do not occur, it Is because of low commitment
from the members, leaders and management of the agencies
and the organizational dynamics that are associated with
the task and the context of administering development aid.
Even when development assistance agency staff members
recognize the developmental benefits of environmental
assessment and planning, they often point out that
environmentally sound projects are neither easy to plan or
implement O'Riordan mentions these impediments to
incorporating environmental management into development
aid. First, good environmental management is not a clearly
defined product, and consequently the overall consensus
that environmental management is desirable is surpassed by
the urgency of economic development needs except when
environmental damages threaten the project investment.
Second, environmental management projects are hard to
prepare and implement - often their benefits are uncertain
or hard to discern.4
Two other problems limit the influence of those
development practitioners that would like to see greater
47. O'Riordan, Timothy, "Problems Encountered when Linking
Environmental Management to Development Aid", Thb.e
Environmentalist, 1, 1981, PP.15-24.
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concern for environmental effects. O'Riordan also points
out that environmental offices in development assistance
agencies occupy peripheral positions, lacking the authority
or capacity to influence the project cycle effectively.
Finally, recipient governments are not always sympathetic
to environmental concerns in the case of specific projects,
and if they resist there is little an agency can do beyond
persuasion or cutting off their own programs.48
Finally, some commentators, notably Sachs, believe that
fine-tuning the development agencies is not likely to solve
the persistent environmental problems in the developing
world. They have argued that it is the theory of
development that is at fault compounded by the structure of
international economic relations. The concept of
development needs to be redefined so that both the styles
of development desired and the strategies for achieving
them respect ecological, social and community processes.
Sachs sees the dominant development strategies as
unsustainable - they take no account of the loss of
resources and seek only to maximize short-term growth by
the application of technology. In contrast, he advocates
the application of systems planning and greater
participation in planning, decision-making and
48. tbiA.
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implementation by local populations. Extended cost-benefit
analysis is, he argues, a contrived and consequently
ineffective method for approaching environmental
problems.4 Consequently, UNEP and Sachs have proposed a
different conceptual approach called "eco-development" of
which the main principles are:
- in any region, development should aim at utilizing the
available resources for the specific basic needs of
the population without importing external styles of
consumption
- development should above all contribute to human
fulfillment
- natural resource utilization and management should
respect the needs of future generations
- production should be organized to avoid wastes and
negative Impacts
- technological choices should reflect the natural
resource situation of any region
- the institutional framework should emphasize
49. Sachs, Ignacy, "Environmental Quality Management and
Development Planning: Some Suggestions for Action", in
Envionmnt ad Dvelpmen: te FunexReprt.Paris,
1972.
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horizontal authority and coordination of sectors and
activities, the participation of the population in the
realization of eco-development strategies and the
protection of local resources from the plundering of
the international markets. 5 0
Sachs' approach, although it does not offer the
political or institutional pathways to achieving the state
of environmentally sensitive economic development, reminds
us that development assistance agencies are part of a wider
political and economic framework. As such, it is
legitimate to ask whether that framework is likely to bring
about economic development that delivers benefits to these
most in need and respects local ecological and
socio-economic conditions. In other words, to what extent
are the inadequacies of development assistance agency
environmental policy and practice amenable to the kind of
proposals discussed above? Is it in fact the case that
because of the type of institutions they are - politically,
financially and organizationally - development assistance
agencies are unable to respond to potential environmental
problems to an adequate extent?
My view is that Sachs' argument points us to the
50. Sachs, Ignacy, "Alternative Pat terns of Development" in
Dwork in, 'E-viomn and Deelpent , pp. 390-392.
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sources of environmental problems caused or neglected by
development assistance agencies. Nevertheless, the
influence and actual operations of these agencies is
considerable, and it would be unrealistic to dismiss the
contribution they can and do make to environmental policy
and planning in developing countries. What remains
disturbing is their apparent inability to ensure effective
environmental review of their own programs.
To recap, development assistance agencies recognize,
for the most part, their responsibility to do what they can
to ensure that their programs do not cause environmental
problems and to support the efforts of recipient
governments to solve their environmental problems. There
seems little problem in responding to the latter
responsibility provided the recipient governments request
such support. But, there appears to be resistance to the
environmental review and planning of their own programs
even when policies to accomplish this are adopted. It does
not seem that this resistance or poor performance results
from inadequate methods or technical material. Nor is it
the case that staff members are unaware of the problem. I
think that it has more to do with the political and
financial structure of the institutions and how that
influences the implementation of what is a developmentally
beneficial objective.
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In chapter 2, 1 discussed the different sources of
development assistance agency policy and the political or
economic interests that influence the administration of
these agencies. I also discussed the organizational
features of these types of agency and how these features
affected the implementation of various types of policy
objectives. It was apparent that various developmental
objectives are not adequately implemented despite the
intent of the leadership. The reasons offered were a
combination of the conflict between different policy goals
and the organizational barriers to action. What I propose
to do is look for an explanation for the capacity of
development assistance agencies to assess the environmenta]
effects of their programs in terms of their political and
financial structure and how this is linked to the
organizational features governing their internal
operations. In the next chapter, I shall explain what the
basis for such an analysis is and how I shall carry it
out.
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CHAPTER 4
Accountability and Development Assistance
Introduction
The theoretical perspectives, reviewed in Chapter 2, do
not provide an adequate analytical framework for explaining
what determines the capacity of a development assistance
agency to review and mitigate, if necessary, the
environmental impacts of its funding programme. In my
view, what is needed is a conceptual linkage between the
political and financial structure of the agency and the
incentives and constraints facing the staff members inside
the organization. The critiques and proposals about how
development assistance agencies could improve their
approach to environmental impacts, as I discussed in
Chapter 3, tend to focus on technical issues, that I do not
believe to be the main barrier to more effective
environmental procedures, or they fail to target the
particular structural and organizational features of the
agency in question. I believe that a better conceptual
linkage between the agency's structure and its operations
would suggest pathways to reforming its environmental
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policies and performance.
In this chapter, I want to propose an analytical
cwncept - namely the accountability system within a
development agency - that provides a linkage between the
political and financial structure of the agency and the
organizational constraints and incentives facing its
staff. On the basis of this concept, I shall discuss how
one can analyze what determines the capacity of development
assistance agencies for environmental assessment. Also, I
shall explain the structure and argumentation of the case
studies that follow, In which I use the idea of an
accountability system.
fleveloornent Assistance Agencies and the-ir Policies
In Chapter 2, I reviewed various perspectives on why
development assistance agencies fail to live up to the
expectations of their political masters and their critics.
These agencies, on the face of it, have to cope with the
demands of the donors, the expectations of recipients and
the great difficulty of their task. When their political
masters or management decide to reorientate the agency's
program or to replace or augment the objectives the agency
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is expected to achieve, it seems that the results are often
disappointing. Policies are resisted: the agencies pay
lip-service to the principles and broad objectives, but the
actual management and implementation of the program is not
affected dramatically. In addition, as large
organizations, these agencies inevitably suffer from
bureaucratic ills or internal conflicts that stifle or
distort their operations.
There appear to be at least three ways of looking at
this problem, each of which would suggest a different
strategy for reform. The first concerns the commitment and
determination of the political masters and leadership of
agencies to policy goals. Individual donor governments or
the main donors in an international agency do not muster
sufficient political will or allocate sufficient resources
to support policies for "better" development assistance.
Efforts to protect the environment are suppressed by the
dominant political and economic goals of donors. Although
the agencies subscribe to certain developmental objectives,
1. In particular, I mentioned Ayres, Robert, Eanking on the
Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty, Cambridge, Mass.,
MIT Press, 1983; Tendler, J., lnsideForeion.Aid,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975; Ascher,
William, "New Development Approaches and the Adaptability
of International Agencies: the Case of the World Bank",
Interniational Oroanization, 37:3, 1983; Micklewait, Donald
e t al., New Directions in Dlevelopmnent : A Study of U S.
AlD, Boulder, Westview Press, 1979.
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these objectives are not supported strongly enough to make
any impact.2 A strategy for solving the problem would,
therefore, revolve around political pressure on the donors
to commit the agency to the policy goal. The environmental
lobbies testifying at the U.S. House Banking Hearings
mentioned in the previous chapter are attempting to apply
political pressure to the multilateral agencies, as they
have in the past to the U.S. bilateral agency, as I
describe in Chapter 5.
Second, policies do not succeed because the agency
itself has other interests or constraints that override the
policy mandates given to it by the leadership or
management. The performance of the agency is a product of
its relationship with its task-environment, including the
various sources of policy, its clients, the nature of its
operations and the other actors with which it must
cooperate. The agency must above all manage and expand its
program and protect itself from the uncertainty of its
task-environment. Consequently, the pattern of incentives
2. Those critics of development agencies that believe they
simply follow the narrow political interests of the donors
represent this approach - see Bello, W., D. Kinley and E.
Elinson, Develocment Dlebacle: the World Bank in the
Philinpines, San rrancisco, Institute for rood and
Development Policy, 1982; Hayter, Theresa, Aidtas
Imoerialismi, London, Penguin, 1971; Payer, Cheryl, The.
world Bank: A Critical Aopraisal, New York, Monthly Review
Press, 1982.
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and constraints perceived by the staff dictate actions that
may conflict with or are Indifferent to the official policy
objectives. If protecting the blo-physical environment
increases the uncertainty facing staff responsible for
managing the program, the staff will resist.3 Thus an
appropriate strategy would focus on staff incentives and
ensuring that implementing the policy objective can result
in less uncertainty not more. A good example of this is
the Environmental Planning and Management Program that AID
funds and that the Joint Environmental Service of IIED and
IUCN implements. The rationale for this mechanism is to
remove bureaucratic and financial disincentives facing
mission staff members who encounter an environmental
problem in the course of preparing a project. Similarly
many environmental guidelines are Intended to overcome the
informational and assessment uncertainties of incorporating
environmental planning into project preparation.
The third approach concerns the relative power of
different policy actors. The membership and leadership of
the agencies, and the different components of donor
governments or agency leadership, have different interests
and degrees of Influence. The fate of a policy initiative
depends on the power of its proponent relative to other
3. Tendler, a.sciLt., and Ascher, .n.. citf., express this
best.
- 132 -
actors who have different agendas. For instance, the
opportunity for a domestic environmental agency in a donor
country to influence a multilateral development bank
directly is slight because the national finance ministry Is
the body represented on the board of governors. Within the
agency, different units also have different sources of
influence over policy and operational decisions and they
have different objectives and prospects for reward. So,
the likely results of a policy initiative depend on how
powerful the responsible unit is and what incentives it
faces. Clearly the central policy staff within an agency
has different sources of authority and different incentives
to the project staff. Among the clients, the recipient
countries, there are different agencies and participants in
the development assistance system which will have varying
perspectives on a given policy objective. If the recipient
government has no environmental policy or agency, then the
donor agency will probably encounter a less sympathetic
attitude to environmental assessment. Appropriate
strategies, on the basis of this approach, would be to
enhance the influence of the proponent of the policy in
question, to support and ally with the responsible unit and
to increase the capacity of the relevant agency in the
recipient country. For instance, environmental lobbies, as
I have mentioned, put pressure on Congress to insist on
stricter environmental protection; environmental units in
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agencies make alliances with environmental contractors or
research institutes to enhance their influence within the
agency, as in the case of multilateral development bank
environmental staff members who leak examples of
environmental damages to outside organizations;
environmental offices also support environmental agencies
within recipient countries to ensure a more sympathetic
response to environmental protection measures - for
instance, the World Bank environmental office has funded
environmental units attached to power generation programs
in Thailand and transmigration in Indonesia, as I describe
in Chapter 6.
These three approaches broadly correspond to Graham
Allison's three frames of reference for analyzing the
outputs of foreign policy and international relations but
which are equally helpful for any domain of public policy,
national or international. His first frame, the "Rational
Actor" model, explains events as "the more or less
purposive acts of unified national governments".
Governments are personified as rational actors who have
specific goals and make choices. In this context, the
rational actor is the donor government choosing to
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implement a particular policy objective within its
development assistance program.4
Allison offers two alternatives to the "Rational Actor"
model. One is the "organizational process" model which
highlights the fact that unitary government actors consist
of different elements and decision-making processes. The
outcomes of policy initiatives are not so much actions or
choices taken by the government, but the regular and
predictable output of organizational process. Following
this model, an analysis should focus on the organizational
processes particular to development assistance agencies to
see how they influence the fate of policies.
The other of Allison's alternative models focuses on
the politics of government. Policy outcomes are the
results of bargaining games between different actors.
Elements within donor governments, for instance, or members
of international organizations bargain with each other over
policy goals; the units of agencies bargain with each other
and recipient government officials over policy emphases or
project design. The result of a policy initiative would
depend very much on how its proponents and opponents fitted
into the political arena comprising the donor governments,
4. Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision :Exolainina the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, Lit tle Brown and Co., 1971,
pp. 2-7.
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the agency, its units and its clients.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and Allison,
himself, suggest that there is value in each of these
approaches, but that none of them alone is able to explain
fully how development assistance agencies respond to
specific policy initiatives. Governments and governing
bodies do make choices about development assistance
policies that shift the programs from one objective to
another. When governments change, bilateral agencies do
follow different policies. When the executive directors of
a multilateral development bank decide to finance
structural adjustment, the pattern of lending changes.
However, governments can make conflicting or incompatible
policy choices or experience resistance from the agency,
and particular policy goals do not succeed.
Second, organizational process does explain a
substantial degree of the resistance of agencies to policy
initiatives and of the persistence of "bad" development
practices. But the nature of these organizational
processes, the pattern of incentives and constraints facing
the agency staff, vary between and within different types
of agencies. The political and financial structure of
agencies tends to shape the organizational processes either
purposively or indirectly. The political masters of an
agency can choose to make certain project appraisal
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procedures mandatory, AID's environmental assessment
regulations, for example, or can attempt to adjust the
Incentive system, for instance, by instituting a project
evaluation mechanism. The financial basis and
circumstances of the agency significantly affects the
pattern of Incentives - either by creating an abundance of
funds that need to be disbursed as fast as possible, which
AID does when it commits huge sums to the Middle East or
Central America or by having to meet the standards of
creditworthiness of international capital markets, as the
multilateral development banks do.
Third, the bureaucratic politics of donor governments,
donor agencies and recipient governments influence the
results of policy initiatives in numerous ways. The
relatiive power of different departments within the donor
government will influence the governments' administration
of development assistance with respect to the political,
economic and developmental objectives of the program. If
there is a strong environmental agency, it may be able to
negotiate for some response to environmental objectives
with the foreign office and treasury. Similarly, within
the agency, if the environmental office can accumulate
support from environmental organizations or lobbies, it may
enhance its capacity to influence programmatic or
operational decisions. One of the most important
- 137 -
influences over the fate of policy initiatives stems from
the response of the recipients. The fate of environmental
policies within development assistance agencies clearly has
much to do with the attitudes and priorities of
recipients. However, even if the balance of bureaucratic
politics could be shifted so that there was greater support
for environmental protection, it is likely that the impact
onn the program would be shaped more by the influence of the
political and financial structure of the agency on the
organizational incentives and constraints facing any
particular policy initiative.
To recap the thrust of this enquiry, I am trying to
explain what determines the capacity of a development
assistance agency to assess the environmental effects of
its funding program and to mitigate or avoid likely
environmental damages. For an agency to achieve this
objective, it must incorporate environmental analysis into
the project cycle and make it possible for the
environmental staff to review and, where necessary, change
project proposals and design. In addition, if the process
is to succeed, the agency must ensure that the evaluation
of projects takes account of environmental factors and
feeds back the relevant information into the project
cycle.
I have argued that It is reasonable to expect that the
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staff members responsible for managing the funding program
will resist such a policy initiative because it imposes an
additional layer of analysis, reduces their control of the
project cycle and requires data collection and analysis
that Is subject to considerable uncertainty. However, it
is possible for such a policy to be taken on board and to
be implemented, as the case of AID in Chapter 5 will show.
I am interested in what forms the linkage between the
political and financial structure of the agency, which
determines whether an environmental policy is accepted, and
the pattern of incentives and constraints within the
organization that governs its implemention. For it appears
that most development assistance agencies can accept that
such a policy is desirable, but that there is considerable
variation In their capacity for implementation. But, I
believe it is the political and financial structure of the
agency that sets the broad dimensions of the organizational
incentives and constraints, even tuough the organization
does perceive interests and objectives of its own that are
independent of the agencies political and financial
processes. In other words, going back to Allison's models,
I see the agency as a "rational actor" when it decides to
take the policy on board, but the "organizational process"
and "bureacratic process" models suggest why implementation
is difficult.
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If this is so, then one needs to identify the mechanism
by which the political and financial structure influences
the organizational incentives and constraints and discover
how this mechanism works In different circumstances. To be
more specific, the political and financial structure,
depending on the type of agency, consists of the governing
bodies, (whether formally constituted in the case of a
multilateral organization or resting in the responsibility
within a national government for development assistance
policy and administration), the agency's political
relationships with other organizations and actors and the
mechanisms for obtaining and disbursing its funds.
The linkage in question is that relating how political
members of an agency, with the aid of a formal constitution
or legislation, set the policies, procedures and budget for
the management of the agency to administer. It also
involves the way the management reserve certain decisions
for themselves and require certain information and
performance criteria from the agency. The main focus of
the linkage between the governance of the agency and the
operations of the agency tends to be the financial
processes of the agency, whether it is Congress authorizing
AID's budget or the Governors of the World Bank approving
an increase in capital. The task of the agency is to
disburse funds. Above all the political masters expect the
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agency to give an account of financial flows. But the
agency is expected to achieve other objectives through its
funding activities - political, economic and
developmental. To some degree the agency must give an
account of these objectives.
How this linkage is organized, what factors are
significant and what effect this process has on the
behavior of the agency is, I believe, the key to
understanding the influence of the political and financial
structure of the agency on the organizational incentives
and constraints governing policy initiatives. I call this
linkage the "accountability s.xystem".
Accountability. fDevelopment Assistance and
Envzironmental Assessment .
Accountability in the context of public agencies means
a liability on the part of the agency or departments of the
agency "to reveal, to explain and to justify what one does;
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how one discharges responsibilities, financial or other,
whose several origins may be political, constitutional,
hierarchical or contractual."5 The most common form of
accountability is financial - an accountability often
enforced by the existence of an independent auditor. There
are also a large number of different devices by which
different parties exercise accountability, varying from
formal audit to manipulation of the mass media, from
legislative oversight to informal lobbying.6
In the case of development assistance agencies, the
leadership holds the agency accountable for financial
matters, and because of the degree of independence often
found in their operations, for compliance with formal
policies, procedures and performance standards.
Development assistance agencies often have considerable
independence, either because their governance is shared by
a number of governments or because what they do is subject
to many factors that are hard to control except by their
staff in the field. Consequently accountability mechanisms
S. Normanton, E.L., "Public Accountability and Audit: A
Reconnaissance", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C. Hague, eds., Te
Dilemma _of Accountability in Modern Government:
Indeaendence Versus Control, New York, St.Martin's Press,
1971, p.311.
6. ror a discussion of these issues, see Smith, B.L.R.,
"Accountability and Independence in the Contract State," in
Smith and Hague, eds., op...s.it., pp.3-55.
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become essential tools for managing the agency, and for
measuring its performance, if not in terms of outcomes,
which may be too hard to measure, then in terms of formal
adherennce to policies and procedures. The agencies are
also held accountable for the political and economic
objectives that the leadership wants to achieve. Since
these agencies are supposed to promote economic development
and address themselves to the inequities and persistent
problems of development, they are held accountable for
developmental objectives. The different variables for
which the organization would be accountable might, in the
case of a bilateral agency, include national foreign
policy, trade advantages, balance-of-payments impact,
humanitarian goals, income redistribution, allocation to
the poorest countries or contribution to the private
sector. In other words, to the extent that these agencies
are expected to achieve a range of policy objectives, as I
observed in Chapter 2, they are held accountable for
multiple performance criteria.
The second feature of the accountability system
operating within development assistance agencies that needs
to be mentioned is that there are a number of different
actors demanding some accountability. The government or
governing body that se ts policy and provides funds demands
accountability so that it may keep control of the
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activities of the organization. But the government or
governing body is not usually unitary - it is composed of
different branches or departments of government in the case
of a bilateral agency or of different governmental members
In the case of a multilateral agency. Furthermore there
are other actors, whether domestic interest groups, other
International organizations or members of the professional
and academic development community, that try to hold the
agencies accountable, according to their particular policy
interests. For example, the different actors might, in the
case of a multilateral development bank, include the
subscribing members, the borrowing members, the management,
the lenders and the development professionals all of whom
have some power over the activities of the agency and can
exact accountability for some aspect of its performance.
To the extent that different actors can legitimately claim
some influence over the policies of development assistance
agencies, these actors try to hold the agency accountable
for the implementation of these policies.
Third, the different actors trying to hold the agency
accountable for different performance criteria constitute
what one can call "channels" of accountability. These
channels can be more or less strict - the agency will be
more or less obliged to give an account of its performance
and to improve it if appropriate. The strictness will vary
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from total in the case of a government demanding that its
aid agency does not allocate bilateral assistance to a
particular country to negligible in the case of a developed
country donor to a specialized UN agency attempting to hold
the agency accountable for economic soundness of a
particular project. These channels can also vary in the
degree that they penetrate into the operations of the
agency - the agency is more or less obliged to reveal the
detail of its performance. Some actors can scrutinize
deeper into an agency's operations and hold it accountable
for what it finds. For instance, the creditors of a
multilateral development bank will probably only hold the
bank accountable for the creditworthiness of a borrowing
government while a government auditor can demand an account
of the precise project Impacts from a bilateral assistance
program.
The configuration of these different criteria, actors
and channels of accountability within an agency forms the
mechanism that links the political and financial structure
of the agency with the incentives facing the members of the
organization responsible for managing the reguler funding
activities. The accountability system, asI shall call it,
shapes the task-environment facing the staff given the
responsibility, but less often the resources and authority
for implementing a new policy Initiative. For example, an
- 145 -
agency may adopt a certain policy initiative, such as
alleviating poverty, but the project staff members
responsible may perceive that inserting an appropriate
statement into each project appraisal report will satisfy
the management. In other words, if they are not required
to give an account of the performance of actual projects,
they have little incentive to implement the policy
initiative further. However, if the project staff know
that the project evaluation staff will measure the
performance of each project with respect to the particular
policy objective and report the results to the leadership,
then the incentive to implement the policy is greater.
In most development assistance agencies, the potential
for injecting a new policy concern into the accountability
system exists but is limited. The task of moving money,
securing implementation and generating reliable future
projects is very time consuming. In addition, each type of
funding agency has a channel of accountability that has to
be attended to simply to keep on operating; for example,
multilateral banks have to maintain the confidence of the
capital markets, bilaterals have to satisfy the political
objectives of their governments and powerful
constituencies, and UN agencies need to keep the political
support of the majority of their members, namely the
developing countries. The capacity of the leadership to
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demand accountability for additional policy objectives is
limited unless there is some clear convergence with a
dominant incentive or policy.
In this study, I am looking at the role of the
accountability system in determining the capacity of
development assistance agencies to carry out environmental
assessments of their programs and to mitigate or avoid
potential damage. As we have seen in the previous chapter,
development assistance agencies carry out a variety of
environmental activities and I think it is important to
understand that not all environmental activities are
influenced by the accountability system in the same way.
It is important to clarify the difference between
environmental assessment of projects being considered for
funding and other environmental activities such as funding
environmental sector and natural resource projects or
providing technical assistance and funds for training,
institution building and policy analysis. These latter
activities need to meet certain criteria in order to
qualify as the type of activities the agency can fund. In
some cases, the economic benefits to be gained from a
project will be the major criterion, in other cases the
potential contribution of the project to rural incomes and
food production and In others responding to recipient
country priorities is the key consideration. Provided such
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environmental activities do satisfy these criteria, then
they have positive value to the agency as opportunities to
move money and expand their programs. Environmental
assessment, on the other hand, is normally viewed by the
agency staff as an impediment to the program. Project
officers are reluctant to accept additional layers of
analysis. Having to satisfy additional criteria during
project approval appears to them as a source of additional
delays and costs in project design and implementation and a
need for coordination with other sectors or disciplines.
Of course, this is not only the case for environmental
assessment, but applies to any requirement to analyze a
proposed project to determine whether it will meet a
certain policy criteria that may be in conflict with the
dominant objective of the agency.
The capacity of an agency to introduce an effective
environmental assessment of its program is, I am
suggesting, influenced by the incentives facing the project
officers of an agency and their perceptions of whether they
will be held accountable - to whom, how strictly and to
what depth of scrutiny? For instance, are the project
staff members merely accountable for communicating with an
environmental office, responsible for environmental affairs
but lacking authority to influence the project cycle. Are
they just responsible for demonstrating that environmental
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factors are included in the project appraisal document?
Are they accountable for compliance with an analytical
procedure or adherence to certain guidelines? Or are they
accountable for the environmental effects of project
impplementat ion?
The nature of the accountability system, surrounding
environmental assessment, or other policy objectives, is
itself a product of the political and financial structure
of the agency. The members, contributors, constituents and
management of the agency have preferences and interests
that ultimately determine the factors they hold the agency
accountable for, how strict they are about demanding
accountability and how deeply this accountability
penetrates the activities of the organization.
To give some perspective to this relationship, imagine
a development assistance agency that was as responsive to
the potential environmental effects of its funding
activities as is conceivable. What political and financial
structure would it be likely to have? First, the source of
funds would need to believe that the pay-off, whether
economic or political or developmental, would be invariably
threatened by the failure to correct environmental
damages. Second, the political membership of the agency,
would need to be vulnerable to strong constituencies that
deplored environmental damage. Third, the management of
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the agency would need to be systematically judged by
members, contributors and outside constituencies for the
environmental quality of the project outcomes. It is my
hypothesis that the responsiveness of a development
assistance agency to the environmental effects of its
funding activities will depend on the degree to which any
or some of these conditions are met.
Analysis and Measurement
How one analyzes this relationship requires some
attention to how measurable the key variables are.
First, the political and financial structure of an agency is
quite easy to discover. One needs to determine the precise
identity of the political members. For instance, what part
of national governments are represented in international
organizations, or what part of the government directs the
bilateral agency? Also the nature of the funds, whether
they are borrowed, allocated by government or levied on
members and whether they are granted, lent and on what
terms or conditions is crucial.
Second, the accountability system that stems from the
political and financial structure can be revealed by
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examining the way the agency works in general. One can
investigate the decision making procedures, regulations,
guidelines and operational responsibilities that govern the
activities of the organization and identify the channels of
accountability that are embedded in these practices. There
are also mechanisms and events by which certain actors hold
the organizations accountable for particular criteria and
corresponding reporting or evaluating procedures within the
agency. How are funds allocated, how are disbursements
reviewed and approved, how are projects evaluated if at
all? What influence do the members, contributors and
constituents have on this process?
The effect of the accountability system on the capacity
of the organization to perform environmental assessment and
to modify projects accordingly can be predicted from the
analysis of the accountability system and by comparison
with other policies that have been introduced. What is
necessary here is to derive some pattern of how the
incentives and responsibilities of project officers are
shaped by the existing accountability system and the
likelihood that a new policy initiative of this sort will
be accepted or resisted. Obviously, it Is not simply the
theoretical capacity to perform environmental assessment
but the practical experience of trying to implement such a
policy that is Influenced by the accountability system. In
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cases where an environmental assessment policy has been
introduced, it is possible to investigate the success with
which it has been implemented and to compare it with other
environmental activities that one might expect to be easier
to implement and with other policies that also involve
project review and modification.
The question of measurement is important here. There
are gradations of environmental assessment ranging from the
most superficial to the most comprehensive, which have
different implications for measurement. At the most
superficial level, the environmental office has advisory
responsibility in relation to the work of the project
staff. It offers some form of environmental determination
on selected project proposals and tries to persuade project
staff members to take steps to minimize potential
problems. Measuring the implementation of this level of
procedure will focus on how easy it is for the
environmental office to gain access to the project cycle,
how comprehensively it is able to review project proposals
and how successful it is in persuading the project staff to
modify project design when appropriate. Where there is a
requirement for the project staff to incorporate a
statement of environmental considerations in the project
appraisal or to follow certain environmental guidelines,
the issue of measurement involves both the actual
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compliance with the requirement as well as the quality of
compliance. For instance, it is possible to include a
statement that a project will have no environmental effects
in every project document without being required to justify
that statement and without any mechanism for checking on
its value. Where there is a requirement for a
comprehensive assessment of project proposals and some
capacity to influence project design as a consequence, the
measurement of the implementation is more extensive and
brings into question whether problems identified are taken
care of and whether the process overall is successful at
identifying problems and minimizing them. In practice,
this is hard to measure without reliable data about the
environmental conditions before and after the project -
such data are rarely available.
In the cases that follow I have tried to follow an
approach to measurement of the capacity of the agency to
carry out environmental assessment and to the
implementation of that capacity that is appropriate to the
agency, its accountability system and its experience with
environmental protection policies. The object is to
investigate a more general relationship between the
political and financial structure of development assistance
agencies and their capacity to follow new policy
initiatives.
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However, it must be accepted that there are
complications involved in measuring that capacity and
actual experience of implementation. There is a shortage
of reliable project evaluations. There are numerous
factors influencing the effects of projects over which the
agency has little control. It Is not necessarily easy to
attribute those project results that are known to certain
design or implementation features.
Another complication in measuring the success of an
agency's environmental assessment policy is that many
effects may be invisible. The existence of the policy may
encourage project proponents and designers to avoid likely
environmental problems. Indeed, this is intended, but very
hard to measure; who can tell what would have happened if
the policy was not in place? It also is possible for a
review policy that has limited success in changing project
design and approval practices within its own agency to have
indirect effects on other actors in other situations that
lead to minimizing environmental damages. They may help to
sensitize consultants, recipient government officials,
other agencies and independent organizations so that their
activities reinforce the same environmental policies.
What I am proposing to measure, as a factor of agency
political and financial structure, is 13 the capacity of
the agency to systematically assess projects and to propose
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environmental mitigation measures, 23 where appropriate,
the success of the environmental staff in securing
cooperation from the project staff in fulfilling this
assessment requirement, and 33 the approximate success of
the environmental assessment process in influencing project
design or mitigation. However, it is obvious that
confidence about measuring these variables decreases
markedly from 13 to 3J.
It is important to stress that I am not measuring the
overall contribution of the agencies to environmental
planning and management in developing countries, as I am
only looking at the assessment function. Nor am I trying
to explain the environmental outncmes, of development
projects in terms of the political and financial structure
of the agencies or any combination of factors. It is, as I
have argued, not the outcomes but the agency's capacity to
review and modify projects according to a specified policy
objective that depends on the agency's structure and the
resulting pattern of principles and incentives governing
its operations.
The..Case Studies
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My argument applies to development assistance agencies
in general, but obviously hinges on different elements of
political and financial structure depending on the type of
agency. There are three main types - bilateral aid
agencies, multilateral development banks and UN specialized
agencies implementing projects funded by UNDP and other
sources. These types of agencies have very different
political end financial characteristics, but also differ
markedly among themselves in their policies and procedures
for environmental assessment.
I will look at one case from each group - in fact, the
example of each group that is most advanced in
incorporating environmental assessment into its funding
program - the United States Agency for International
Development, the World Bank and the rood and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. I make no attempt to
argue that all members of each group, by sharing similar
ppolitical and financial elements, should demonstrate the
same level of commitment and achievement with respect to
this particular policy issue. But I am suggesting that
members of the same group, if they felt that similar issues
were important or they were to bring the similar levels of
commitment and resources to bear on the same task, would
experience broadly similar constraints or opportunities
stemming from their political and financial structure.
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After the three case studies, I try to summarize the
main points that each case suggests for its group of
development agencies, and use examples and material about
other members of the groups as supporting dvidence. Then I
combine these points about the groups of agencies into
general conclusions about the relationship of political and
financial structure with implementing a policy of this
type. As I have already noted the issue of environmental
assessment has many similarities with other policy concerns
that require the screening and modification of- project
proposals.
The case studies set out to do the following. They
describe the political and financial structure of the
agency; they define the accountability system that follows
from that structure and analyze its influence over the
agency's capacity to respond to a policy initiative such as
environmental assessment; they examine the experience of
the agency in installing and implementing an environmental
assessment policy; they test whether the experience can be
explained in terms of the incentives and constraints that
follow from the accountability system and the dependence of
that accountability system on the political and financial
structure of the agency.
There is inevitably some variation from this scheme.
The agencies Present somewhat different experiences with
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environmental assessments policies which demands particular
treatment and presentation. For instance, the World Bank
has ostensibly operated a project screening process since
1970, but it is extremely hard to obtain data on its
implementation or to get access to examples of projects
influenced by it. The Bank maintains a public image that
the reviews are comprehensive, successful and free of
constraints, while privately conceding that there are
limitations. AID has been legally mandated to perform
environmental assessments since 1975 and is subject to
Congressional and public scrutiny on its performance. Data
on the assessment system and its actual application over a
period of years exist and have formed the basis of
adjustments designed to make it work better. The FAO, in
implementing field projects, has a relatively weak project
review process but is attempting to install an effective
environmental assessment procedure whether the existing
project system is tightened up or not, and consequently
there are limited data on performance, but an explicit
illustration of the constraints of the prevailing
accountability system.
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CHAPTER 5
Bilateral Aid Programs
Case Study United States Agency for International
Development1
Introduction
"In April 1975, four United States
environmental organizations sued AID for failure
to prepare an environmental impact statement on
its financing of pesticide sales abroad and to
establish procedures under NEPA for systematic
review of all AID projects and programs"
"In carrying out programs under this chapter, the
President shall take into consideration the
environmental consequences of development
1. The United States Agency for International Development
(AID) administers the U.S. government's development
assistance, economic security assistance and Food for Peace
programs. In this study, I shall be referring only to the
development assistance program, unless I specify otherwise.
2. Blake, Robert 0., et al., "Aiding the Environment: A
Study of the Environmental Policies, Procedures and
Performance of the United States Agency for International
Development." Washington D.C., Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1980, p.38.
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actions." Foreign Assistagce Act of 1961,
Section 118, amended 1978.
International Development Cooperation Agency,
Agency for International Development,
"Environmental Procedures": "In accordance with
Sections 118(b) and 621 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, (the FAA) the following
general procedures shall be used by AID to ensure
that environmental factors and values are
integrated Into the AID decision-making process.
These procedures also assign responsibility
within the Agency for assessing the environmental
effects of AID's actions. These procedures are
consistent with Executive Order 12114, issued
January 4th 1979, entitled Environmental Effects
Abroad of Major Federal Actions and the purposes
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 4371 et seq.) (NEPL;. They
are intended to implement the requirements gf
NEPA as they effect (sic) the AID program."
Like any bilateral development assistance agency, AID
is a creation and agent of its government. Unlike most
bilateral agencies, AID serves a government that passed
strong environmental protection legislation -in the early
1970's. Not only did the U.S. government adopt a vigorous
domestic environmental protection policy, but it found
itself answerable to the courts and public interest groups
for the implementation of that policy. After AID was
challenged in the courts for failing to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), it revised its
procedures, received forceful mandates from the President
3. 22 U.S.C. Sec 2151p.
4. 22 CFR Part 216, October 23, 1980.
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and Congress and by 1978 was preparing the only enforceable
and systematic environmental assessments of development
projects in the development assistance community.
While any bilateral agency responds to the policies and
laws of its government, AID's capacity to review and
mitigate the potential environmental damages of its
projects stems from the focus and strictness of its
accountability to the various parts of government and some
of its constituents. Bilateral agencies do not respond
equally to all government policies nor do all their efforts
to implement changes in their funding program have equal
success. Minimizing environmental damages within an aid
program is not an easy task, given the tendencies of
bureaucracies to resist change, to avoid delays in moving
money and to maintain smooth relationships with recipient
governments. The story of AID's environmental assessment
policy illustrates how a planning reform can overcome
resistance and take hold in relation to the political and
financial structure of the organization.
AID's environmental assessment procedure is the
mechanism for achieving only one of the three goals in its
policy for Environmental and Natural Resource Aspects of
Development Assistance. The three goals are:
1. "To assist the less developed countries: [1J in
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building the institutional and scientific capacity
required for identifying, assessing and solving their
critical environmental and natural resource problems;
and E2J with establishing programs to address natural
resource management problems.
2. To ensure the environmental soundness and long-term
sustainability of AID assistance programs and
projects.
3. To promote environmentally sound development projects
funded by multilateral and bilateral development
assistance organizations." 5
The environmental assessment procedure is, however, the
aspect of AID's environmental policy that came first, that
is most formal and has the most effect on the regular
funding program of the agency. AID's environmental staff
tend to play down its significance, partly because they are
aware that NEPA-style assessments are not the most
effective tools for environmental planning and management
of development projects, partly because they feel the
overall sensitivity to environmental issues within the
agency has improved so that assessments are often redundant
5. United States. Agency for International Development,
"Environmental and Natural Resource Aspects of Development
Assistance", Policy Determination, PD-6, Washington D.C.,
April 26, 1983, p.1.
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and partly because they wish to emphasize both to domestic
and host country audiences those aspects of their
environmental policy that contribute to the program.6
Without the legally mandated requirement to conduct
assessments, I suggest that other environmental activities
would have met greater resistance within the agency and
from its recipients. It is unlikely that the agency would
have committed as many resources to environmental
activities nor would recipients have cooperated had not the
initial reform been mandatory. While it may be true that
some AID missions do now integrate environmental planning
on a routine basis and consequently do not need to carry
out assessments, it is unlikely that this would be the case
if the threat of the assessment requirement was not there.
To put it another way, had not the domestic
environmental movement thet backed NEPA been able to ensure
compliance from AID, they would have had a far more
difficult time persuading Congress to direct AID to address
environmental degradation and natural resource management
than they did. Once the Agency was forced to make the
reforms necessary for environmental assessment procedures,
promoting other environmental activities met little
6. Interview with Albert Printz Jr., Environmental
Coordinator, AID, 1933.
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resistance.
As I have discussed in chapter 4, this study examines
how an agency's capacity to detect and correct
environmental problems in its regular funding program
depends on its political and financial structure. Thus, it
is AID's assessment procedure, unique among development
agencies, rather than other environmental activities on
which I shall focus. First I shall describe the way that
AID installed an environmental assessment procedure and how
it evolved over time. Then I shall consider the
accountability system of AID in relation to this and other
planning refarms undertaken by the agency.
NEPA and Develooment Assistance
Soon after NEPA was enacted in 1970, AID, being a
federal agency that was responsible for projects that might
have environmental impacts, albeit overseas, adopted
limited procedures for carrying out assessments of
traditional engineering and industrial projects. In August
1970, Manual Circular 1221.2, entitled "Consideration of
Environmental Aspects of U.S. Assisted Capital Projects"
was issued, followed in September 1971 by Manual Circular
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1214.1, "Procedures for Environmental Review of Capital
Projects". AID's response to NEPA was overseen by a
Committee on Environment and Development, established in
May 1971.
In fact AID responded slowly and reluctantly to NEPA,
like many federal agencies, believing that NEPA was
domestic in intent and that the U.S. should not enforce
such legislation beyond its own territory. However the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEG), fulfilling its task
of securing the implementation of NEPA by federal agencies,
turned its attention to AID in 1971 and even proposed
amendments to the existing regulations that would extend
NEPA to development assistance to the fullest extent
possible in an effort to persuade AID to respond. 8
At the same time, the Center for Law and Social Policy,
a public interest lobbying organization began to apply
pressure on AID to implement NEPA. This was consistent with
the active support by lobbying groups for environmental
legislation and their efforts to ensure that federal
agencies responded to NEPA, if necessary by initiating
7. United States. Agency for International Development.
"Environmental Procedures", 36 Fed.. Reg. 22686.
8. Le tter from Russell Train, chairman of CEQ to John
Hannah, Administrator of AID, April 6, 1971.
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legislation. During 1971 and 1972, there was also some
Congressional interest in AID's response to NEPA. The
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries requested information from AID on what steps had
been taken in compliance with NEPA. AID submitted a package
of materials in January 1972 that included the AID Manual
Circulars, mentioned above, an environmental activities
report, case studies of the environmental impact of
development projects and details of the AID pesticide
review panel. 9
However, according to one of the Center for Law and
Social Policy attorneys, AID was stalling and seemed
unprepared to take any firm action, particularly in
relation to one of the Center's main concerns, namely
pesticide use.10 AID considered the possibility that it
would be the subject of litigation but thought it less
likely as time went on. The Center continued to apply
pressure, especially on the subject of pesticides. In
April 1973, the Center objected to AID's response on the
9. These materials were included in United States Congress.
House. Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
of the Commit tee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Administration of the National Environmental Policv Act.
1972. Hearings, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. 92-25, Washington
D.C., Government Printing Office, 1972, pp.1687-1763.
10. Interview with Elton Greenberg, April 1984.
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following grounds:
1. the environmental regulations only applied to capital
projects, which were less significant in AID's
program than before;
2. there had been no compliance with respect to
financing commodities, such as pesticides, or
technical assistance;
3. there was no public input into the internal review of
pesticide use that was undertaken;
4. in the two years since the regulation were adopted
there had not been a single EIS.11
In 1974, the focus on AID's pesticide program
intensified on the part of both the Center for Law and
Social Policy and the CEQ. However, there was little
response from AID. By 1975 the environmental organizations,
concerned with the implementation of NEPA, came to the
realization that AID would not comply voluntarily and
decided to file a suit. According to one of the attorneys
at the NRDC, which was among the plaintiffs, the
environmental organizations had concluded that filing a
11. Let ter from Richard Frank, Center for Law and Social
Policy, to James Fowler, Executive Director, Commit tee on
Environment and Development, AID, April 19, 1973.
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suit would not inhibit any voluntary compliance since
almost none was forthcoming and that AID's inertia stemmed
from its view that there was no longer a threat of a
suit. 1 2
In mid 1975 a consortium of environmental organizations
brought a suit against AID, citing the failure to prepare
an EIS on the financing of pesticide sales overseas and the
failure to establish procedures for systematic review of
all AID projects and programs.13 By this time, 1975, the
New Directions mandate was in effect and AID was preparing
few of the traditional capital projects that the original
procedures addressed.
Once the suit was filed, AID settled very easily. The
agency was quite shocked to discover that litigation had in
fact been initiated and proved willing to negotiate with
the environmental lobbies and the CEQ. There was growing
interest in Congress at the time in the quality of the
development assistance programs and AID did not want to
provide Congress with more reason to question its
12. Interview with Jacob Scheer, NRDC, April 1984.
13. Blake e t al., op&s.cit., P.38. Pesticides had, of
course, played an important role in focusing support behind
NE PA.
14. Interview with Elton Greenberg, formerly of the Center
for Law and Social Policy, April 1984.
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opera tions.
By August 1975, AID issued Environmental Policy
Determination 63, but CEO and the environmental
organizations did not find it satisfactory. In December
1975, the parties agreed to a settlement. AID undertook to
prepare new regulations for implementing the intent of
NEPA, a programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on
AID's pesticide program, interim pesticide regulations and
eventually final pesticide regulations.1 These new
environmental procedures were issued in June 1976.16 The
settlement also prompted the Agency to issue an
Environmental Policy Determination that undertook to
"assist in developing the indigenous capabilities of
developing countries" to assess and mitigate environmental
effects of projects and to assess and mitigate the effects
of proposed AID projects in conjunction with the host
government. 17
Some of the same environmental lobbies that had brought
the suit against AID believed it was necessary to
supplement the environmental regulations with a
15. Blake et al., op.Gcit., p.38.
16. 22 CFR Part 216. 1978.
17. United States. Agency for International Development,
"Environmental Policy De termination", PD-63, 1975, p.1.
- 169 -
Congressional mandate for AID to promote and support
environmental protection and natural resource management.
One of the NRDC attorneys cites the case of a request by
the Costa Rican government for assistance for its national
park program which AID declined on the grounds that it had
no authority to fund such activities.18 NRDC and other
environmental organizations lobbied the House Foreign
Affairs Committee and enlisted the support of Senator Pell
and Congressman Solarz who played key roles in drawing up
the 1977 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. These
efforts met little resistance from AID or other Interests
and thus a specific mandate for environmental protection
and natural resource management came about. The Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) amendments of 1977 contained a new
section, Section 118, that called upon AID to:
"Furnish assistance...for developing and
strengthening the capacity of less developed
countries to protect and manage their environment
and natural resources. Special efforts shall be
made to maintain and where possible restore the
land, vegetation, water, wildlife and other
resources upon which depend economic growjg and
well-being, especially that of the poor."
Soon after, in 1978, the Congress amended Section 102
of the FAA directing AID to include environment and natural
18. Interview with Jacob Scheer, NRDC, April 1984.
19. 22 U.S.C. Sec. Z15ip.
20. 2Z U.S.C. Sec. 2151-1
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resources in the list of "critical problems" to address. 2 0
At the same time, it amended Section 118 of the same act to
legally oblige AID to consider the environmental impacts of
all its development assistance activities:
"In carrying out programs under this chapter,
the President shall take into consideration the
environmejal consequences of development
actions."
Finally, President Carter reaffirmed the
extra-territoriality of NEPA, (already fairly clear to AID)
in Executive Order 12114 in 1979.22
Although the original suit had cited the failure to
adopt adequate environmental impact assessment procedures,
the 1975 policy determination, the Congressional mandates
in 1977 and 1978, and a subsequent 1978 policy
determination23 all embraced a wider environmental and
natural resource management policy than simply
environmental assessment of projects. For instance, the
1978 amendments to Section 118 of th. FAA also said:
In furtherance of the purpose of this
section, the President shall carry out studies to
identify the major environment and natural
21. 22 U.S.C. 2151p.
22. Executive Order 12114, "Environmental Effects Abroad of
Major Federal Actions", Jan. 4th, 1979, 44 F.R. 1957.
23. United States. Agency for Tnternational Development,
"AID Policy on Environment and Natural Resources," (May IS,
1978) in AID Handbook No. 1, Supplement A-38, 1978.
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resource problems, and the institutional
capabilities to solve those problems, which exist
in developing countries. The results of these
studies shall b24reported to the Congress by
March 1, 1979."
Congress also mandated AID to address the problems of
deforestation and soil erosion within the part of its
budget allocated to "Agriculture, Nutrition and Rural
Development."25 The 1978 policy statement lists new
categories of assistance, AID expected to provide,
"reforestation, watershed protection, wildlife protection,
wildlife preservation, improvement in the physical
environment, environmental education and institution
strengthening." It also commits the Agency to training its
own personnel, drawing upon the expertise of other federal
agencies and cooperating with non-governmental
organizations and other international donors. 26
The scope of the mandates and policy statements thus
combines the codification of AID's responsibilities under
NEPA with a more developmental mandate in line with the
"New Directions" and basic needs orientation of the
24. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2151p. See United States. Agency for
International Development, Environmental and Natural
Resourct Nanagement in Developing Countries :A Reort to
Connress.., Volume I: Report, Washington D.C., 1979.
25. 22 U.S.C. 2151a.
26. United States. Agency for Internationa] Development,
"AID Policy on Environment and Natural Resources", 1978,
p.2.
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development assistance program. Furthermore President
Carter lent more weight to the responsibility of the U.S.
for the environmental impacts overseas of any major federal
actions, a statement designed to reaffirm the intent of
NEPA towards the world wide environment but which
reinforced the developmental mandate for environment and
natural resources with which it coincided.27
It is likely that AID policy makers found a mandate for
including environment and natural resources in their
functional sectors more palatable than the precise
commitments to carry out assessments. Many AID staff
members, especially in the field, probably felt that
NEPA-style impact statements were not suited to AID's goals
and operating style and would be hard to implement in
developing countries. Attention to severe environmental
degradation and natural resource management problems in
developing countries, however, converged with and was
included in AID's main policy paper of that period.2 9
27. Executive Order 12114, o.&cit.
28. These views were expressed by AID Washington
environmental staff and consultants hired by AID to carry
out environmental assessments when interviewed in 1980
about the implementation of the assessment procedures up to
that point'.
29. United States. Agency for International Development, "A
Strategy for a More Effective Bilateral Development
Assistance Program: AID Policy Paper", Washington D.C.,
March 1978.
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At first, the bulk of AID's effort was devoted to
fulfilling the assessment requirements. AID's
Environmental Coordinator estimates that, during the period
1976-1979, 90% of environmental staff effort was taken up
with assessments, dropping to 60% during 1979-1981 and 20%
since 1981.30
Implementing the environmental assessment regulations
required considerable reforms within AID. The Agency had to
recruit staff members with the appropriate experience31; it
had to identify eligible consulting firms and contractors
from universities qualified to prepare assessments32; AID
appointed three Indefinite Quantity Contractors (IOC)
30. Printz, Albert, Presentation to Talloires Seminar, May
1984.
31. AID appointed an Environmental Coordinator, since 1978
located in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination,
Environmental Officers for the regional bureaus and
eventually an Environmental Protection Specialist in the
Office of Science and Technology within the Development
Support Bureau. Also each Mission was required to designate
an Environmental Officer, in addition to other duties and
usually without prior environmental knowledge and
experience. See Blake et al., oWt.cit, pp.184-193.
32. Title XII of the FAA requires AID to make use of
land-grant colleges for appropriate services. 22 U.S.C.
2220a Sec.312 of Public Law 94-161. Other regulations apply
to hiring minority and small firms for consulting services.
- 174 -
initially to carry out environmental services not all of
which proved successful; in 1979, six IQC's were appointed
with better prospects of success 33; in addition to the
statutory restrictions, there was a shortage of U.S.
consulting firms with both environmental assessment and
overseas development experience3; AID had to educate its
regional bureaus and Missions about the regulations and
prepare procedural and technical guidance. 3 5
The quality of the first generation of environmental
assessments was not high and certainly not of much value in
improving the preparation of the projects concerned. In
the words of AID's Administrator, testifying to Congress in
1982:
"At first the assessments took on some of the
characteristics of the early NEPA impact
statements--separate documents prepared by a
visiting team, performed often after the project
planning was well under way, and highly
duplicative of material presented elsewhere in
33. See Blake et al., op. cit., pp.214-215.
34. See Horberry, John and Brian Johnson, The Environmental
Performance of Consulting Firms in Development Aid,
International Institute for Environment and Development,
London, 1981, pp.67-69.
35. The regulations were quite complex, involving an
Initial Environmental Examination, a Threshold Decision,
and the possibility of an Environmental Assessment or
Environmental Impact Assessment to be integrated with the
project review process and involving division of
responsibility between mission and Washington staffs. See
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the project documentation. 3 6
In a study of the environmental policies, procedures
and performance of AID, carried out in 1978-1979 by the
Natural Resources Defense Council as part of a six country
comparative study of bilateral aid agencies by the
International Institute for Environment and Development,
the authors came to the following conclusions about the
early environmental assessments:
- the programmatic EIS on AID's Pest Management Program
resulted in significant changes in AID's operations.
(This had been the main cause of the law suit in
1975.)
- Several other assessments had positive effects on the
design of the projects.
- The procedures had increased the sensitivity of AID
staff members to environmental problems, brought about
environmental training and demonstrated the need for
technical guidance.
- Initial implementation difficulties included : poor
knowledge within the Agency about the procedural acr
36. Peter McPherson, "Prepared Statement of the
Administrator, Agency for International Development", in
United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations of the Commit tee on roreign
Affairs, Review._of the Global Environment 10 Years alter
5tocikholrw. Hearings, 97 Cong. Znd sess. Washington D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1982, p.34.
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technical requirements; inexperienced contractors;
inadequate review of assessments; IEE's were more
procedural than substantive and provided an inadequate
basis for judging the need for further assessment;
resistance from the field staff; poor guidance from
Washington to the field staff; excessive emphasis on
the procedural requirements, leading to unnecessary
length and poor focus on potential problems;
inadequate integration with project design and
insufficient attention to measures to alleviate
specific site impacts; preparation too late to
contribute to the Project Paper. 3 7
In 1983, 1 reviewed about twenty early Environmental
Assessments to see whether they identified specific
environmental problems and, if so, whether they recommended
changes in project design. It was clear that most
Environmental Assessments of that period were isolated from
the project design process, did not present any analysis of
alternative design features or implementation measures and
contained much irrelevant, descriptive information. Nor
was it clear from reading them what potential problem had
provoked a judgement that an assessment was needed.
Subsequent interviews with the current regional bureau
37. Blake et al., n..cits.L., pp.43-53.
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Environmental Officers confirmed the conclusion that few of
the early assessments had influenced project design at
all.38 Many had simply concluded that no problems were
likely, which may have been true; others were attached to
Project Papers to satisfy the procedural requirement. This
Is not the place to argue whether the environmental
consequences of the projects bore out the conclusions of
the assessments. I do want to note that few assessments
focussed on whatever potential problems had been initially
identified and few were integrated with the project design
process.
The recipient governments were indifferent to the
environmental procedures as long as the studies did not
consume their funds. Any resistance on their part could,
however, be overcome by AID by arging that U.S. law
required the assessments before the funds could be
released. Mission staff members, whether they approved of
assessments or not, had no choice but to comply with the
38. This brief review of the early assessments and
follow-up interviews with regional Environmental Officers
had the purpose of collecting information on cases of
project design being changed on the basis of Environmental
Assessments. The staff interviewed were able to give
examples of recent assessments that had significantly
improved project design. See H-orberry, John, Status and
Application of Environmental Imoact Assessment for
Development, (Report to the Bundesministerium fur
Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, rederal Republic of
Germany), Gland, International Union for Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources, 1984, pp.49-50
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procedures at least. The Washington staff members may not
all have welcomed the new policy, but had mandatory
regulations to back up the necessary reforms. Once several
staff members were in place and had gained some experience,
it was clearly in their interest to improve the
implementation of the regulations. It was unlikely that
NEPA would be repealed, and Congress supported AID's
assistance for environment and natural resources.
The first steps toward improving the assessment
procedures took the form of improved technical guidance,
programmatic environmental assessments of a class of
projects, and the preparation of design criteria for
specific types of projects. Some efforts were made to
increase the participation of recipient country officials
as opportunities presented themselves. For instance,
environmental consultants were placed in AID missions in
Indonesia and the Philippines. Local organizations were
encouraged to cooperate in carrying out assessments in
these two countries. In India the mission identified and
evaluated a number of consulting organizations for possible
involvement in the preparation of assessments.3 9
Finally, the Agency revised its formal procedures in
39. Blake et alo. i. pp.53-57.
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line with the revisions to the CEQ regulations for
preparing EIS's under NEPA.40 As the Administrator has put
it:
"The revised procedures, which became final
(on October 23, 1980) introduced some appropriate
flexibility in the environmental evaluation
process and reduced the potential for delays in
processing. They eliminated from the requirement
of environmental review, categories of projects
with little or no likelihood of environmental
impact. Conversely, the procedures identified
types of projects which most likely result in
significant adverse impact which will always need
further environmental study. For these projects,
the procedures established a process of working
with the host country to define, at an early
stage, the likely areas of significant adverse
impact to be fully evaluated during subsequent
stages of project preparation. The procedures
also now recognize the appropriateness of using
some common design criteria for activities with
predictable impacts or requiring a
straightforward environmental review and
encourage the participation of local or host
government expertise as a means o&1 strengthening
their capabilities in this area."
In addition AID was able to improve the image of
environmental assessments within the Agency and gain very
valuable experience in two ways. One was the stream of
capital projects in the Near-East region under the Economic
Security Assistance program. Examples are the Maquarin Dam
40. 22 CFR Part 216; See also United States. Agency for
International Development, "Memorandum for the executive
staff, mission directors and environraental officers from
Albert Printz, Jr., Environmental Affairs Coordinator on
Revised Environmental Procedures and Pro ject Design
Criteria", January 22, 1981.
41. McPherson, o.aa c.it..., pp.35-36.
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and Jordan Valley Irrigation System in Jordan and the
Alexandria and Greater Cairo Wastewater System in Egypt.
The scale and complexity of these assessments required
hiring large experienced consulting firms and, although
there have been difficulties, it has been possible to
benefit from the experience. The AID staff members
concerned have become better at ensuring that recipient
agencies participate in scoping the assessment with the
consultants, that the consultants focus on alternative
design options and that the assessment results in an
agreement between AID and the recipient to avoid or
mitigate potential problems.42
The most recent Environmental Assessment completed in
1982 of the Greater Cairo Wastewater System West Bank
included a serious comparison of alternative options and
their economic, reliability, public health and
institutional implications and proposes a mitigation plan
to be negotiated with the recipient government. 4 3
The other source of experience and improved performance
42. Interview with Stephen Lintner, Near-East Bureau
Environmental Officer, AID, 1983.
43. Interview with Stephen Lintner, Near-East Bureau
Environmental Officer, AID, 1983; Interviews with staff of
Arthur D Lit tle, Inc, and Camp Dresser Mckee, 1981: see
St anley Consul1t ant s, Environmen tal_ Assessmen t o f Greater
Cairo Wastewater System : West Bank, 1982.
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was the practice of funding the Environmental Assessment of
large multi-donor projects that AID was not otherwise
involved with or was only funding a small part. The first
case, that of Senegal River Basin Development scheme, a
project jointly implemented by three governments, was an
enormous and not particularly successful effort started in
1977. The intergovernmental development authority had
little sympathy or capacity for solving the likely
environmental problems and neither AID or the consulting
firm had the necessary experience for such a difficult and
complex task.44 The Environmental Assessment of the
Mahaweli development scheme in Sri Lanka was much more
successful, judging by the adoption by the relevant Sri
Lankan authorities of an environmental mitigation
implementation plan resulting from the assessment. The
assessment and plan of action were carefully integrated
with the complex project planning and implementation
44. Interview with staff of Ganne tt, Fleming, Corddry and
Carpenter, Inc, 1981; interview with Jim Sherbourne and
George Thompson, Environmental Officers, Africa Bureau,
AID, 1983; see Ganne tt, Fleming, Corddry and Carpenter.
Inc, Assessment of nvironmental Effects of Proposed
Devecomets n th SeegalRivr Bain.1981.
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process and the effort was managed in close cooperation
with the Sri Lankan authorities.45
Since the new regulations of 1980, the environmental
staff officers of AID, who have not been reluctant to admit
the difficulties of the system in the past are pleased with
the benefits that environmental assessments have delivered
to the design and management of projects and the serious
mistakes thus avoided. The environmental officers also
report that in recent years, the effort of complying with
the regulations has become more a positive contribution to
project preparation. Missions understand the requirements
better and have better guidelines to assist them in
carrying out the various stages of the environmental
procedures. There is greater emphasis on effects that will
cause "significant" harm to the environment and engaging
the host country officials in "scoping" the assessment.
There is also a greater inclination on the part of mission
staff to anticipate recurrent environmental prcblems in the
early stages of project preparation in order to demonstrate
at the stage of the Initial Environmental Examination that
45. Interviews with staff of
Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 1981 and 1982;
interviews with Mike Philley, Asian Bureau Environmental
Officer, 1982 and 1983; see
Tippe tts-Abbet t-McCarthy-Strat ton, Environmental Assessment
and Environmental Plan of Action: Accelerated Mahaweli
Development Programme, 1981
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an assessment is not needed. 4 6
AID supports other environmental activities, such as
training, institution-building, the national environmental
profiles program, implementation support (by means of the
IIED/IUCN Joint Environmental Service Environmental
Planning and Management Program), and direct funding for
forestry, natural resource management, and environmental
improvement. Looking at the whole picture, AID's current
environmental activities bear the hallmark, not of an
unwanted domestic legal requirement but an integrated
developmental concern that addresses the resources and
management strategies on which so many of the rural poor in
developing countries depend. The 1981 amendments to the
FAA and AID's 1983 policy determination reflect this more
balanced approach that includes a relatively well
integrated assessment procedure but places more positive
46. Interviews with regional bureau Environmental Officers
1983; interviews with Asian Bureau Regional Mission
Environmental Officer, Indonesia Mission and Environmental
Officer, Philippines Mission, 1982; see also McPherson, aa.
ciL., p.36-38. See United States. Agency for International
Development. "Environment Sector Strategy Paper",
Washington D.C., December 1982, p.2 for a current statement
of the environmental assessment process for Mission staff.
47. See McPherson, .oL..cit., pp.39-64, for a full account
of AID's direct assistance for environment and natural
resources. These have risen from $13 millions in FY1978 to
an estimated $120 millions in FY1984; United States Agency
for International Development, Congressional Presentation.
Fiscal Year 1984. Main Volume, Washington D.C., 1983,
p.234.
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emphasis on directing some of the available development
assistance resources to environmental and natural resource
programs of relevance to the recipient governments.48 The
1982 Environment Sector Strategy Paper says:
"The strategy to implement AID
[environmentalJ policy has six components which
should be viewed as a mutually reinforcing set of
activities: environmental analysis, improving
host country environmental policy, building human
and institutional capabilities, technology and
information transfer, environmjgtal research, and
cooperation with other donors.
The current picture, in mid 1984, owes more to a
developmental mandate than to NEPA - or so it appears.
But, without NEPA, its supporters and their attention to
AID, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms to the
review process would have been accepted, or that the
Congress would have developed tfsa mandate, or that the
necessary expertise would have been put in place, or that
the missions would have appointed environmental officers
however inexperienced and uninterested, or that many
governments would have cooperated with AID in preparing
projects that focussed on environmental and natural
48. 22 U.S.C. Sec 2151p; United States. Agency for
International Development, Environmenta_ and Natural
Resource Aspects of Develonment Assistance, PD-6, April 26,
1983.
49. United States. Agency for International Development.
"Environment Sector Strategy Paper", Washington D.C.,
December 1982, p.1.
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resource issues.
The Political and Financial Structure of AID?
AID is a federal agency of the United States
Government. It is responsible for most of the non-military
bilateral assistance that the U.S. provides to other
countries. Its Administrator reports to the Secretary of
State on matters of policy and budget while retaining
authority over day-to-day operations. As part of the
federal administration, it is ultimately responsible to the
President who appoints the Administrator and many of the
senior officers and sets the broad policies for its
operations.
Other federal agencies, particularly the State,
Treasury and Commerce Departments play a role in defining
AID's policies, influencing its decisions and requiring
certain types of performance. The Office of Management and
Budget oversees the disbursement of the funds on behalf of
the administration and promotes the interests of
cost-effectiveness and financial control.
The Congress appropriates the funds that AID spends.
The appropriations request that the Congress requires AID
to submit is extremely detailed and the appropriate
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committees review some individual activities and even some
projects before approving the funds. In a comparison of
aid procedures of Development Assistance Committee members,
the OECD reports that "the American Congress requires
detailed breakdowns of aid activities and their estimated
costs as part of the budgetary cycle, thereby authorizing
AID to approve individual projects or activities."5 The
Congress oversees AID's activities closely and can summon
its Administrator or other senior officials to testify in
front of a number of Congressional Committees. The General
Accounting Office monitors AID's disbursement program on
behalf of the Congress.
Table 9. TOTAL U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMMITMENTS. U.S.$ millions.
Fiscal Year: 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
----------------------------- 
-------------------
3181 4082 3848 4062 4209 4990
Source: United States. Agency for International Development,
U.S. Overseas TLoans and Grants and Assistance from
International Organizations, Washington D.C., 1982.
50. OECD, Compendiulm of Aid Procedures; A Review of Current
Practices of Members of the Develooment Assistance
Lommi.Lt..tee, Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1981, p.22.
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AID's budget consists of the development assistance account
and the Economic Security Assistance program or Security
Supporting Assitance as it was formerly known, which is
spent to promote U.S. security interests in selected
nations.
The main development assistance program of AID, about
$1350 million in rY 1984, comprises six functional areas:
agriculture, rural development and nutrition; population
planning; health; education and human resources; energy,
private voluntary organizations and selected development
activities; science and technology.51 The development
assistance account includes several other items such as the
Sahel Development Program, American Schools and Hospitals,
International Disaster Assistance, operating expenses and
U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations, amounting
to about $450 million.52 The Economic Security Assistance
program, while comprised mainly of cash and commodity
import support, does include some traditional capital
51. United States. Agency for International Development,
Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1984 Main Volume.
Washington D.C., 1983, p.5.
52. ...t4
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TABLE 10
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM TRENDS: FY 1980-1983
US$ millions
I FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983
actual actual est. est.
Functional Development Asssistance: I
Agriculire, Rural Development
and Nutrition.................... 1 630.8 652.6 700.5 700.0
Population Planning.............. | 184.9 189.9 211.0 201.0
Health...........................1 129.9 143.3 133.7 114.1
Education and Human Resources
Development...................... .. . 97.8 102.7 103.8 116.4
Energy, Private Voluntary
Organizations and Selected
Development Activities..............119.8 112.9 138.1 156.7
Science and Technologyn...........
SUBTOTAL, Functional Accounts......I 1,113.q 1,213.3 1,297.1 1,298.2
(Grants, included above).........1 (726.6) (826.3) (906.3) (905.8)
(Loans, included above)............ .(436.7) (387.0) (390.9) (392.5)
Sahel Development Program.......... 76.5 95.6 96.2 93.8
American Schools and Hospitals
Abroad............................. .. .. 25.0 20.0 20.0 7.5
International Disaster Assistance.. 55.9 51.5 73.2 25.0
Miscellaneous Prior Year Accounts.. ---- 2.
SUBTOTAL, Functional and Other..... 1,320.8 1,382.5 1,488.3 1,424.5
Operating Expenses................. 273.0 302.8 333.0 377.0
Foreign Service Retirement Fund.... 26.7 2 7.8 31l 3.
TOTAL, AID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.. 1,620.5 1,713.2 1,854.9 1,836.0
Economic Support Fund............... iLJ.1 L.2.199. 2i5640 2.886.0
TOTAL, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT........................I 3,778.7 3,912.5 4,418.9 4,722.9
Source: United States Agency for International Development,
Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1983. Main Volume,
1982. These totals do not include contributions to
multi lateral organizations.
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projects, particularly in the Middle East which are of
relevance to this study because of their environmental
. . 53implications.
The broad policy objectives that have shaped the
development assistance program over the past decade are set
out in the 1973 "New Directions" and 1978 "basic human
needs" amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, namely to
reorient assistance towards alleviating poverty and
inequitable income distribution and to meet the basic needs
of the poor, with an emphasis on food production and rural
development.54 Additional amendments call attention to
environment and natural resources, appropriate technology,
women in development, energy and assisting the private
sector,55
The development assistance account is appropriated for
53. Between 1975 and 1979, 15% of the economic security
assistance program was for project aid, according to AID
figures quoted in Congressional Budget Office, Assisting
the Developing.Countries: roreign Aid and Trade Policies of
the United States, Washington D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1980, p.20.
54. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2151 (a) & (b); U.S.C. Congressional and
Administrative News, 1973, pp.2806-2867 & 1978,
pp.2354-2356, 2368-2370; see also Rough, Richard, Eco..anmic
Assistance and Security: Re thinkingz U.S. Policy, Washington
D.C., National Defense University Press, 1982, pp.59-64,
for an elaboration of Basic Human Needs goals.
55. See 22 U.S.C. Secs. Zi51p, 2151n, 2151k, Z151n, 2151q,
2151u.
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the "functional" sectors listed above, and regional bureaus
receive allocations to be distributed among the missions
according to their submission of proposals. Following the
"New Direction" and "basic human needs" amendments, most of
the development assistance account goes to the poorest
people in the poorest countries, and is made available at
highl- 'oncessionary rates. 5 6
The organization is more decentralized than other
development assistance agencies (with approximately 42% of
its total staff based in overseas missions, compared to the
next highest, the EEC, with 36% and France, 27%)57 and
missions enjoy considerable discretion. Since 1979 mission
directors have the authority to approve projects having a
total value of up to $5 million over the life of the
pro ject.58
56. 42% of AID's development assistance request for FY1984
was to be allotted to countries with per capita incomes
under $375 and 75.5% to countries with per capita incomes
under $795; United States. Agency for International
Development, Congressional Presentatin. Fiscal Year 1984.
Main Volume, Washington, D.C., 1983, p.10. The grant
element of total U.S. official development assistance was
93.4% in 1981; Development Assistance Committee,
Development Cooperation :1982Review, OECD, Paris, 1982
p.222.
57. OECD, opt..cit±., p.32.
58. Mickelwai t, Donald et al ., Ne~w_.Direciorns ..in
Development: A Study of U.S. AID, Boulder, Westview Press,
1979, p.xix.
- 191 -
The formal procedures for development, review and
approval of projects govern the responsibilities of
missions and headquarters for adequately preparing the
project before approval. In brief, missions receive
requests from recipient governments, (or Identify projects
jointly with the government, for instance, in the course of
preparing the annual Country Development Strategy
Statement). The mission then prepares a Project
Identification Document for each of the projects it
proposes to develop, and submits them to the regional
bureau and policy bureau in Washington for review. When
Project Identification Documents are apprc'ved, they are
incorporated into the mission's contribution to AID's
Annual Budget Submission, which is submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget and ultimately to Congress for
approval of funds. Meanwhile once the Project
Identification Document is approved, the mission and
regional bureau can start to prepare a Project Paper
representing the full analysis and design of the project.
Final approval of the Project Paper by Washington allow5 a
Project Agreement to be drawn up between AID and the
government. It usually takes at least 2 years from Project
Identification Document to implementation, and sometimes
considerably longer.
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AID's Accountability System.
The distinctive characteristic of the AID case is that
the agency has adopted a mandatory environmental assessment
requirement. I have described above how this came about as
a result of domestic legislation and the efforts of
environmental organizations to ensure AID's compliance
Given the focus of my analysis, the simple answer to the
question of how the political and financial structure of
AID determines its capacity to assess the environmental
effects of its funding program must surely rest with the
government's power to extract accountability from the
agency via regulatory legislation and Congressional
mandate. The issue is, however, more complex, and below I
expand on the accountability system AID faces, how it
affects the operations of the agency and (in the final
section), how environmental assessment is influenced by
this accountability system in comparison with other policy
objectives.
Naturally enough, AID's accountability derives from its
status as a government agency. Thus, at the most
superficial level, AID is accountable to the Executive,
Congress and the Judiciary for enhancing the political,
economic and humanitarian interests of the United States by
transferring development assistance to poor countries
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according to its legislative mandate and relevant
regulations. Obviously, the pattern and content of AID's
accountability to the U.S government is more complicated.
The various parts of the government seek different goals,
by different mechanisms and with a different amount of
consistency and influence.
An investigation of AID's accountability should reflect
its mission and objectives. Although foreign assistance is
not popular with the electorate, it is generally assumed
that the Executive and Congress value foreign assistance as
a means of enhancing tlobal, strategic and economic
security in the interests of the U.S., of fulfilling its
economic and humanitarian responsibility to the poorest
countries, of securing strategic and economic advantages in
particular countries and regions, and of promoting U.S
trade and commercial interests abroad.5 9
Since my focus is on the development assistance
program, the significance of stecific political interests
is small. The Economic Security Assistance program is
specifically intended to serve U.S. security objectives by
channelling assistance, mainly non-project funds, to
59. Hough, o. cis.t., pp.57-74; Congressional Budge t Office,
orci. pp.11-27.
60. Hough, op i. p.72.
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countries of special importance to U.S. foreign policy. 6 0
The development assistance appropriation, on the other
hand, is requested by sector, not country, and is
distributed among a wide range of recipients.61 It also,
pursuant to the FAA, must be allocated according to the
need of the recipients and the commitment of the host
government to addressing basic human needs.62. Financial
and economic interests are also of little significance.
Unlike some other bilateral agencies, there is litt]e
explicit effort to pursue specific trade advantages by
targeting assistance to certain countries, even though most
assistance is tied to the purchase of U S goods and
services.63 Also because most assistance is in the form of
grants or soft loans, there is little emphasis on
creditworthiness or ensuring an adequate economic or
61. idem, pp.31-37, 60; Congressional Budget Office, n-&.
rjl. , pp.4-5, 15-21.
62. 22 U.S C. Sec. 2151-1(b)
63. In 1981, 28.3% of grants and 35.6% of loans in the
total U.S. foreign assistance budge t were untied
Development Assistance Commit tee, op i. p.192.
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financial return. In fact, AID's development assistance
mandate specifies the "needs" and "commitment" criteria for
selecting recipients and projects. 6 4
The dominant mission for the development assistance
program is to deliver developmental benefits as is
indicated by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
Congressional concern for the contribution of development
assistance to alleviating poverty and correcting
inequitable income distribution.65 What one needs to ask
is - to what extent is this reinforced or contradicted by
the accountability system?
Before discussing in more detail how the government
holds AID accountable, it is worth adding some perspective
to this view of the goals of development assistance
program. Development assistance's share of the budget has
declined relative to Econcmic Security Assistance over the
past decade, indicating that the Executive, with the
approval of Congress, has preferred to allocate foreign
64. Hough, op. it., P.63.
65. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2151, 2151-1; U.S.C. Congressional and
Administrative News, 1978, pp.2354-2356 & 2368-2370. See
also, Rough, on.s cit., p.60.
66. During 1970-1979, the Economic Security Assistance
tripled and the development assistance program fell
slightly in constant dollars, Congressional Budge t Office,
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assistance in support of non-developmental policies.66 Nor
is there much evidence of the Executive's direct concern
for developmental impact. John Sewell of the Overseas
Development Council reports that most developmental
initiatives have come from Congress and been resisted by
the administration.67 The Executive's policies reflect the
major foreign policy objectives of aid, certain domestic
policies that should be adhered to, such as a focus on the
private sector, and the administrative aspects of the
program. Finally, Congress contains both supporters and
opponents of development assistance. While some members
have steered the legislation towards a more developmental
focus, others have sniped at AID's budget and performance
and tolerate it only when convinced of direct commercial
and political gains to the U.S.6 8
But, given that the main objective of the development
assistance program is to achieve developmental benefits,
how is AID held accountable and by whom? First, AID is
accountable through its Administrator to the Executive and
the Administration. The President has the authority to
issue Executive Orders governing or affecting AID's
67. Sewell, John and the staff of the Overseas Development
Council, The United States and World Develonment. Agenda
L1980, New York, Praeger, 1980, p.114.
68. H-ough, oa.p.. cJi., p.58.
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operations and to demand accountability for their
implementation. He also appoints the Administrator and
other senior officials. The State Department, although it
exercises most influence on the Economic Security
Assistance program, takes some interest in how the
development assistance budget is spent and may intervene if
foreign policy is at stake. The Treasury and Commerce
Departments exercise some influence over AID's operations
and decisions in the interest of balance-of-payments and
trade. The Agriculture Department has a special interest
in food aid. Finally, the Office of Management and Budget
oversees cost-effectiveness, program development and policy
formation.
Thus, from the Executive and Administration side of the
government, holding AID accountable mainly forces AID to
serve the interests of the President and the other federal
agencies.69 Only Presidential Executive Orders and the
responsibility of AID's Administrator to implement them
could be construed as having the potential to enforce
development assistance objectives. But, in practice, this
channel is usually dictated by administrative and domestic
interests not specifically aimed at the development
69. Tendler, Judith, Inside Foreian Add, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp.43-47. Tendler
illustrates how vulnerable AID is to its critics within the
Administration.
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assistance program. 70 However, such accountability has the
potential to be both strict and penetrating.71 AID cannot
ignore the demands of other federal agencies or the
government watchdogs, and has to present information on the
results of projects, for instance the effects on
balance-of-payments or cost effectiveness.72 It must also
comply with government regulations concerning the use of
private voluntary organizations, small and disadvantaged
contractors and land-grant universities (Title XII)
70. See U.S.C. Congressional and Administrative News,
generally, for Executive Orders that pertain to the FAA.
Most concern the administrative provisions for the foreign
assistance program.
71. Tendler argues that AID's operations are significantly
conditioned by the need to comply with demands and policies
of other agencies, o.acit., pp.47-50.
72. For instance, the General Accounting Office conducted a
study of AID's cost-effectiveness and management recently;
see United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security of the Committee on
Government Operations. AID's Administration and Management
Problems in Promoting Foreign Economic Assistance.
Hearings, 97 Cong. let sess., Washington D.C., Government
Printing Office, 1981, passim.
73. See 22 U.S.C. Sec 2151 for reference to the need for
increased minority participation in foreign assistance
activities, referring to Sec. 133 of PL95-88, and 22 U.S.C.
Secs. 2351 and 2352 for promoting the private sector and
small and minority business respectively; Title XII of the
Foreign Assistance Act directs AID to make more extensive
use of U.S. land-grant, sea-grant and other qualified
colleges and universities to carry out foreign assistance
programs, see United States. Agency for International
Development, Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1984.
Main Volume, Washington D.C.1983, pp. 206-209 for an
account of the Title XII program..
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. e 73
services.
AID is also accountable to the Congress. The Congress
plays an active role in setting the economic and
developmental policies of AID and can demard some account
of AID's performance via its committees. It also reviews
AID's performance with respect to items of the
Congressional mandate, such as human rights, the private
sector, population programs, women in development and
involvement of private voluntary organizations. However,
this is an uncoordinated and diffuse process. There are
numerous committees that concern themselves with AID's
performance in some way or other, each with a particular
orientation or perspective According to Sewell, 10
different Congressional committees and subcommittees
74. See recent House and Senate Appropriations Committee,
Foregn Assistance and Related Progarams Appropriations.
Hearings, passim. AID's Congressional Presentatign
accompanying its annual budget request addresses various
programs that Congress is concerned about. See also
special Congressional Hearings, for instance: United States
Congress. House. Committee on the Budget. Task Force on
International Trade and Finance, Export Financing Issues
and Foreign As-sistance. Hearings, 98 Cong. 1st sess.,
Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, March 1983,
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Subcommittee on Trade, Productivity and Economic Growth,
U.5. foreign Aid and the Private Sector: Is Partnershin
Possible? Hearings, 97 Cong. 1st sess., Washington D C.,
Government Printing Office, Oct. 1981; United States
Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Obectives
of U.S. Foreign Assistance: Does Developmnent Assistance
Benefit the Poor) Hearingis, 97 Cong. 2nd sess., Washington
D.C., Government Printing Office, Aug. 1982.
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examine the annual foreign aid legislation. Diffused power
in this process allows individual members to promote
special interests, such as restrictions on particular
countries, specific trade issues and human rights
concerns.75 It is through this mechanism that lobbying
groups make their formal presentations to Congress. It also
the case that skillful and energetic lobbies can influence
the subjects and content of special hearings in order to
promote their particular interest.
The Congressional budget process, in contrast, is
regular and predictable. AID has to submit a budget
request that specifies the individual development
activities to be funded, thus exposing itself to scrutiny
on the basis of development policy, political and economic
objectives and other concerns of Congress.76 The
significant feature of this process is its focus on early
proposals for development activities not the results of
project analysis or, even less likely, evaluations of
project results. AID is thus held accountable for how
project proposals conform to Congressional mandates in
order to facilitate the approval of its budget. The budget
75. Sewell, op i~. pp.114-115.
76. See United States Congress. House and Senate
Appropriations Commit tee, Foreigin Assistance and Related
P r oaramslAD roriatios Htfearinos_.
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orocess has most influence over major policy compliance and
sectoral emphasis, and only marginally affects actual
project decisions at the mission level. 7 7
Congress, to recap, screens the budget proposals to
ensure budgetary, political and developmental goals are
represented and to approve the annual appropriations for
each region. It also revises the legislation governing
foreign assistance policy and goals. It demands
accountability for any number of governmental and special
interests from AID. Finally it provides a vehicle for
lobbies and organizations to press their views and
objectives.
AID, like any other government entity, is accountable
to the judiciary regarding compliance with legislation and
regulations governing the action of public agencies. Thus,
governmental and private "'chdogs or special interests are
able to bring lawsuits against AID for failure to comply
with a regulation or procedure, just as they can with any
other government body. Clearly, AID has a statutory
accountability to the judiciary in the event of such a
suit. However, it is not easy to generalize about the
effect this accountability may have on the developmental
77. Interview with Bob Berg, ex-AID Director of Office of
Evaluation, April 1984.
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performance of AID activities outside the context of a
specific issue.
Finally, AID is accountable to the public - or more
specifically both to lobbies and special interests and also
the development community on which it depends for
professional services, such as consulting firms,
universities, and a wide range of research and private
voluntary organizations who advise, monitor and influence
AID on matters of developmental policy and performance,
notably the Overseas Development Council. Clearly AID has
no statutory accountability to these organizations, but
they wield some influence over AID's developmental policies
and performance. The capacity of outside organizations to
hold AID accountable depends on whether they can "raise
hell", whether they can bring about a mandate that
corresponds to their special interest and whether they can
mobilize follow-up support in Congress or within the OMB.
Once AID has set up a unit to promote a specialized policy,
then it is likely that the staff of such a unit will ally
with these outside interests in order to further their
concerns within the Congress and the agency. 7
78. For example, the Institute for Development Anthropology
and Cultural Survival provide a useful resource, and act as
contractors and supporters for the "social soundness" staf f
in AID.
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Over the past decade, there has been a pronounced
increase in the influence of special interests via
Congress, including population control, health, food aid
and nutrition, women in development, education and PVO's as
well as the environment.
To sum up, AID is accountable to Congress and the
Executive in both a positive way, meaning that AID must
comply with its mandate, and also a defensive manner,
responding to criticisms or pressures to comply with the
policies of other government bodies. The government sets
AID's mandate; it also enforces other relevant policies
acting in ways that deflect AID from achieving its goals.
Obviously this process is neither consistent or unitary and
most accountability is exercised prior to the funding
approval not on the basis of actual performance. The
positive accountability is most strict with respect to the
budgetary process, whereby Congress can scrutinize proposed
development activities. But budgetary review is neither
systematic or consistent. Defensive accountability tends
to divert the energies of AID towards objectives that are
not part of its developmental mandate, such as maximizing
balance-of-payments benefits. Judicial accountability is
less easy to characterize as it depends on the nature of
the agency's statutory responsibility, and accountability
to non-governmental organizations depends on the issue at
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stake and the capacity of the organization to evaluate the
performance of AID.
AID is most strictly accountable via the budget
process, but this has little effect beyond the preparation
of the proposals included in the budget request. The
Congressional committee system has the most potential to
scrutinize AID's developmental program, but I have argued
that this source of accountability is the most diffuse and
subject to special interests. The channel of
accountability that actually penetrates to the results of
projects, the oversight of the OMB and GAO, tends to
produce a defensive reaction from AID - because the
interests of the oversight bodies and the critics that
prompt them have little sympathy for AID's mission.7 9
Notably, there is almost no accountability for
financial or economic performance of projects.
Appropriations do not depend on demonstrating rates of
return or economic benefits - indeed, the "need" and
"commitment" criteria of AID's mandate encourage the
allocation of funds to places and recipients in the direst
economic straits. According to a study of the
79. Tendler, in her study of how AID behaves in response to
its task-environment, argues that AID's critics within the
government bring about a form of "goal displacement" within
AID; Tendler, op~s. ct, p.48-50.
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implementation of the "New Directions" mandate,
commissioned by AID from a consulting firm (DAI), economic
analysis, when performed, serves to facilitate approval of
a project proposal by AID/Washington but has little bearing
on the actual economic prospects of the project.80 Tendler
also argues that economic analysis of projects validates
design decisions already made and improves the packaging of
bureaucratic output 81
Accountatility. Organizational Response and
Environmental P1-anning
As described earlier, AID environmental procedures came
about because of NEPA and its powerful supporters.
Initially, AID failed to comply with NEPA to the
satisfacction of the CEO and environmental organizations and
in 1976, it was sued by several of these environmental
organizations. From that point, AID was forced to prepare
formal regulations for environmental assessment procedures
and to allocate the responsibility for implementation
80. Mickelwait,....o .stL., pp.210-211 and footnote 5, p.221.
81. Tendler, o&..citA.., p.95-96.
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within the organization so that AID fulfilled the intent of
NEPA as appropriate to its mission and unique operational
features.
Within this analytic framework, the question of how
AID's accountability system would promote or hinder the
environmental assessment and mitigation of projects is
somewhat after the fact. AID's environmental assessment
procedures stemmed from domestic legislation to which it
was held accountable by environmental groups and the
judiciary. The Congressional mandate came later and was
supported by the same environmental organizations who saw
the assessment requirement as a bridgehead for
strengthening the mandate. However, one can ask - what
might have happened had environmental responsiveness been
mandated by Congress in the absence of enforceable domestic
legislation, with similar status to women in development or
social soundness analysis, for instance? What influence
would the accountability system have had?
First I shall consider what effect AID's accountability
system has on organizational behavior within the Agency and
consequently on its ability to implement the policies that
the government demands of it. In particular, how do these
observations of how the government holds AID accountable
for fulfilling its mandate and conforming to other policies
illuminate the incentives facing the staff of AID in the
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Missions and Washington?
The pervasive organizational objectives of developing
the program (thereby sustaining or expanding the agency)
and ensuring the necessary disbursement levels are as true
of AID as any other funding agency. So too is the
uncertainty attached to the actual output of the
organization. What is distinctive about AID is its degree
of decentralization which is designed to ensure that there
are sufficient AID staff in the field to manage the program
despite high uncertainty. In combination with the other
distinctive influence on AID's organizational behavior -
its vulnerability to criticisms and the interests of other
parts of the government - one can identify a two part
relationship between the accountability system and
organizational behavior. One part concerns the Washington
staff and the need to satisfy Congress and other government
agencies. The other concerns the mission staff responsible
for developing the material for the program and achieving
desired disbursement levels.
Both Tendler and the DAI study find that there is
conflict between being accountable to Congress for the
selection and packaging of project proposals and the task
of managing and implementing effective projects in the
field. Washington staff devote their energies to
satisfying Congress, thereby withholding from the missions
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the authority for making decisions about designing,
reviewing and, most importantly, adjusting projectsd.
Mission staff members face keen incentives to generate more
projects and disbursements, but experience delays and
obstructions in the project review process that they
perceive to stem from Congessional requirements initiated
by special interests and provide little benefits to the
actual projects. Consequently their energies are diverted
82from project impplementation to packaging proposals.
The implications of these observations for particular
policy objectives are somewhat disheartening. Policies are
translated into requirements for project selection and
packaging by the Washington staff. These requirements are
imposed on field staff members who realize that it is not
the effect on project design and implementation that is
significant but the assurance to Congress that the policy
objiective has been taken into account before funds are
committed. Thus analysis of project impacts or certain
design features play an advocacy role and are not seen by
mission staff as functional for the execution of the
project. Only rarely do policy objectives become positive
influences on the design and implementation of projects;
even more rarely do they provide opportunities to develop
82. See Mickelwait et al., o. cit., pp.209-222, 225-231;
and Tendler, oap..sci.,... pp.23-25, 47-50.
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the funding program further - the acid test, in the eyes of
AID staff, is "will it leverage program?"
To put it another way, Congress issues mandates for AID
to fulfill, but AID's need to fend off criticism, satisfy
numerous special interests both within and without the
agency conflicts with the kind of organizational functions
needed for the primary task. Many of the policies that AID
is required to promote stem from domestic concerns, and,
while they may be quite desirable in themselves, are
enforced in ways counterproductive to the business of
generating and implementing reliable development
projects 83 The DAI study, for instance, concludes that
New Direction goals cannot be achieved without greater
decentralization of review and approval of projects and
without a shift of accountability from project proposals to
project results. Meanwhile, missions continue to be
judged not by the results of projects but by the
obligations of funds and the conformity of proposals to
Congressional mandates.8 5
83. Mickelwait et al. mention policies on social
soundness, effects on women, environmental reviews,
employment generation, nutritional consequences, income
distribution and land tenure changes, ots. cit., p.214.
84. ibid., p225-231.
85. £ibid. p.216.
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Of course, different policy objectives fare differently
between the demands of Congress, the Administration and the
public and the response of the organization as it wrestles
with the uncertainties of its task-environment. In order
to illustrate more clearly how environmental assessment has
become more than just an unwanted, externally imposed
requirement and has actually improved project design and
"leveraged program", I shall offer some brief comparisons
with two other policy objectives - women in development and
social soundness analysis. 86
These two policy objectives are both similar to and
different from environmental assessment in important ways.
Women in development came about as a result of a strong
outside lobby, as did environmental assessment, but has
never taken the form of a required analysis of each project
proposal. Social soundness analysis had its origins within
AID, without a strong external lobby or active
constituency, but takes the form of a formal analysis of
project proposals like environmental assessment.
The AID women in development program, starting as a
relatively symbolic response to a strong out5ide lobby has
86. Social soundness analysis is the term used by AID to
describe socio-economic and cultural analysis.
87. Interview with Bob Berg, ex-AID Director of the Office
of Evaluation, April 1984.
- 212 -
eventually reached the stage where it is "leveraging
program".8 Following the 1973 ammendments to the FAA, AID
set up a women-in-development office in 1974 in the Bureau
of Policy and Program Coordination. The commitment to
promote activities that integrate women into the national
economies of developing countries and to allocate a
proportion of AID's funds to women in development was
restated in the 1978 ammendments. Finally in 1982, AID
produced a policy paper on women in development that
maintains that the misunderstanding of gender differences
in project planning leads to diminished returns on
investment.88
However, it has never become a routine aspect of
project preparation and analysis. Having an active lobby
in support of women in development has ensured that
AID/Washington responds to the issue and exploits its
potential for enhancing the program. But there has been
little success at penetrating the practice of project
preparation and implementation. The groups that support
women in development have not been able to influence the
day-to-day incentives facing the field staff.
Social soundness analysis was a component of the new
88. United States. Agency for International Development,
Cogesoa Presentatin. Fiscal Year 1984. Main Volume,
Washington D.C., 1983, pp.200-205.
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project analysis procedures developed internally in 1974 to
fit the "New Directions" program with its emphasis on
technical assistance rather than capital projects and on
socio-economic criteria for success. Social soundness
analysis was a response proposed by the Office of
Evaluation to new requirements for information and planning
suited to projects designed to alleviate rural poverty and
assist small farmers. The AID staff that saw the need for
analysis of the socio-economic organization, culture and
attitudes of project beneficiaries enlisted anthropologists
to prepare the procedures and methodology. 8 9
However, the natural constituency of such a procedure,
the anthropology community, has always been ambivalent
about alliances with government agencies and was still wary
after some unfortunate relationships with AID during the
Vietnam war. Thus no strong external lobby materialized to
maintain support and tighten the accountability system at
the crucial stage when project staff members were being
asked to incorporate another unfamiliar layer of project
analysis. Nor has any effective constituency been
established in more recent years. Various organizations
like Cultural Survival Inc. and the Anthropology Resources
Center advocate better protection of the rights of tribal
89. ibi..Z
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peoples affected by development projects. The Institute
for Development Anthropology has responded to AID's need
for contractors in this area. But, in the view of the
projects director of Cultural Survival, the poor
performance of social soundness analysis within AID is
partly due to weak support from outside lobbies and
resistance on the part of host governments. He cites the
poor coupling of domestic organizations that lobby about
native rights and social impact assessment with
international development issues. In contrast, he thinks,
the environmental organizations have made an effective
transfer of lobbying clout from domestic issues to foreign
assistance and have exacted accountability for the
environmental procedures. 9 0
The comparison of environmental assessment with these
two other policy objectives - similar in that all three
embody a desirable outcome that projects can attain only if
properly analyzed and corrected during project preparation
- illustrates two important characteristics that enhanced
the likely accountability for environmental assessment.
One is that the procedures had external legitimacy and once
the court case was settled there could be no real argument
by mission staff against supplementing project
90. Interview with Ted MacDonald, Cultural Survival Inc,
April 1984.
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preparation. The other is that there was a well organized,
experienced and successful lobbying community there to make
sure that AID did not let the matter rest with pro forma
regulations and perfunctory assessments. The environmental
lobbies had both legitimacy and clout behind their efforts
to hold AID accountable for environmental assessment.
In the light of the above, it is interesting to
consider how environmental assessment might have fared in
the absence of NEPA and the domestic lobby. I have argued
that the Executive's main concern is securing the political
and economic benefits of the foreign assistance program,
while ensuring that important domestic policies are adhered
to, and that the administration reinforces the compliance
of AID to domestic interests and policies. From this, I
would suggest that the Executive would not have demanded
accountability for an environmental assessment mandate in
the absence of NEPA and strong post-NEPA lobbying
organizations. The Executive is concerned mainly with
promoting foreign assistance in the face of budgetary
priorities and divers political constraints from Congress,
and the Administration sees AID as a spending agency that
should conform to domestic policies despite its unique
overseas mission.
Within Congress, the dominant concern is political and
budge tary. The legislation se ts a policy framework for the
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development assistance framework that reflects both
developmental objectives and domestic political and
economic concerns from within and without Congress. AID is
held accountable for the inclusion of major developmental
objectives in appropriations requests, but less prominent
developmental goals are only pursued from the diffuse and
unpredictable basis of hearings, depending on the energy of
a small number of members of Congress and lobbying groups.
This process can occasionally lead to demanding some
account from AID of how specialized developmental mandates
have been implemented.
Without NEPA and its supporters, it is hard to imagine
that overseas environmental impacts would have been very
important. As already mentioned, the issue of the impact
of development projects on tribal peoples is arguably as
important, but has fared much worse within AID. The point
is that once the legislation is in place, the
accountability system gives the policy's supporters an
opportunity to enforce it.
The Congressional system does allow outside groups to
lobby directly for holding AID accountable to policy
mandates. But, in the absence of strong, well organized
lobbies pursuing environmental policy goals domestically,
the pressure for environmental planning in foreign
assistance would have barely existed.
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Given that Congress and lobbying groups are able to
hold AID accountable on this issue, it is likely that the
accountability only penetrates as far as allocations of
funds and project proposals. There is very little
opportunity to probe the results of projects and present
evidence to Congress that AID did or did not modify
projects on the basis of projected environmental effects.
Within the organization itself, the dominant concerns
for smoothing the passage of projects through the
Congressional approval process illuminates the operational
incentives facing both the Washington and mission staffs.
Again, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of a
rigorous domestic environmental policy and lobbying power,
environmental planning would share the same status as
social soundness analysis and women in development.
Although the mandates promoting these issues have created
specialized offices and built alliances with outside
organizations, the dominant concerns of generating projects
and seeing them through the project review process has not
created a strict accountability for the performance of
these functions.
In addition, the absence of a rigorous economic
appraisal provides no incentive for paying at tention to the
recognizable economic costs of environmental damages. Nor
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does the weak project evaluation process increase the
incentives of the agency staff to anticipate problems that
would cause disapproval later in the project cycle.
My conclusions from projecting the fate of an
environmental planning mandate in the absence of a rigorous
domestic policy and lobbying community is that
environmental considerations would certainly have played a
part in project review. However, the accountability for
performing such a review would have been shallow and would
not have brought about a genuine reform of how missions
identify and prepare project proposals, and would have had
negligible effects on how projects are judged.
AID/Washington staff members would only have enforced the
mandate iif they expected Congress to apply environmental
criteria to the budgetary process.
In contrast to the environmental review of project
proposals, environmental sector projects, technical
assistance and institution building would have fared
differently. Environmental and natural resource management
projects fit well with the orientation of the development
assistance program to rural development, health and basic
human needs. The missions in their efforts to stimulate
project proposals that match the criteria of the
development assistance program might have found such
projects desirable and seen advantages in developing their
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"portfolio" of environmental and natural resource
programs. The major constraints facing these activities
are the low level of demand from recipient governments and
the general lack of experience and knowledge about the
sector on the part of the mission staff. As a result of
AID's compliance with NEPA, mission staff members are now
much more knowledgeable about environmental considerations,
and have stimulated greater demand for assistance in this
area from recipient governments.
To sum up, I have argued that NEPA and the strength of
the domestic environmental lobby explain how AID undertook
the systematic environmental assessment of proposed
projects and significantly altered the incentives facing
the mission staff in preparing projects for approval by
Washington. Certainly, not all mission staff members have
welcomed the additional procedures nor have all the results
of assessments been of great value. But, as mentioned
earlier, once the environmental officers were in place and
the procedures well established, there has been less
emphasis on procedure and more on positive natural resource
management and environmental sector activities - a
different issue in relation to the accountability system
and staff incentives.
Indeed, there has been some convergence between the
corrective orientation of assessments and the positive,
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"program leveraging" nature of natural resource management
activities. AID environmental staff cite a recent case
which demonstrates how the environmental policy mechanisms
are supposed to benefit project design and to promote
sustainable natural resource utilization.9 1
The Peruvian government proposed an extensive highway
and land colonization project (Pichis Palcazu) in the
forested foothills of the Andes. The project enjoyed the
personal favor of the president and a group of donor
institutions were eager to participate. AID considered
providing $22 million for one of the components of the
project - the Palcazu Valley. The government's emphasis was
on building the highway, but AID, partly at the suggestion
of environmental organizations, became concerned about the
feasibility of the colonization and cultivation plans, for
environmental reasons.
The environmental assessment was carried out between
the Project Identification Document and the Project Paper,
and became a central input into the preparation of the
Project Paper. Using environmental and socio-economic
analysis of the proposed project and comparing other
91. Interviews with James Hester, AID Latin American Bureau
Environmental Officer, June 1983; Dennis McCaffrey,
formerly AID Regional Environmental Management Specialist,
Peru, April 1984.
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colonization experiences in Peru, the consultants concluded
that the project would not be sustainable and made a set of
proposals about how the project could be redesigned.
However, the Peruvian government would not accept serious
modifications to its highway proposals, and AID
consequently tried to addapt the colonization plans to
ensure that the project would be ecologically sound, using
the land suitability analysis carried out as part of the
environmental assessment. The project has accordingly been
renamed the Central Selva Resource Management Project.
There have since been long delays in executing the
project which have undermined the support of the Peruvian
government Also the highway construction has fallen
behind schedule which might make it necessary to modify
colonization plans. However, according to AID's regional
environmental specialist at the time, this is how the
environmental assessment procedure should work. The
government proposes a project, the assessment comes early
enough to contribute to the Project Paper and is organized
around testing the feasibility of the original proposal and
suggesting alternative approaches that avoid the
environmental difficulties that have become evident. Thus
the final shape of the project is negotiated with the host
government so tha t its interests and the environmental
management priorities can be reconciled.
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CHAPTER 6
Multilateral Development Banks
Case Study The World Bank.1
Intro d u ct.ion
"The question is not whether there should be
continued economic growth. There must be. Nor
is the question whether the impact on the
environment must be respected. It has to be.
Nor - least of all - is it a question of whether
these two considerations are interlocked. They
are.
The solution of the dilemma reyolves clearly
not about whether, but about how."
What is remarkable about McNamara's bold statement to
1. The World Bank Group comprises three institutions the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA) and
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD and
IDA share the same administration-but their sources of
capital and lending policies are quite distinct. The IFC
is financially and legally a separate entity but is subject
to the same environmental procedures. Below the "World
Bank" or the "Bank" shall refer to the IBRD and its lending
program, unless I specifically mention- the IDA credits
(soft or concessionary loans). See World Bank Annual
Re)rt, 1983, p. 3, for a current description of the World
Bank Group.
2. McNamara, R., "Speech to the UN Conference on the Human
Environment", Stockholm, 1972.
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the Stockholm conference in 1972 is not only that he was
expressing an extremely modern view of the relation between
economic development and environmental planning, and one
that was not shared by many of the Bank's clients, but that
the Bank had already established an Office of Environmental
and Health Affairs in 1970. McNamara was referring to
current practice not to honorable intentions for future
reform. In 1970, McNamara had made a speech to the United
Nations Economic and Social Council in which he announced
that the Bank would henceforth determine the possible
environmental consequences of development projects being
considered for financing. 3
In 1981, A. W. Clausen, McNamara's successor as
president of the World Bank, gave a favorable review of the
work of the Bank's environmental office and confirmed his
support for a policy that he may not have found
ideologically appealing. It was, however, a policy that
the bank had publically asserted by signing the Declaration
of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to
3. McNamara, R., "Address to United Nations Economic and
Social Council", New York, 1970.
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Economic Development in 1980 and was about to internally
codify in the Operational Manual. 4
"Our environmental experts have reviewed more
than 2000 projects and programs in developing
countries since 1970.
We've found that the cost of paying attention
to environmental concerns has been much lower
than many people expected when this procedure was
first established. Nearly two-thirds of the
projects reviewed have raised no serious health
or environmental questions, and I'm pleased to
say that it has been possible to incorporate
adequate protective measures in all the projects
we have financed in the past decade.
The cost of these environmental and health
measures has proved not to place an unacceptable
burden on our borrowing countries. And we've
learned, as have many private corporations, that
the cost tends to be lower the earlier that
environmegtal problems are identified and
handled."
Despite the early commitment to environmental analysis
of its lending program and the reaffirmation on the part of
the new president, both official and private organizations
with an interest in environmental aspects of development
assistance have become increasingly critical of the
performance of the World Bank. For instance, the executive
4. World Bank, "Progress Report (1982-1983)", in United
Nations Environment Programme, Summary Record, 4th meeting
of the Committee of International Development Institutions
on the Environment (CIDIE), UNEP/CIDIE/83.8 (Final),
Nairobi, 1983, p.43.
S. Clausen, A.W., "Sustainable Development, the Global
Imperative", the Fairfield Osborn Memorial Lecture,
reprinted in The Environmentalist, 1982, 2:23-28.
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director of UNEP did not exclude the World Bank from his
criticism of the multilateral development agencies
delivered to the 4th meeting of the Committee of
International Development Institutions on the Environment
(CIDIE).6 He said, "Our view in UNEP is that the
performance tin implementing the Declaration] - on all
fronts - leaves much to be desired," and "The Declaration
has been for the most part, a paper tiger. Your job is to
give it teeth and claws." At a series of U.S. House of
Representatives Banking Committee hearings on the
environmental impact of multilateral development banks in
June 1983, speakers representing the Environmental Policy
Institute, National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club,
the National Resources Defense Council, the World Wildlife
Fund - U.S., the Friends of the Earth - U.S., the Izaak
Walton League of America and the National Auduben Society
strongly criticized the World Bank for funding projects
6. The CIDIE was established by UNEP as a mechanism for
reviewing annually the efforts of the signatories of the
Declaration to implement its principles.
7. Tolba, Mostafa, "Putting the Principles to Work
Statement to 4th meeting of the CIDIE", United Nations
Environment Programme, n...cit., pp.32, 41.
8. United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on
International Development Institutions and Finance of the
Commit tee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
Environmental Imnact of Multilatetal Develooment
Dank-Fnmefd _Protiects Hiearings , :97-37. 98 Cong . 1 Sess .
Washington, Government Printing OffIce, 1983, pp.35-119.
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that caused significant environmental damages.8 The
numerous World Bank projects cited include: the health
impacts of the Volta and Kariba dams in Africa,
deforestation from the Bayano dam in Panama, the impacts of
the Transmigration program in Indonesia and land
colonization in the Amazon basin, resettlement problems
problems caused by dams in the Philippines and Thailand,
various environmental problems caused by a dam in Colombia,
a water transfer scheme in Peru, Irrigation schemes in
Pakistan and Sudan and a land colonization and cotton
production project in Kenya.9
In a writ ten statement to the same hearings, the Joint
Environmental Service of the International Institute for
Environment and Development and the International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources reported that
a comparative survey of the environmental policies and
procedures governing development aid had shown that
"despite strong policy statements by both the previous and
present World Bank presidents about environmental
protection and sustainable development, at an operational
level much of the preparation and implementation of bank
9. ±LUd.
10. Horberry, John, Statement of the Joint Environmental
Service of lIED and IUCN in U.S. Congress, oap..ci.,.L. 1983,
p.33.
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loans is free of routine environmental analysis." 0 The
research report on which that statement was based said
"(the Office of Environmental Affairs) often has difficulty
in overseeing the environmental analysis of all projects as
well as promoting other environmental activities and
responding to particular problems that occur." It
concludes that much of the office's efforts are directed at
attracting support from outside the Bank because it lacks
the resources and authority to screen and modify project
proposals. 11
In March 1984, testimony on behalf of various
environmental organizations to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations cited several cases including an
agriculture and irrigation scheme in Madagascar and a land
settlement scheme in Nepal, where the Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department identified serious environmental
impacts. 12
11. Horberry, John, Envionental Guidelines Survev : An
Analysis of Environmental Procedures and Guidelines
Governina Development Aid, London, Joint Environmental
Service of IIED and IUCN, 1983, p.65.
12. Bruce Rich, Testimony to U.S. Congress. Senate.
Subcommit tee on International Foreign Policy of the
Commit tee on Foreign Relations, 7th U.S. Replenishment of
the International Develooment Association, Hearings,
Washington D.C., 1984.
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Madagascar : Lake Aloatra . IDA credit. The
OED 1980 project performance audit report (PPAR)
of this irrigation and rice production project
cites several factors contributing to the failure
of the project, including inadequate analysis of
the peat soils on which the project depended and
failure to take account of longstanding erosion
problems in the surrounding watersggd that made
the irrigation canals ineffective.
Nepal : Nepal Settlement Project. IDA Credit.
The PPAR of 1983 identifies serious daforestation
and erosion problems in the project area that
were gravely underestimated at the time of
appraisal. The project made no attempt to
protect areas prone to erosion and soil
conservation measures were not introduced to
compensate for removal of tree cover. As a
result, the success of the project was seriously
compromised and the project conflicted with the
Nepalese ygvernment's forest conservation
strategy.
To many observers, the World Bank is the leading
international development agency in the field of
environmental planning and management. It certainly has
more experience than other multilateral agencies; it
advises less qualified agencies and distributes a wide
range of literature to the development assistance community
about environmental procedures and guidelines. To others,
it is guilty of neglecting the real task of environmental
planning, namely to prevent and mitigate the environmental
13. cited in World Bank, IDA in Re trosoect: The First Two
Decades of the International Develooment Association,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.
14. World Bank, "Project Performance Audit Report. Nepal
Se ttlement Project : Credit S05-NEP", Operations Evaluation
Department, June 20, 1983.
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damages of regular economic development programs, while
putting up a smokescreen of environmental guidelines and
publications.
What really is the case? My purpose here is to
investigate the environmental performance of the World Bank
while recognizing the institutional factors that govern its
behavior. I shall analyze the efforts of the World Bank to
implement environmental policies in the light of the kind
of organization that it is.
Below I try to answer the following questions. How can
we judge what the Bank could do in response to potential
environmental damages, given its particular constitution,
political and financial structure and the accountability
system that governs its behavior? How can we tell whether
the Bank has performed well in relation to its
institutional characteristics - what does it claim itself,
what do outside lobbies and watchdogs say, what empirical
evidence is available? Are there opportunities for the
Bank to Improve its environmental performance?
There are certain aspects of the overall political and
institutional environment in which the Bank operates that
should be clearly stated before looking at the organization
in de tail. First, the IBRD is a bank - it has to borrow
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money on the International capital markets and is given a
credit rating like other institutional borrowers.1 5
Second, its clients are the governments of nations or
agencies guaranteed by those governments16 with their own
policies and priorities. Third, it rarely finances 100% of
a project and often less than half of a total Investment;
in almost all loans the borrower is also an investor, and
In an increasing number of loans, the Bank co-finances with
other aid donors, export-credit banks or private
investors. Fourth, while it has considerable leverage
over the terms and conditions of the loan, and some
influence over the economic development policies of the
borrower,18 it has limited practical control over the
implementation of projects for which loans have been
15. Mason, Edward and Robert Asher, The World Bank Since
Bretton Woods, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution,
1973, p.124.
16. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Articles of Agreement., Article III.
17. See World Hank Annual Report, 1983, pp.18,38,39 for
current policies about co-financing and pp.104-125 for
typical figures on World Bank contributions relative to
total project costs.
18. Mason and Asher, op.-cit., pp.420-434.
19. The various instruments available to the Bank for
securing the implementation of a project, such as loan
conditions, progress reports, project completion report and
the audits of the Operations Evaluation Department do not
challenge the principle that implementation is the
responsibility of the borrower. See Baum, W., "The Pro ject
Cycle", In Finance and Development, 7 2:2-13.
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made. 19
The Political and Financial Structure of the
World Bank.
In 1983 the World Bank had 144 members, employed 5,587
staff, committed $14,447 million in IBRD loans and IDA
credits and the IBRD borrowed $10,292 million.20 It is the
largest single aid donor and the largest borrower in the
international bond market.21 Formally, it is a specialized
agency of the United Nations; informally it has very strong
ties to its largest contributor, the United States, and
what has been traditionally Its largest source of capital,
Wall St.22 It has been criticized by some conservatives for
being a global welfare agency and lending to socialist
governments; to others it is an instrument for capitalist
20. World Bank Annual Recort, 1983, pp.12, 19.
21. "A Bank for All Seasons : A Survey of the World Bank",
The Econgmist, Sept. 4th, 1982, p.7.
22. Actually, since 1979, West Germany has overtaken the
U.S. as the largest source of borrowings. In 1980, 33% of
Bank debt was in U.S.$, down from 49% in 1977. See Rotberg,
Eugene, The World Bank: A Financial Appraisal, Washington
D.C., the World Bank, 1978, pp.14-18.
- 232 -
imperialism and maintaining repressive regimes in the
interests of multinationals and U.S. foreign policy.2 3
My concern is to ask what does its financial and
political structure mean for the way the Bank decides about
lending money, the extent to which the leadership of the
Bank requires accountability from its administration and
for what aspects of its activities, and what effect this
accountability system has on new policies designed to alter
the outcomes of lending programs. The focus is on the
lending program, which is not the only activity of the
Bank. The Bank also carries out an extensive research
program, publishes literature on development policy and its
implementation and studies, evaluates and influences the
macroeconomic policies of member countries.24 But,
borrowing and lending money are the prime activities.
The following rules are spelled out in the Bank's
charter:
"It must lend only for productive purposes
and must stimulate productive growth in the
developing countries. It must pay due regard to
23. For a discussion of the differing evaluations of the
Bank, see Ayres, R., Banking on the Poor the World Bank
and World Poverty, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983,
pp.11-16. See also Bello, W., D. Kinley and E. Elinson,
Francisco, Institute for rood and Development Policy, 1982,
pp.197-198.
24. ibid. pp.19-37.
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the prospects of repayment. Each loan is made to
a government or must be guaranteed by the
government concerned. The use of loans cannot be
restricted to purchases in any particular member
country. And the IBRD's decisions to2 end must
be based on economic considerations."
The Bank's capital comes from subscriptions from member
governments, of which 7.5% is paid-in and the remainder is
callable and can only be used to meet the obligations of
the Bank to holders of its sccurities.26 Loanable funds are
made up of paid-in capital subscriptions, earnings and
borrowings, mainly long-term, on the basis of its callable
capital. It is restricted to lending no more than its
capital which isa very conservative ratio. So far the
Bank has been able to borrow what it has needed on the
international markets and lend at fixed,
lower-than-commercial rates.27 Since the 1950's, it has
enjoyed the maximum credit ratings of the main investors'
services.28 The IDA obtains its funds directly from
members and disburses them at concessionary terms for
projects in countries with a per capita income below a
25. World Bank Annual Report, 1983, p.3.
26. These figures refer to the most recent capital
subscription. Between 1959 and 1980, 10% wa paid-In, and
originally the amount was 20% - 2% in gold or dollars, and
18% in the member's currency. See Mason andAsher, aoa-
all., pp.105-124, and Ayres, op..cis.t., pp.582 60
27. The Economist, op...ci.,~. p.26.
28. Mason and Asher, opnt.,. p.132.
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TABLE 12 THE WORLD BANK
The Record for Ten Years, 1974-83
Fiscal ye~ar
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 198
IBRD
millions
Loan amounts'
Disbursements'
Total income
Net income
Total reserves
Borrowings. total
Sorrowings: net
Subscribed capital
Operations approved
Borrowing countnes
Member countries
3,218 4,320 4,977 5,759 6,098 6,989 7,644 8.809 10,330 11,136
1,533 1,995 2,470 2,636 2,787 3,602 4,363 5,063 6,326 6817
929 1,157 1,330 1,617 1,947 2,425 2,800 2,999 3,372 4,232
216 275 220 209 238 407 588 610 598 752
1,772 1,902 1,916 2,026 2,245 2,498 2,893 2,859 3,124 3,134
1,853 3,510 3,811 4,721 3,636 5,085 5,173 5,069 8,521 10,292
990 2,483 2,530 3,258 2,171 3,235 2,382 2,347 5,692 7,349
30,431 30,821 30,861 30,869 33,045 37,429 39,959 36,614 43,165 52,089
---nmher
105
49
124
Professional staff
(number)
122 141
51 51
125 127
161
54
129
137
46
132
142
44
134
144 140 150 136
48 50 43 43
135 139 142 144
1,752 1,883 2,066 2,203 2,290 2,382 2,474 2,552 2,689 2,821
IDA
USS$ millions
Credit amounts 1,095 1,576 1,655 1.308 2,313 3,022 3,838 3,482 2,686 3,341
Disbursements 711 1,026 1,252 1,298 1,062 1,222 1,411 1,878 2,067 2,596
Usable resources,
cumulative 7,433 11,608 11,514 11,789 18,062 19,661 20,773 22,331 25,311 27,967
-number
Operations approved' 69 68 73 67 99 105 103 106 97 107
Borrowing countries 41 39 39 36 42 43 40 40 42 44
Memberwcountries 113 114 116 117 120 121 121 125 130 131
nExcludYes ans to FC of 110 milimon in FY1B?4 s50 riin FY197S$70mlon en FY1B?6. 520 mcion nYI977.5100 iion in FY1981, 5390
millionen Ff1982, arid $I4Sminion in FY1983. knctudesamjounts in FY1976 and Ff1977 lent on Third Window terms
Excludes desbursemernts o  bans to IFC.
5Joint IBRD/IDA operatorm are counted only once as ilRD operations.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report, Washington D.C., 1983
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specified level.
The voting structure is based upon capital
subscriptions with the result that in 1983 the
Industrialized countries held 60% of the votes, with 19.58%
in the hands of the United States.29 The senior voting
body, the Board of Governors, consisting of one governor
and one alternate appointed by each member, meets once a
year and decides on membership, capital increases and
certain other reserved functions. The daily operations of
the Bank are delegated to the Executive Directors, five of
whom are appointed by the five main subscribers and fifteen
are elected to represent groups of the remaining members.
The Executive Directors are based full-time at the Bank's
headquarters and approve every commitment of funds and
major operational policy decisions. They fulfill two
roles, that of representing the views of their governments
to the management of the Bank and of communicating the
views of the management and policy decisions to the Board
of Governors and to their governments.30 They rarely vote
formally but operate on the basis of consensus, ratifying
commitments for projects only after they have been fully
prepared by the Bank staff.
29. World Bank Annual Report, 1983, p.184.
30. J&bLd., p.101.
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The Bank's Accountability System.
I shall argue that the political and financial
structure of the Bank determines its accountability system:
manifest in the extent and focus of efforts by the Bank's
leadership and membership to demand some measure of
performance. To answer this, one must first conceive of
the Bank as a "bank", a "political" organization and a
"development agency", and try to understand what is
inevitably a composite accountability system.
As a bank, accountability stems from the need to
maintain the confidence of the international credit raarkets
and takes the form of a consistent concern with the
creditworthiness of the borrowing country and executing
agency and the effect of the particular loan on that
creditworthiness. This manifests itself in the evaluation
of country macroeconomic performance by the Bank staff,
leverage over borrowing governments' economic policy and
executing agencies' financial practices and the appraisal
of financial and economic return on projects.
As a political organization, an intergovernmental body
that formally belongs to the UN family, accountability
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stems from the foreign and economic policies of the members
as exercised through the voting power and influence of
their governors and Executive Directors. The government
body responsible for multilateral participation, normally
the finance ministry or treasury, tries to influence the
geographical and sectoral distribution of lending and the
Bank's leverage over borrowers' macroeconomic and trade
policies.
As a development agency, accountability stems
ultimately from the views and actions of the leadership,
the policies of both lending and borrowing members, other
international development agencies and lobbying groups.
The management and staff of the Bank, once a developmental
policy is adopted, monitor its Implementation. From
outside, research and lobbying organizations scrutinize its
performance. These development policies are manifest in
speeches, annual reports, sector policy papers,
organizational changes and operational manual statements.
I shall consider the effect these strands of
accountability have on the operation of the Bank and what
mechanisms there are for enforcing such accountability.
- 239 -
Creditworthiness and financial reliability are probably
the dominant organizing principles within the Bank's
operations.3 The capital markets rate the Bank; the
governing bodies and the management make decisions about
borrowing policies, about liquidity, about exposure to
currency fluctuations, and about lending policies, about
gearing ratios and interest rate spreads; the directors and
management ask about the prospects for repayment, about
national financial policies, executing agency practices and
the expected rates of return on loans; the organization
evaluates policies, appraises projects and negotiates loan
agreements to secure acceptable rates of return, ensure
repayment and maintain creditworthiness. 3 2
The bulk of the material presented in the World Bank
Annual Reports concerns the financial policies and
activities of the Bank. Each Annual Report describes the
matters that the Executive Directors consider during the
fiscal year: in 1982, for instance, they were "currency
swaps, per capita GNP and country classifications, external
31. IBRD Article of Agreement, III,4,v, states "In making
or guaranteeing a loan, the Bank shall pay due regard to
the prospects that the borrower ... will be in a position
to meet its obligations under the loan."
32. See Rotberg, Eugene, The World Bank: A rinancial
App.ria1, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1978, p.8, for
a description of how the Bank de termines creditworthiness.
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relations, the U.S. Dollar-Swiss Franc-linked transaction,
a review of IBRD income prospects and policies, IDA service
charges, procurement issues, the budget process, structural
adjustment in developing countries, borrowing and lending
rate policies of the IBRD, topics for future World
Development Reports, the Bank's poverty focus and personnel
policies."
It seems clear that "banking" accountability is tight.
If the Bank should perform poorly and threaten its
creditworthiness, its ability to borrow would diminish, the
major subscribers would worry about their liabilities, the
borrowers would worry about their source of funds and the
management would demand corrective action. So that this
does not happen, the organization appraises all loans to
make sure they are financially sound, to make sure they are
technically sound and to demonstrate that they are
economically productive. It also negotiates with a
government or agency about financial practices that
influence the ability to repay.34 Not only that, the Bank
closely watches the country creditworthiness of its
borrowers and will urge corrective action if debt
33. World Bank Annual Report, 1982, p.9S.
34. Mason and Asher, .op..cit.L., p.229.
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management, balance of payments or fiscal policies threaten
the ability of the government to repay its loans to the
Bank.35
However, this strand of accountability is not as
mechanical as it might appear. Creditworthiness has been
maintained over time despite more efforts to address
developmental problems within the lending program. The
Bank does lend money for projects that have negative
financial rates of return, (lending to sectors such as
education and health are not revenue producing), where the
executing agency is unlikely to raise the revenue needed
for repayment directly from the project (most rural
development and urban projects fall into this category) and
which cannot unequivocally be regarded as economically
productive (such as population control). In fact, it is
not obvious that for individual loans the leadership of the
Bank is able or feels the need to check on the appraisal
calculations.36 Also, the Bank has lent large amounts of
35. Mason and Asher,o..cit., pp.195-197 and
Ch.13:"Leverage and Performance". See also U.S. Treasury
Department, o.aci.t., pp.29-38, for a current evaluation of
leverage.
36. Mason and Asher refer to the limited access of
Executive Directors to individual loan decisions. gs.._
iL.L. pp.90-91. The U.S. Treasury Department, a..it.,
p.25, mentions only one IBRD loan on which the U.S.
Executive Director abstained from 1979-1981 - a structural
adjustment loan to Guyana - although influence is more
likely outside the formal voting process.
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money to countries with severe debt problems and "unsound"
macroeconomic policies, and to agencies that have not
proved competent or able to raise adequate revenue for
repayments, even though it doubtless would have preferred
otherwise. Nevertheless, there have been no defaults and
officially no loans have been formally rescheduled. As the
Treasurer of the Bank has written:
"The Bank has no actuarial basis for
"reserves" simply because the Bank has never had
to write-off a loan. That is not to say we will
never have a "bad" loan. But borrowers have, in
fact, seen fit to maintain impeccab 5 financial
relationships with the World Bank."
So what does banking accountability really amount to?
The credit markets are highly sensitive to Bank financial
policies - consequently the Bank maintains a very
conservative gearing and increases capital subscriptions to
guarantee its liabilities.38 It is reasonable to expect
that Its credit rating would suffer if any of its clients
went bankrupt or if many of its projects were failures. So
the Bank tries to keep these risks at a minimum. On a day
to day basis, this concern for creditworthiness translates
into rigorous financial and economic appraisal of proposed
37. Rotberg, .Lcit.., p.11.
38. See "A Bank for All Seasons", The Economist, Sept.4th,
1982, p.17.
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loans and efforts to meet the projected rates of return
during execution.39 The Bank's Treasurer describes the
system as follows:
"Alternative solutions (to project design)
are examined to achieve the most favorable
results at lowest cost. It is the appraisal
stage at which the project Is formally presented
to the Bank management for final decisions on its
structure, technical features and operational
issues. The Bank's policy on project formulation
strives to obtain a cost-benefit relationship
compatible with the efficient use of scarce
resources and witl4 prices reflecting real
economic values."
The Bank's Treasurer also implies that the financial
community's concern is really with Bank lending to specific
countries rather than with projects. 41
Because financial and economic appraisal of proposed
projects is geared towards maintaining the overall
creditworthiness of the Bank and the soundness of its
lending programs, some observers have argued that rates of
return are the "icing on the cake", (as van der Laar
reports many Bank officials feel); in other words, the
39. See Mason and Asher, opz.....cit., pp.247-254.
40. Rotberg, on t.,.. p.6.
41. .ibidL. p.8-9.
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calculations are made after the project has been prepared
and they play little role in the selection, design and
approval of projects.42 This would suggest that efforts to
incorporate additional factors, such as environmental
values, into the calculations would be resisted; the task
is made more complicated and does not enhance the "banking"
performance that is so important to the project staff.
In addition, there is a financial cost to the Bank in
extending or complicating the project preparation and
appraisal process - delays in disbursements require Bank
borrowings to be kept liquid for longer. This reduces the
earnings of the Bank during any borrowing cycle.43 Again
the financial dynamics of the Bank tend to inhibit the
routine consideration of factors that do not directly
contribute to "banking" performance.
"Political" accountability is the second strand of the
accountability system. The rationale for multilateral
agencies is that they should be free of direct political
influence from their members and this was explicit at the
founding of the World Bank. Yet, some of the Bank's critics
would argue that it is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy
42. van der Laar, Aart, The Wprld $ank and the Poor,
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1980, p.221.
43. Interview with Bob Banque, Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, U.S. Treasury Dept., April 1984.
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and multinational corporations. 4 Clearly, the major
subscribers hold the majority of the voting power; the
Bank's headquarters are down the street from the Treasury,
the State Department and the White House; the senior
management are conscious of the "political" preferences of
the capital markets. The management of the Bank seek to
minimize political interference, but member governments
with financial clout can press their policies on the Bank
and expect some results. Ironically, as Bello et al.
point out both conservative and liberal critics assert that
the Bank serves U.S. interests in different ways.45 The
Reagan administration commissioned a report from the
Treasury to see whether the multilateral development banks
served U.S. interests adequately and, if not, how to secure
greater compliance with U.S. policies.46 The report
concluded that the U.S. Executive Directors had been
relatively successful at getting their views accepted and
that the Reagan administration should not abandon the
multilaterals, but try to increase its influence via its
Executive Directors. 47
44. See Bello et al., o .i., pp.32-34.
45. ibid. pp.3-4.
46. U.S. Treasury Department, U.LS. Prtcipatio...n.n the
Multilateral Development Banks in the 1980's. Washington
D.C., 1982.
47. iLhid., p.65.
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Since the Board of Governors only meets once a year,
most of the job of securing political Influence is
delegated to the Executive Directors. Thus, the Board of
Executive Directors is the instrument for securing
political accountability, both at formal meetings where
they vote on loans or policy changes and informal
interactions with management and staff. In the case of the
U.S., the Treasury Department Instructs the U.S. Executive
Director, taking account of the advice of the National
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Policies composed of the Sezretaries of Treasury, State and
Commerce, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the
president of the Ex-Im Bank and the Administrator of AID.
Congress has in the past tried to legislate certain
criteria that U.S. Executive Directors should follow in
voting - for instance, the Gonzales amendment of 1972 that
required U.S. Executive Directors to vote against loans to
any country that had nationalized or expropriated property
of U.S. citizens. 4 8
The Executive Directors have regular formal meetings,
regular informal seminars and private consultation among
themselves. In this way most policy issues are decided on
48. Payer, Cheryl, The World Bank:_ A Critical Aocoraisal,
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1982, pp.40-41.
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a consensus basis. Votes are only taken if the issue is
divisive or if any particular Executive Director wishes to
record dissent. In the case of loans, it is rare for
Executive Directors to formally vote in opposition, but
criticisms can be expressed to the staff responsible who
attend the meeting in the hope of influencing future
decisions.
Ayres argues that U.S. Executive Directors have limited
power over management - rarely influencing the nature of
appraised loans or credits or initiating policy changes.5 0
In fact, according to Ayres, and Mason and Asher before
him, management enjoys considerable autonomy from the
political interests of their members, both lenders and
borrowers; they raise their own capital; they protect
themselves from outside scrutiny by asserting the
confidentiality of their operations and negotiations with
clients. The influence of even the strongest members tends
to focus on broad financial policy issues, strategic
lending criteria and geographical distribution of
commitments. 51
49. Interview with Bob Banque, Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, U.S. Treasury Department, April 1984.
50. Ayres, D.-r.it., pp.66-67.
51. Aye~p i. p.66, Mason and Asher, op i.
pp. 87-94.
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As I mentioned, the U.S. is concerned about its degree
of influence. For instance, in recent testimony to the
Senate Appropriations Committee, the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury reported:
"Since taking office, the Administration has
opposed 49 loans in the MDBs for economic or
financial reasons. We are often asked whether
the loans were defeated. Unfortunately, the
practice of explicit opposition to formal loan
proposals in the MDB boards is not firmly
established.
Nonetheless, we believe" we are being
effective when we oppose loans for financial or
economic reasons. We find that Directors
representing other countries frequently support
our substantive points, even if they do not cast
a negative vote.
You can well imagine that a project officer,
who may present one or two loans a year to the
Board, finds the pointed criticism an
embarrassing experience which he will seek to
avoid in future projects. Senior bank management
can also ill-afford to see one of its largest
shareholders - joined by others - regularly
criticizing its project proposals. I am
convinced that a sound and consistent approach to
loan analysis by the United States is having the
desired effect: to strengthen the policySdvice
that the MDBs convey to their borrowers.
In theory, political accountability is tight for the
major donors and weak for most borrowers. In practice,
except for the U.S., it would be difficult for any of the
major donors to secure its individual interests in a formal
52. U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Foreign
Relations. Committee on Appropriations. Statement of the.
Honorable Donald T. Reaan. Secretary of the Treasury,
Hearings, March 15, 1984, pp.2-3.
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vote in opposition to other donors, (the Federal Republic
of Germany, the second largest shareholder, only had 6.61%
of the vote in 1983); also, big borrowers, as with any
bank, can exercise some influence over Bank policies and
operations.5
Bank members tend to expect political accountability
over matters of major foreign policy interests, such as the
U.S. halting lending to Chile, Indo-China and Afghanistan;
major sectoral policies such as initiat ng and then halting
the World Bank energy affiliate; and the financial and
operational policies of the Bank itself, such as a new
interest rate formula, graduating high income borrowers,
improving auditing and evaluation systems and containing
administrative expenses, where these decisions have
significance for the economic policies and contributions of
donors.54
In counterpoint to member's trying to exercise
political influence over the Bank, the Bank sometimes needs
to secure support from its most powerful members over major
financial policies. For Instance, during 1983 and early
1984 the Bank has been trying to obtain U.S. support for
53. See U.S. Treasury Department, 2.citsf., pp.58-65, for
an evaluation of U.S. Influence on the World Bank and other
MDBs.
54. U.S. Treasury Department, oaa. c.it., pp.60-61.
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the IDA replenishment and IBRD selective capital
replenishment. Reluctance on the part of the U.S. to agree
can induce the Bank's management to be more sympathetic to
minor political issues in the hope of attracting support
for the major concerns.5
Political accountability does not penetrate to the
soundness of individual projects or the options for
executing them. They rarely concern the substance of the
lending program at all, but revolves around the sectoral
and geographical distribution of the lending program. In
this sense, I would argue that the depth of political
accountability is not great.
Finally, there is some form of developmental
accountability. The Bank's developmental policies stem
from a variety of sources, including its leadership and
staff, the community of development theorists and
practitioners that serve it, other international
development agencies with which the Bank deals and
independent development organizations and pressure groups.
The mechanisms through which these policies should be
implemented are not hard to discern. In the first place,
the preparation, appraisal and terms of loans should take
55. Interview with Bob Banque, Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, U.S. Treasury Department, April 1984.
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account of developmental objectives; second, the monitoring
and supervision of implementation should include indicators
of developmental objectives; and third, the independent
Operations Evaluation Unit should provide information on
performance. But as Ayres notes in relation to the Bank's
anti-poverty policy, these mechanisms tend to focus on
other issues. Loan agreement conditions deal with
financial and implementation measures. Project supervision
emphasizes meeting targets in the appraisal report, such as
cost estimates, timing of disbursements and implementation
delays. Similarly, the audit of completed projects
compares the implementation with the appraisal report in
terms of timing, costs and rates of return.56 It is not
that these mechanisms cannot enforce policy objectives, but
that at the project level more practical implementation
issues are of greater concern and easier to measure.
It seems clear that the process of ensuring
developmental accountability is not very tight. The
Executive Directors, being responsible to their
government's treasury, do not appear to have much capacity
to monitor and guide the Bank's developmental policy
performance. The President and senior management can
demand performance, but in practice are constrained by
56. Ayres, nt...sii., pp.44-46; van der Laar, .o..cit.L., p.4.
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financial and political criteria; thus actual
implementation of development policy at the project level
is more conservative than major speeches and Bank
publications would indicate.57 The central project
advisory staff, once given responsibility for a certain
policy objective, has to overcome considerable resistance
from sectoral departments and regional offices. The
dominant instrument for appraising projects, financial and
economic cost-benefit analysis, and the vehicle for
securing implementation, the loan agreement, are organized
around the task of maintaining creditworthiness and
financial soundness, managing disbursements and minimizing
uncertainty. In the case of anti-poverty projects without
financial returns, the cost-benefit analysis is expanded to
capture economic and social "returns".58 For example,
analysis of rural development projects takes account of
income generation and increased output; analyzing
poverty-orientated urban projects takes account of services
provided to target populations, employment creation and
cost-recovery potential.59
While the Bank promotes and implements developmental
5?. Mason and Asher, op. c.it., pp.468-469; Ayres, o.g.aci...tj.,
pp.21,22,30.
58. Ayres, aa.scit., pp.62-63.
59. .Lbid., pp.99, 155, 163.
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policies within its lending program, the basis for securing
accountability for these policies is weak. It is rarely
clear how to measure or correct developmental performance.
The Bank's efforts to influence borrowers' policies are
mainly concerned with macroeconomic, financial and
implementation issues.60 The operational context within
the Bank is influenced by the need to expedite loans,
maintain disbursements and secure implementation. Project
appraisal seeks to demonstrate financial and economic
returns, almost in spite of development objectives.
Expanding cost-benefit analysis to show returns based on
employment creation or improved income distribution
involves greater effort, uncertainty and subjectivity. 6 1
The mechanisms for holding the Bank accountable for
developmental objectives do not penetrate to the substance
of actual projects. The governing bodies and management
are only interested in developmental objectives in
aggregate - in particular, levels of funding for certain
programs and aggregate indicators of performance.
Occasionally, members will express some interest in
developmental policy that is of concern within their own
60. Ayres, o. c.it., pp.32-37. Ayres cites the Bank's
mainly unsuccessful at tempts to persuade the Philippines to
improve industrial efficiency and to influence Tanzania's
Basic Industrial Strategy.
61. van der Laar, opa. cit., p.221.
- 254 -
domestic political context, but the potential for demanding
accountability is limited. Other international
organizations and the academic and professional community
do promote developmental objectives, but the Bank's
response and sometimes initiatives tend to be manifest in
research or policy analysis output rather than project
orientation. Furthermore, the specialized offices within
the Bank responsible for certain policy objectives have
limited influence over the project staff in regional
offices who are responsible for project preparation and
appraisal.
A look at the work of the Operations Evaluation
Department (OED) should give some clues to what aspects of
the lending program the Bank staff are held accountable
for. The Annual Review of Project Performance Audit
Results focusses on two categories of indicators. First
the "effectiveness" of projects, meaning the actual
economic or financial rate of return, or in the few cases
where rates of return were not estimated during appraisal,
a qualitative assessment of whether the project met its
target. Depending on the nature of the project,
effectiveness may also include impact on the intended
beneficiaries and institutional strengthening. Secondly
the "process efficiency" is measured. This includes the
extent to which changes in project design were necessary
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and the time and cost of project implementation.62
The emphasis, not surprisingly, is on the economic and
financial soundness of loans, and on the expeditious
disbursement of funds. After all the Bank must maintain
the creditworthiness of its lending program. It also must
ensure that it expedites its lending program efficiently,
reducing cost overruns, delays and the need to change
direction mid-project. With these dominant principles in
mind, it is not hard to see what project officers are
rewarded for and what is their attitude to extending the
appraisal process to capture additional costs or problems,
or to complicating the design and implementation phases by
incorporating additional planning considerations.
Van der Laar concludes that "...staff are strongly
tempted to avoid anything that detracts from well-trodden
paths; any deviant or more ambitious course of action
introduces additional uncertainty and possibly delays in
completion dates...The prevailing work-environment entails
that any novel approaches come about not because of the
organizational style adopted but in spite of it." 6 3
62. See World Bank, Eiahth Annual Review of Proiect
Perforimance Audit Results, Washington D.C., 1982, pp.6-l8.
63. van der Laar, ona. cit.L., p.232.
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The Accountability System and
Environmental RespDonsiveness
In this section, I shall discuss the Influence of the
Bank's political and financial structure, and the resulting
accountability system, on its environmental
responsiveness. It is worth making a distinction between
the capacity to screen and modify traditional projects and
the promotion of environmental sector or "new-style" loans
that include major components designed to improve
environmental conditions.
In the first case, the project appraisal system serves
more to demonstrate that the loan will not jeopardize the
creditworthiness of the borrower by providing a certain
financial rate of return; it rarely serves to select the
project option that has the most desirable results for the
economy In the long term. It is quite hard, even in
theory, to sensitize the appraisal to external or
non-monetary effects and the regional officers do not
welcome complications or delays imposed on their dual task
of expediting the flow of loans and ensuring that they are
"sound". They do not expect the capital markets to penalize
them for overlooking developmental or environmental effects
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that are external to the project's financial performance.
In the second case, because of the non-financial nature
of the projects benefits, it is incumbent upon the regional
staff to demonstrate the wider ecoromic and social benefits
so that their contribution to the overall economy can be
estimated. Environmental sector investments, especially,
in conjunction with rural development, urban improvement,
health and education benefits can serve this purpose.
These types of projects, as we have seen, are not
inconsistent with the way financial accountability works.
In the case of the World Bank, the thrust of financial
accountability is not sensitive to environmental effects
and the penetration of that accountability does not reach
individual project results. We might expect the financial
management of the Bank to take notice if a country's
economy or an agency's program was put a risk on account of
a massive environmental disaster, (for instance, if the
economic life of a hydroelectric dam was shortened on
account of sedimentation and eutrophication, or the
productivity of a land colonization program threatened by
soil exhaustion and erosion), but the credit markets
normally do not judge the ability to repay on the basis of
environmental mismanagement.
The political structure of the Bank presents lit tle
- 258 -
opportunity for members to impose their policies, although
the U.S. and the other major subscribers have some
influence. Attempts to enforce political accountability
appear limited to foreign policy and economic or trade
issues, and its penetration is shallow, affecting broad
policies and the sectoral or geographical distribution of
loans. Some of the major subscribers, particularly the
U.S., have demonstrated their support for environmental
assessment of development assistance in other fora and
within their bilateral programmes. However, this has
rarely been of concern to the national finance ministry.
In exceptional circumstances, domestic political action
in a developed country could generate some concern on the
part of the Executive Director. For instance, the U.S.
Congress House Banking Committee held hearings in 1983 on
the environmental impact of multilateral development bank
projects, instigated, in part, by domestic environmental
groups hoping to persuade the Congress to legislate greater
environmental scrutiny by U.S. Executive Directors. Thus,
the Treasury was obliged to demand an account of the
environmental policies and performance of the Banks via the
U.S. Executive Directors.64 Indeed, the initial adoption of
an environmental policy by the Bank was supported or
64. United States Congress, pp.cit.
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tolerated by the Executive Directors of the major
subscribers.
Whatever, the domestic political concerns, the Treasury
is likely to view its possible leverage over the Bank's
operations in more financial, economic and foreign policy
terms.65 Environmental issues are not high on the priority
list and are hard to see through to the project level. 6 6
Even Congressional hearings are not likely to change Bank
operations radically, especially if it is relatively easy
for the Bank to demonstrate to the Executive Directors that
performance is satisfactory.
Finally, does developmental accountability create any
incentive for environmental assessment? I have suggested
that developmental accountability has the advantage of
shifting the focus to the outcomes of projects, but that it
is diffuse and weak. The project appraisal process, the
project supervision and evaluation mechanisms do not really
respond to developmental goals nor provide incentives to
65. U.S. Treasury Department, oo.ci. pp.66-76.
66. Interview with Bob Banque, Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, U.S. Treasury Department, 1983. Also,
James Conrow, director of the Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, testified to the House Banking Commit tee
that his office was not set up to be knowledgeably involved
in the issue of environmental impacts of multilateral
development bank lending nor had any coordination with
other more knowledgeable U.S. government agencies. See
U.S. Congress, om i. p.25.
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regional staff to demonstrate performance. The advisory
staff faces bureaucratic obstacles in enforcing its
developmental policy missions. The external
intergovernmental and private organizations can demand
accountability, but are easily handled or incorporated by
the Bank into less critical areas such as conferences,
research, publications and technical assistance. In the
environmental field, this seems especially true, and much
of the Bank's activities are designed to convince outside
actors of the achievements in this area.
Studies of how the Bank has implemented other major
developmental policy objectives have observed that what the
Bank does changes more slowly than what the Bank says, and
that initiatives tend to be implemented by gradual addition
to traditional lending activities rather than
substitution. For instance, an analysis of the Bank's
population program concluded that the new program
encountered resistance from project officers, raised
questions about creditworthiness and was most easily
accepted when population projects resembled traditional
loans.67 Particularly in relation to the Bank's much
vaunted anti-poverty orientation, the Bank's traditional
6?. Crane, B. and J. Finkle, "Organizational Impediments to
Development Assistance :the World Bank's Population
Program", World Politics, 33 :4, 1981, pp.516-553.
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concern with creditworthiness, repayment and rates of
return does not prevent rural development, urban
improvement, health and population control projects, but
dictates a very cautious style in the projects themselves,
if not in research, sector policy papers and
publications. 68
This conclusion would suggest that the developmental
accountability system does not create strong incentives to
address the environmental impacts of projects. Changing
the design and adding to the costs of traditional projects
is not feasible unless project staff perceive some
convergence with achieving economic objectives or avoiding
implementation difficulties. If the accountability system
penalized project staff for neglecting the environmental
effects of projects, then one would see more concern during
project preparation.
In summary, the accountability system of the Bank does
not favor environmental assessment, but it does not prevent
environmental sector projects or, in some cases,
environmental components of projects. Financial criteria,
undoubtedly the most important, do allow some non-financial
projects and would justify environmental management of
68. See Avres, op i. passim; van der Laar, op..c.it.,
pass im.
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projects where large investments depended on the
sustainable management of natural resources. In cases
where the domestic political concern for environmental
effects of development assistance in member countries can
penetrate the thinking of the Treasury, there is some
chance of prodding the Executive Directors even though
their influence over project design is limited.
Developmental accountability, where environmental
productivity should find most support, is diffuse and
easily deflected away from actual project outcomes. The
emphasis that the leadership of the Bank puts on
developmental objectives does increase the incentives to
demonstrate performance, but such incentives are inevitably
blunted by financial, political and implementation
factors.
1he Environmental Resoonse of the Bank.
Since 1970 when the Office of Environmental and Health
Affairs, subsequently the Office of Environmental Affairs
and now the Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
(referred to below as the OEA), was established as part of
the Projects Advisory Staff, it has devoted its energies
- 263 -
and resources to a range of activities designed to improve
the environmental productivity of development assistance.
- ensuring that Bank financed projects do not cause
severe or irreversible deterioration, by influencing
their preparation, screening project appraisal reports
and recommending mitigation or corrective action
- developing and promoting environmental sector
investments
- developing and promoting environmental technical
assistance and institution-building
- improving the attention to environmental issues during
the early stages of the project cycle
- improving the attention to environmental issues in
sector policy papers and training
- preparing and distributing environmental planning and
management guidelines and literature
- cooperating with international organizations, other
donors and member governments in conferences, meetings
and other public events. 6 9
69. The World Bank, "Environmental Requirements of the
World Bank", QEA, mimeo, 1982, pp.2-11.
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To evaluate these activities in a way appropriate for
the current analysis, I shall emphasize the efforts to
screen and evaluate proposed projects in order to avoid
severe or irreversible environmental deterioration. This
was the task highlighted by McNamara in his ECOSOC address
in 1970, confirmed as Bank practice in 1972 at Stockholm,
re-affirmed in various OEA publications and pronouncements,
once again publically undertaken at the signing of the
Declaration in 1980, and finally codified in the Operations
Manual in 1984.70
To be sure, this objective is the most difficult, but
most representative of a commitment by a development agency
0
to environmental protection. No more than three OEA staff
members have attemptel to screen a large stream of proposed
loans and credits, from 174 in 1974 to 243 in 1983, in
addition to all their other activities, travel and
70. McNamara, "Address to ECOSOC", 1970; idem, "Address to
UN Conference on the Human Environment", 1972; Lee, J.,
"Environmental Considerations in Development Finance," in
world Eco-CriAsi., eds. David Kay and Eugene Skolnikoff,
Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1972, pp.171-182;
The World Bank, "Environment and Development", 1975 & 1979;
idem, "Environmental Requirements", pp.3-4; the Declaration
calls for "systematic examination of all development
activities, including policies, programmes and projects,
under consideration for financing to ensure that
appropriate measures are proposed for (the protection and
improvement of the environment)J."; World Bank, in iumarx
Bsscord, 1983, p.43.
71. World Bank Annuat.Report, p.12.
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commitments. Their role is advisory, and in cases where
they feel action is needed, they have to convince the
regional staff, whose responsibility it is to ensure
environmental protection, at a stage in the project cycle
when channge is, to put it mildly, inconvenient.
In theory, every project proposed for financing is
reviewed by the OEA at the 'project brief' stage and during
preparation. If the OEA staff anticipates any
environmental problems it collaborates with the Bank
regional or IFC project staff to determine appropriate
action. In practice, some categories of loans, such as
structural adjustment, can be ignored, while others, such
as water supply and sewerage or urban sites and services
routinely include standard environmental measures. In
other cases, OEA and Regional staff members suggest the
appraisal analysis or measures fer consideration by the
borrower before submitting the loan request. 7 2
The screening process, because of resource constraints,
relies heavily on the experience of OEA staff and their
familiarity with sectors of the Bank's lending program.
The staff needs to recognize types of activities that
72. World Bank, "Memorandum on Bank Environzantal Policy:
Response to Statements of Environmetntal Organizations Sent
by the U.S. Executive Director", Washington D.C., January
11th, 1984, pp.1-2.
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invariably require attention, such as forest clearance,
resettlement, land colonization and certain types of
industrial projects. Once identified, the task becomes one
of persuading the project staff and the borrower to assess
the significance of the problem and take the necessary
action to minimize it.
Finally, the regional staff is responsible for
including a statement of the environmental implications of
the loan in the appraisal document. If mitigatory measures
have been agreed with the borrower, they are either
included as a covenant in the loan agreement or in a
separate memorandum of understanding.
Two factors influence this process more than others.
One is the effect of environmental protection measures on
the financial and economic feasibility of the project. The
other is the attitude of the borrower toward modifications
or other suggestions. In some cases the Bank provides
financing for the studies and measures necessary for the
environmental aspects of project preparation and
execution.
In order to make this task easier, the OEA has
emphasized the risks posed by environmental deterioration
to the economic and technical viability of the projects and
the economic costs of external damage and social
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disruption. In the Operations Manual Statement,
environmental protection or mitigation measures are
explicitly linked to conditions for "loan effectiveness and
disbursement".73 In fact, almost every Bank publication
about environmental review emphasizes that the process does
not impose heavy costs on projects. It has also
attempted to sensitize regional staff members to these
problems and convince them of the need to anticipate these
problems before all the project decisions are nmade. To
this effect, the OEA publishes policy papers or influences
the preparation of sector policy papers by sectoral
departments.75
The other activities of the OEA contribute indirectly
to this central task and also achieve other objectives.
73. World Bank, :Environmental Policies and Procedures of
the World Bank", (public version of Operations Manual
Statement), Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
Washington D.C., May1, 1984.
74. For example, see 1dm, "Environment and Development",
Washington D.C., 1975, pp.11-13; "Environment and
Development", Washington D.C., 1979, pp.10-13; World Bank
Annual RePort, 1973, p.23; Clausen, oip.cit., p.26; World
Bank, "Environmental Requirements of the World Bank", 1982,
p.3.
7S. World Bank, "Environmental Considerations in the
Industrial Development Sector", Washington D.C., 1978;
"Environment, Public Health and Human Ecology:
Considerations for Economic Development", 1984; "Tribal
Peoples and Economic Development :Human Ecological
Considerations", 1982: "Wildland Management in World Bank
Projects", draft, 1984.
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Since 1974 the Executive Directors have approved lending
for environmental sector projects, mostly pollution control
in urban areas. The Bank has also provided funds for
wildland conservation, watershed protection and forest
conservation components of rural development and
infrastructure projects, for technical assistance, training
and institution-building, often in conjunction with major
loans or for agencies that have executed Bank loans. 7 6
Although the guidelines prepared by the OEA have no
authority with respect to the responsibilities of regional
staff, the OEA hopes that their existence increases the
chances of appropriate environmental mitigation or
protection measures, especially for industrial projects.
It is not easy to measure the success of the OEA in
screening and correcting project proposals. How can one
tell if a decision to approve or suggest change is right or
not? If the OEA does a good job at indirect improvement of
the project preparation, there should be fewer incidents of
change being recommended. But if the OEA feels weak and
overstretched in screening project proposals, it may
reserve its efforts for the exceptional cases. Both
situations would result in fewer changes.
76. See World Bank, "Environmental Requirements", pp.9-11,
20-22, 35-37.
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What does the Bank claim itself? Clausen claims a
perfect record over the course of reviewing 2000 projects.
0 77
This is probably optimistic. The OEA tends to gloss over
this function when giving an account of its performance,
but has published statistics on the results of screening of
1166 Bank/IDA and 176 IFC projects between 1972-1978 made
up of the following categories: no problems apparent when
reviewed (62.9%); problems handled by others prior to Bank
Group involvement (1.6%); in-house disposition (27%);
consultants and special studies required (8%).78 Again,
this break-down implies that all problems are detected and
all actions are appropriate; it does not admit any
circumstances of the OEA recommending action that is not
accepted by the regional office or the borrower.
Nevertheless, it does show that between 1972 and 1978 about
35% of Bank Group projects had discernible environmental
problems during preparation or screening.
Although the World Bank does not allow scrutiny of its
project files or readily admit to problems in the
preparation or implementation of its projects, there are
several sources of evidence on which to judge the
effectiveness of the environmental screening process.
77. Clausen, "Sustainable Development", pp.25-26.
78. World Bank, "Environment and Development", 1979, p.10.
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These are interviews with the OEA staff, OEA publications
and miscellaneous Bank documents such as project completion
reports and project performance audit reports that have
become available and the assessments of watchdog or
research organizations that have monitored the
Implementation of the Bank's environmental policies. In
addition, the 1983 House Banking Committee hearings,
already referred to, have provoked an investigation of the
Bank's environmental performance by the U.S. Treasury
Department and required the Bank to give an account of its
policies, procedures and performance.
OEA staff members are not in a position to expose
environmental impacts resulting from bank projects
directly, but they admit they lack the resources to screen
all proposed projects at a sufficiently early stage or in
sufficient depth. They also emphasize that their role is
£dvisory and that not all project officers are concerned
about ensuring that environmental considerations are
analyzed. Finally, they point out that borrowers are
inclined to resist mitigation measures or environmental
components in projects and do not always implement those
that are agreed. Because of this, the Bank cannot in
practice enforce environmental mitigation during
implementation. In addition, the capacity of the Bank to
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monitor environmental effects is limited by the frequency
and scope of project monitoring and evaluation missions.
OEA staff members point out that ensuring adequate
environmental analysis and protection progresses
incrementally. Some sectors, such as industry, are easier
to deal with than, for instance, agriculture, where the
issues are less clear-cut and trade-offs more hazy. They
feel that at least some appraisal reports do adequately
address .nvironmental issues, while others only pay lip
service and still some do not include any environmental
determination. In the Bank's official response to the U.S.
Treasury Department's investigations following the House
Banking Committee hearings, the alleged inadequacies of
existing environmental procedures and measures are fully
listed followed by a one sentence response: "The World Bank
is working towards incorporating these procedures into its
operations".80 In response to a question about the Bank's
environmental guidelines, the Bank asserts that: "Their
systematic use and rigorous enforcement would be adequate
79. Tixhon, J., "The World Bank and the Industrial
Environment", mimeo, pp.10-12.
80. World Bank, "Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy:
Response to Statements of Environmental Organizations Sent
by the U.S. Executive Director", Washington D.C., January
11, 1984, p.4.
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to ensure that most development projects would not incur
serious environmental, health or socio-cultural
consequences."81 But the Bank stops short of claiming that
they are used or that environmental problems are avoided.
Where environmental screening does take place, several
outcomes are possible. The environmental analysis and
input into project preparation and negotiation may be
inadequate to deal with the potential problems and
environmental problems occur. The environmental input may
be adequate but the agreements on mitigation measures may
be too weak or there is insufficient resolve on the part of
the borrower and the Bank to ensure implementation.'
Finally, the input may be adequate and the implementation
of the environmental measures may be successful.
From outside the Bank, it is not always easy to
distinguish these outcomes. OEA staff members, for
instance, publicize environmental components of land
development and agricultural projects but privately concede
that many of these measures are inadequate to compensate
for environmental problems even if adequately implemented.
They suggest that official publications tend to emphasize
the positive cases and that observers should read between
the lines to gain an impression of what a small proportion
81. jbid. , p. 3.
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of relevant projects those positive cases represent.
There are several documented cases, in addition to
those mentioned at the beginning of the chapter,
demonstrating that proposed projects do not always receive
adequate environmental analysis and input.
Brazil : Alto Turi Land Settlement Project.
IBRD Loan. The PPAR admits that the audit mission
did not have environmental expertise available to
it, but nevertheless cites extensive
deforestation and soil erosion. "There is also
no indication that much study was done under the
project into the effects of land clearing and
pasture development on run-off and soil
erosion." "The failure of the environmental
component is to a large extent also due to the
fact that insignificant allowance was made for it
at appraisal. While there were clearly
established environmental objectives, they were
not translated into actual components in the
implementation plan, neither were they costed 82
under the project; this should have been done.
(The follow-up project, Maranhao Rural
Development Project, Loan 2177-BR, has continued
in the same vein. Despite some attention to
forest conservation in the Staff Appraisal
Report, a project supervisory mission in Sept.
1983 reported that the forest conserntion
component was not being implemented.)
Sri Lanka: Drainage and Land Reclamation
82. World Bank, "Project Performance Audit Report. Brazil
Alto Turi Land Settlement Project. Loan 853-BR", Operations
Evaluation Department, Dec. 29, 1982.
83. World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report. Northeast Brazil,
Maranhao Rural Development Project", Projects Department,
Latin American and Carribean Region Office, May 21, 1982;
Draft Letter from World Bank to Secretary of Planning,
State of Maranhao, Oct. 24, 1983.
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Project. IDA Credit. The PPAR of 1979 concluded
that this project interfered with natural cycles
in the estuarine areas and "adversely affected
the ecological balance". Significant losses to
coastal fishing resulted. The report concludes
that "it can be said that consideration should
ahev been given the project's negative effect
on marine life".
Kenya : Bura Settlement Project. IBRD Loan
1449. Credit 782. An OEA staff member, included
on the Bank mission charged with reviewing this
extremely unsuccessful project, cites a series of
environmental problems that have been added to
the serious economic and managerial problems
associated with this land settlement, irrigation
and agriculture scheme. These environmental
problems include:
* threats to endangered species
* deforestation because the fuelwood plantation
was inadequate
* impedance of wildlife migration
* livestock losses from wildlife
* pesticide impacts
* increased malaria
* loss of fisheries downstream
Other examples of projects with significant
environmental input during preparation, but weak or
non-existent implementation of the environmental components
are:
Tanzania : Kidatu Hydroelectric Project -
Second Stage. IBRD Loan 1306-T-TA. The project
completion report of 1982 states that some of the
agreed environmental measures were implemented
but " no program of action has been undertaken by
the regional authorities to prevent soil erosion
and consequent siltation of the resevoir; no
program has been worked out, so far, by regional
84. World Bank, "Project Performance Audit Report. Sri
Lanka Drainage and Land Reclamation Project. Credit
168-CE", Operations Evaluation Department, Dec. 28, 1979.
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authorities to arrange for adequate hygiene and
health education so as to protect the people
against the danger of Schistosomiasis around the
lake; no action has been taken against the
possible mggace of aquatic weeds such as water
hyacinth."
Brazil : Northwest Region Development
Program. Phase III. IBRD 4424-BR. According to
OEA staff, this project which involves road
building, forest clearance and jungle
colonization was subject to environmental
analysis. The OEA was able to persuade the
Bank's regional office and the Borrower to
incorporate some forest reserves, demarcation of
tribal lands, improved site selection and
sustainable land use at the time of the loan
negotiation, these measures are not being
implemented. Nevertheless the Bank is
accelerating disbursements on this loan.
Panama : Bayano Hydroelectric Project. The
Bank's reply to the U.S. Treasury Department
investigations states: "Despite the assurances
given to the Bank during the execution of the
pr.oject, the Government of Panama has not yet
taken steps to c-ontrol deforestation of the
Bayano basin, which at present is being carried
out so that agricultural crops can be cultivated
or timber exploited... The increased biomass
flooded bg6 the resevoir has impaired water
quality".
An OEA report on wildlife management indicates that
less than half of wildlife components included in project
85. World Bank, "Project Completion Report", Nov. 30, 1982,
cited in "Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy: Response
to Statements of Environmental Organizations Sent by U.S.
Executive Director", Washington D.C., January 11, 1984,
At tachment I, p.1.
86. ibid., p.21.
87. World Bank, "Wildland Management in World Bank Projects
:A Policy Proposal", Office of Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, Washington D.C., 1984, Annex 1,
pp. 1-21.
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agreements were adequately implemented.8 7
Other cases where OEA staff members are doubtful
whether the environmental measures that have been agreed
are adequate for the scale of the environmental problems
being experienced are the Transmigration program'-in
Indonesia and the Mahaweli Ganga scheme in Sri Lanka. The
Bank has continued to support these programs in the hope of
improving the environmental analysis and implementation in
the face of very serious resource depletion, settlement and
wildlife problems.
A case where the Bank was attempting to secure
accepta.ble environmental mitigation measures when the
project was dropped by the borrower in the face of mounting
international outrage is the Nam Choam hydroelectric
project in Thailand, whose resevoir was to fall within the
Thung Yal Wildlife Sanctuary. However one of the DEA staff
raised the question of whether the project with a
strengthened environmental management component would not
be better than the existing situation of "paper" parks and
weak environmental management.8 8
There are, on the other hand, numerous cases where the
88. Goodland, R. , "Are Trade-offs Admissible?" Informal
comments to the International Rivers Conference, American
Institute of Architects, Washington D.C., March 31, 1984.
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Bank's environmental screening and negotiating have been
successful both In terms of the loan agreement and
implementation. The wildlife management report cited above
lists Bank projects with wildlife management components of
which many cases are adequate to compensate for the
undiluted Affects of the project or the vulnerability of
the investment to environmental degradation. Some of these
cases are reported to be satisfactorily implemented, such
as the Shire Valley Agricultural Development II, Kenya:
Credit 303, Tourism Rehabilitation, Tanzania: Credit 860,
Irrigation XV, Indonesia: Credit 995, Northern Agricultural
Development; Thailand: Credit 929 and Amazonas Agricultural
Development, Brazil: Loan 2163.89
The Bank's submission to the U.S. Treasury Department
mentions several successful cases including the Second
Water Supply Project (Nakdong Barrage) in Korea:
The project was redesigned to take into
account important environmental concerns
pertaining to a bird habitat in the river
estuary; and, through the development of
institutional components, the borrower (ISWACO)
is introducing measures that will provide
long-lasting protection for these environmental
values. Further, the project provided the first
89. World Bank, "Wildland Management in World Bank
Pro jects", Annex I, pp.1-21.
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opportunity for the Government's newly formed
Office of Environment to influence the design ag
implementation of a major development project."
Another well documented case is the Carajas Iron Ore
Project in Brazil. A report circulated by the OEA wNitten
by some of the environmental staff of the borrower, the
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), describes the
environmental studies undertaken In preparing the project
and the environmental management measures included:
"Through its experience in the south of
Brazil, CVRD had become sensitized to the
ecological issues of mining projects and has
developed expertise in environmental assessment
and management practices. Study of the Carajas
Iron Ore Project began as early as 1972 with the
completih- of more than twelve environmental and
related studies, mostly by outside consultants
under the supervision of CVRD staff responsible
for environmental management.
In 1980, CVRD created an independent advisory
group - GEAMAM - responsible for advising on all
environmental aspects of Company activities and
for preparation of an environmental management
manual. At all project sites, CVRD created
internal environmental commissions - CIMA's -
which monitor and control the environmental
aspects of project implementation and operation.
Two internal environmental commissions were
created at the mine and port sites of the Carajas
Iron Ore Project, coordinated by ecologists,
Field Environmental Officers, who divide
responsibility for the environmental management
of the railway.
The Environmental Management Program
includes: analysis of environmental conditions;
research, planning and establishment of
management strategies; monitoring and control of
.90. World Bank, "Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy"
P.24.
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impacts; environmental education; monitoring and
control of basic services; liason with
environmengjl, governmental and financial
agencies."
In the OEA publications and its submission to the U.S.
Treasury, the OEA emphasizes the positive cases where some
form of environmental component has been included in the
project design. These components often take the form of a
wildland conservation area, for example, to protect a
watershed or prevent environmental degradation from a
highway or land colonization scheme. However, OEA staff
members privately admit that often these are low-cost
concessions won by the OEA in return for the implementation
of environmentally damaging projects. Frequently, the
measures are not adequately implemented. 9 2
The Bank submission to the Treasury was able to deflect
most of the criticism by environmental organizations of the
Bank's environmental performance by concentrating on the
inaccuracies in the testimony, without making a substantial
case for the success of its environmental procedures for
screening project proposals. During the course of the
Treasury investigations, Treasury staft members have been
91. de Frietas, Maria de Lourdes Daavies, and Christine
Smyrski-Shluger, "Brazil's Carajas Iron Ore Project -
Environmental Aspects", Rio de Janeiro., Companhia Vale do
Rio Doce, 1982, pp.1-2.
92. World Bank, "Wildiand Management in World Bank
Projects", Annex I, pp.1-21.
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directing questions at the regional staff about the
environmental implications of upcoming loans via the U.S.
Executive Director's office. The experience has indicated,
according to Treasury staff, how the quality and depth of
the environmental analysis varies greatly from project to
project.93
The OEA also emphasizes its positive environmental
sector work more than the day-to-day screening and
modification of Bank projects. OEA publications describe
environmental sector loans, such as urban pollution control
projects, technical assistance and preparation of
guidelines.94 While these activities are extremely
worthwhile, I suggest that they are less problematic than
screening project proposals.
Environmental sector loans, such as pollution control,
are easier to promote than corrections to traditional
projects, especially in combination with urban
improvements. Wildland conservation components do not add
large costs to the main investment, but provide a
93. Interview with Bob Banque, Office of Multilateral
Development Banks, U.S. Treasury Department, April 1984.
94. See especially, World Bank, "Progress Report
1981-1982", in Summarv Record, UNEP/CIDIEIBZ.8 (Final),
1982, pp.27-34; idem, "Progress Report 1982-1983", in
Summary Record, UNEP/CIDIE/83.8 (Final), 1983, pp.43-58;
idem, "Environmental Requirements", 1982, passim.
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compensation for the conflict between the investment
objectives and possible resource degradation, which can
even enhance the project appraisal, especially in watershed
protection and land development schemes. Providing
technical assistance, training or supporting the creation
of an environmental unit within an executing agency, (for
instance the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
and the Transmigration Program in Indonesia), can overcome
the problem of resistance on the part of the borrower to
the costs and effort of complying with Bank requirements in
situations of considerable domestic political significance,
and allow the OEA to achieve its objectives without
conflic-t with the regional offices.
The Bank gives extensive publicity to the guidelines
that the OV.A has prepared. However, those that refer to
project preoaration are only advisory and there is no
evidence that they are used systematically by regional
staff.95 Indeed the Bank offers little to contradict the
impression that there is resistance to the OEA's more
direct involvement in project preparation.
The weight of this evidence supports the view that the
effective screening and environmental management of the
9 5. Hlo rb er ry , En~viro~ntn tiGunidelines_ Survey, 1 983 ,
pp.64-66.
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regular Bank lending program is severely constrained by the
pressures facing the project staff and the accountability
system it faces. These conclusions confirm the views of
previous observers of the environmental policies of the
Bank, such as the International Institute for Environment
and Development's (IIED) survey of nine multilateral
development agencies, published in 1979 points out that the
OEA "only has time to screen closely a small part of the
total flow of loan projects". The pressures facing
regional staff members to process loans, the authors note,
makes it hard for them to give serious attention to much of
the advisory material coming their way, including that from
the OEA. Nor is the cost-benefit analysis procedure
practiced in a way that improves the assessment and
mitigation of environmental problems.9 6
In his Ph.D. thesis about how the OEA adapts to its
"task-environment" in trying to implement the Bank's
environmental policy, Le Prestre examines the efforts to
screen projects and minimize damages as well as its other
activities. He concludes that economic factors
predominate. The Bank, he argues, is primarily an
96. Stein, R. and B. Johnson, Banking on the Biosphere?,
Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979, PP.11-23. The
authors carried out extensive interviews with a wide range
of Bank staff, reviewed project files and made a series of
field visits.
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investment agency:
"The environmental analysis starts with the
assumption that the project...is needed. This
leads to privileging the project and its
immediate economic rationale over the
environmental perspective. If mitigation efforts
have not been successful, for example because
they were too expensive, or undercut the
rationale of the project, the Bank will
nevertheless go ahead with the project, assuming
the economic and development rationale for the
project outweigh the environmental
costs...[EJeconomic or political motivations
carry the greatest weight in94ts relation with
its borrowers or creditors."
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
environmental organizations giving evidence at the House
Banking Committee hearings criticized the Bank, citing
cases o.f hydroelectric projects, irrigation projects, land
development schemes, colonization and cattle ranching in
which the Bank participated despite inadequate
environmental protection and management.98 Following these
hearings these organizations have continued to urge
Congress to exercise more influence over this aspect of
Bank lending via the U.S. Executive Director's office.9 9
97. Le Prestre, P., TheEcoioav of the World Bank
Uncertainty Management and Environmental Policv. Ph.D.
thesis, Indiana University, p.284.
98. United States Congress, o. cit~.L., pp.35-119.
99. Interview with Bruce Rich, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Washington D.C., April 1984.
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ConcIusion
What can one conclude from this evidence and how does
it fit with the implications of the Bank's accountability
system? The issue is how does the political and financial
structure of the Bank affect its capacity to deal with the
environmental effects of its lending program.
First, the Bank explicitly sets itself the task of
screening projects and ensuring that they do not cause
severe or irreversible deterioration to the environment.
Thus, it believes it is possible to reconcile this
objective with the financial, political and developmental
functions of the institution.
However, the OEA finds It easier to tackle this problem
indirectly than to intervene in the preparation and
approval of traditional Bank investments. That is not to
say that it does not try nor that it never succeeds, just
that it finds this task more difficult. It seems clear
that one reason for this is that the financial
accountability of the Bank is the driving force behind
project appraisal; the regional staff members realize that
the reason for their calculations of rates of return is to
demonstrate the likelihood of repayment and in the context
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of non-financial projects the tangible economic benefits
that the project is providing. This affects the attitude
of the regional staff to environmental analysis and
mitigation and consequently governs the strategies of the
OEA.
Although the major subscribers to the Bank do support
the environmental assessment of development assistance in
their bilateral programmes, the political structure of the
Bank does not permit this support to strengthen the concern
for environmental performance by the governing bodies.
Only in exceptional circumstances will an Executive
Director demand some accountability for this activity.
When this occurs, as it did following the House Banking
Committee Hearings, the OEA feels that its mandate and
authority are 7aisiderably enhanced. But, it is the view
of the U.S. Treasury Department staff that the political
influence of the environmental lobby on the current
administration is limited, that Congressional pressure to
pursue this issue with the Bank will not persist.
Normally, the OEA is forced to create political alliances
with organizations outside the Bank and to use the
criticism of outside organizations as way of manufacturing
some political accountability.
The developmental policies of the Bank are somewhat
rhe torical. The Bank as it expands its lending program
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cautiously adds soft lending to its traditional sectors,
more readily when some tangible economic or health benefits
are likely, while the research staff and publications
authors contribute vigorously to the development debate.
The Bank is constantly nervous about its standing with the
financial markets but knows that it can support
non-financial projects up to a point. The developmental
rationale for environmental mitigation and natural resource
protection is genuine but the Bank is only sensitive to
environmental damages that affect the financial and
technical feasibility of a project. The developmental
concerns of the Bank thus make it more attractive to the
OEA to .promote environmental sector investments and
technical assistance rather than correct, at some cost and
delay, traditional investments.
There are, of course, other factors that contribute to
the environmental performance of the Bank. The OEA's
location within the bureaucracy, its response to an
uncertain and unwelcoming task-enviironment, its alliances
with outside organizations, its strategies to overcome
resistance by borrowers and poor implementation capacity of
executing agencies all help to explain the Bank's
environmental activities. However, I suggest that the most
dramatic way to alter this situation would be to engineer a
financial structure that was sensitive to the long-term
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benefits of environmental protection measures, a political
structure that gave somee role to the members' environmental
agencies in instructing the Executive Directors and a
system for measuring and correcting developmental
performance more sensitively. The accountability system,
as I have characterized it, would provide strong incentives
to carry out environmental assessments if failure to
include environmental protection measures when needed
threatened to undermine the creditworthiness of the Bank.
The Executive Directors would look for stricter enforcement
of environmental policies if they were accountable to the
national government's environmental agency in some way.
rinally., if project evaluations examined the environmental
impacts more closely and published the results, there would
be more risk to the professional reputation of project
staff from neglecting environmental impacts. Of course, it
is not hard to see obstacles to these conditions coming
about, and pervasive bureaucratic tendencies and the
reluctance of borrowers to implement environmental measures
would still pose problems. But the incentives within the
organization could be significantly altered in favor of
environmental assessment, if it were possible to accomplish
these reforms.
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CHAPTER 7
The United Nations System
Case Study The Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations
IDntroduc t ion
"In that almost all FAO field projects are
concerned with increasing production and managing
natural resources, almost all involve modifying
or intensifying man's relationship with natural
systems. In this sense, they are all of
environmental concern. More particularly, as the
pressure for more intense production methods and
greater modification of natural systems
increases, so do the risks of upsetting
ecological balances, exhausting natural resources
and disturbing natural systems in ways chat
damage human welfare 1or impose costs on other
development sectors.
In the late 1960's, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) established an
1. FAO, "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group of the IDWG on
Environment and Energy on Environmental Assessment of Field
Projects", Rome, November 1983, p.2.
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Inter-Departmental Working Group (IDWG) on Natural
Resources and the Human Environment within the Agriculture
Department. Its task was to ensure that the FAO Regular and
Field Programmes took account of natural resource
management and conservation and to advise the Director
General on natural resources and the environment. During
the preparation for the UN Conference on the Human
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, the mandate of the
IDWG was strengthened, and a focal point for environmental
activities was set up, called the Environment and Energy
Programmes Coordinating Centre, (referred to below as the
Environment Centre) located in the Agriculture Department.
In 1984, this Environment Centre was made part of the
Research and Technology Development Division, with FAO-wide
responsibilities for administering environmental, energy
and remote sensing activities.
The tasks of this Environment Centre are threefold.
First, it collects and disseminates information, conducts
Policy analysis and provides technical literature and
assistance for the benefit of member governments on
environmental issues of relevance to food production,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. These include the
rational management and conservation of natural resources
in the course of aaricultural production, the minimization
of the environmental Impact of agricultural production and
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processing, the development and application of assessment
and management methods suited to natural resource problems,
such as soil conservation, waterborne diseases, forestry
management, watershed protection, grassland monitoring and
pesticide and fertilizer use. Second, the Environment
Centre executes and coordinates FAO activities funded by
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), such as
the preparation of guidelines, assessment methods,
technical documents, training courses and program
development relating to specific environmental issues. For
example, current UNEP/FAD joint projects include : human
and environmental health - training courses on food
contamination control and monitoring, with special
reference to mycotoxins; pest management systems - Near
East inter-country program for the development and
application of integrated pest control in cotton growing;
environmental management - operational guidelines for
afforestation projects and large-scale agricultural
mechanization.3 Third, the Environment Centre participates
in and helps to coordinate UN system activities and
consultations about environmental issues. For example, it
2. See FAQ, "Natural Resources and the Human Environment
for Food and Agriculture", FAQ Environment Parer 1, Rome,
1980.
3. See FAQ, "Qffice Memorandum :FAQ/UNEP Projects Progress
Report (Qctober 1983 to March 1984)", Rome, May 1984.
- 291 -
cooperates with the World Health Organization and UNEP in
the Joint WHO/FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts on Environmental
Management for Vector Control. 4
Most of these activities fall within the Environment
and Energy Sub-Programme of the Research and Technology
Development Programme - part of the FAQ Regular Programme. 5
However, the Environment Centre is also responsible for the
environmental implications of the FAO Field Programme -
projects and activities funded by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and other donors and executed
by the FAO on behalf of member governments. It is this
area of work that is comparable with efforts by
multilateral and bilateral donors to carry out
environmental assessments of their funding programs. Thus,
it is the Environment Centre's concern for the Field
Programme that I shall analyze in the course of this case
s t udY.
While the FAO does not provide the funds for its Field
Programme, with the exception of the Technical Cooperation
Programme, (a special facility, funded from the regular
4. Panel of Experts on Environmental Management for Vector
Control, "Report of the First Mee ting, WHO, Geneva, 1981",
Geneva, PEEM Secre tariat, World Health Organization, 1981.
5. See FAQ, "Programme of Work and Budge t for 1984-1985",
Rome, 1983, para. 2.1.4.5.
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budget, for urgent short-term technical assistance missions
on request from member governments), the fact that so many
funds for agriculture, forestry and fisheries are channeled
through the FAO for project preparation and execution gives
FAO the major responsibility for technical review and
approval for the stream of projects and activities. If
there is to be any systematic assessment and mitigation of
potential environmental impacts, then it has to take place
at the time the projects are prepared by the FAQ rather
than when they are approved by the individual sources of
funds.
Until recently the UNDP was the major source of funds
for the FAD Field Programme, but its share has dropped to
under 50% in 1983.6 The remainder is composed of Trust
Funds, ("multi-bi" funds provided by bilateral donors,
normally earmarked for particular types of activities or
regions, or "unilateral funds" provided by the recipient
government itself), and the Technical Cooperation
Programme. None of these funding sources is likely to
undertake environmental assessment of the projects to be
executed by the FAO or to assume responsibility for the
technical soundness of project preparation and execution.
6. FAQ, "Review of Field Programmes 1982-83", Rome, 1983,
p.3.
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The UNDP has very limited capacity to assess the
environmental implications of proposed technical assistance
at the time of negotiating with the member government which
projects should go forward for execution by one of the UN
specialized agencies or the World Bank. First, much of the
consideration of governments' proposals is the
responsibility of the Resident Representatives in the
country concerned who have neither the expertise to assess
possible environmental impact or the capacity to exercise
much leverage over the policies and proposals of
governments. Second, although the UNDP has environmental
guidelines in its operations manual, there is little
evidenc.e that they are implemented at all during the review
of technical assistance proposals or that UNDP headquarters
believes that it can persuade governments to correct
environmental problems. In the case of the Trust Funds,
the bilateral donors surrender most responsibility for
technical analysis to the FAO, provided the funds go to the
sector and/or region specified and with the unilateral
funds the FAO obviously supplements whatever technical
7. See Stein, Robert and Brian Johnson, Banking on the
Biosphere?, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979,
pp.44-50; Luke, Robert, "The Environmental Practices of the
United Nations Development Programme: Critique and
Recommendations", report for the UNDP, July 1980; Horberry,
John, Environmental Gutdelines Survev: An Analysis of the
Environmental Procedures and Guidelines Governing
Develonment Aid, London, Joint Environmental Service of
iIED and IUCN, 1983, pp.71-72.
- 294 -
appraisal is provided by the member government. Finally,
the Technical Cooperation Programme is fully the
responsibility of the FAQ.
Thus, anxious to increase the environmental sensitivity
of the Field Programme, the IDWG began in 1977 to consider
what steps should be taken within the FAQ to avoid
undesirable environmental impacts and to minimize conflicts
over the sustainable use of natural resources. Since then,
few significant changes have been made in how the Field
Programme is appraised, executed and evaluated. Initially,
the Environment Centre has encouraged the preparation by
FAO technical divisions of guidelines on the environmental
impact of several typical agricultural and forestry
activities.8 It also has published a research report on
"Environmental Impact Assessment and Agricultural
Development".9
Later, in late 1983, the IDWG commissioned a
consultant's report on possible procedures and technical
guidance for environmental assessment of the Field
8. For example, FAQ, "The Environmental Impact of Tsetse
Control Operations", Animal Production and Health Paper
No.?, Rome, 1980; FAQ, "The Environmental Impact of
Forestry", Conservation Guide No.?, Rome, 1982; FAQ,
"Effects of Intensive Fertilizer Use on the Human
Environment", Soils Bulle tin No.16, Rome, 1972.
9. FAQ, "Environmental Impact Assessment and Agricultural
Development", Environment Paper No.Z, Rome, 1982.
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Programme but has yet to take any action to implement the
recommendations.10 These included: training sessions for
FAO field representatives and the staff of the divisions
responsible for implementing the Field Programme, more
environmental content in the terms of reference for
programming missions, specific procedures for screening
incoming project requests and flagging them for special
attention if they conform to a list of activities with
potential environmental problems, clearance with the
Environment Centre for the necessary coordination between
technical divisions or environmental planning input if
flagged and specific mechanisms for reporting on progress
during.implementation if environmental problems were
considered likely.
The view of the IDWG and the Environment Centre is that
it is not yet possible to reform the procedures for
analyzing and executing the Field Programme to incorporate
systematic environmental assessment, but that it may be
feasible to isolate some categories of field projects that
are most likely to cause environmental impacts, prepare
appropriate guidelines for assessing the possible impacts
10. FAQ, "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group of the IWIG on
Environment and Energy on Environment Assessment of Field
Pro jects", Rome, 1983.
11. ibidZ., pp.7-9.
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and persuade the relevant technical division to improve its
review of such projects. But, for this to happen the
Environment Centre believes the Development Department
needs to install a more effective system for managing the
incoming project requests and to exercise more authority
over the technical divisions concerning the degree of
coordination and consultation with specialized offices,
such as the Environment Centre. There also needs to be a
more comprehensive evaluation program that investigates the
technical quality of projects more stringently. This is a
problem that the Environment Centre does not at present
feel confident to influence because it lacks the authority
and res5ources to have much impact on the operations of the
Development Department or to change the incentives facing
the staff responsible for implementing the Field
Programme. 12
The aim of this case study is to examine the
relationship between the political and financial structure
of FAO, with particular attention to the Field Programme,
and the accountability system surrounding the preparation
and execution of field projects. This relationship, I
suggest, reveals the incentives and constraints facing the
12. Interviews with Dr Mout tapa, head of the Environment
and Energy Programmes Coordinating Centre, FAQ, November
1983 and May 1984.
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IDWG as they address the environmental impact of the FAO
Field Programme. Unlike the previous two case studies,
there is very little documentary material regarding the
outcomes or impacts of field projects or about the
operations of the FAQ itself. Also, for the simple reason
that no systematic environmental review procedure has been
instituted, it is less clear how to judge the influence of
the organization's accountability system on its capacity to
review projects effectively.
Instead of project histories, this case depends on the
effort by the IDWG to prepare and install an environmental
review process. The IDWG has addressed the constraints
facing such a policy initiative and has explicitly
estimated its own capacity to extend or tighten the
accountability of the FAO for the environmental quality of
the Field Programme. The fact that the IDWG has not taken
any action and remains pessimistic about the opportunity of
reforming the Field Programme system is itself a measure of
FAO's lack of assessment capacity. Thus the thrust of this
case will be to examine how the political and financial
structure of FAO shapes an accountability system that
provides little incentive or opportunity to assess the
environmental impact of the Field Programme.
There is very lit tle literature and documentation on
the FAD, its policies, operations and pro jects, either
- 298 -
outside or within the organization in comparison to the
World Bank or USAID. Much of the supporting evidence for my
arguments in this case originated in interviews with FAO
staff members in almost every technical and operations
division and in the Development Department. These
interviews focussed on the constraints to environmental
assessment and on possible opportunities for tightening the
accountability of the FAO for the environmental effects of
field projects.13
The Political and FJinancial Structure of the FAQ
The FAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, is
charged by its member governments with addressing the
following tasks: to raise the levels of nutrition and
standards of living of their peoples, to improve the
production and distribution of all food and agricultural
products, and to improve the conditions of rural
populations. 4 It carries out these tasks in a variety of
13. In the text, I have limited the attribution of
individual interviews to a minimum but in the majority of
cases indicate the part of the organization from which the
views are taken. it would be invidious and in some cases
embarrassing for those kind enough to cooperate to be
individually named for views that they would not officially
put forward.
14. FAQ, "FAQ : What it is, How iut Works", Rome, 1982.
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ways - the collection, analysis and dissemination of
information; advising governments on policy and planning;
promoting consultations and cooperation among member
countries; and providing technical advice and assistance.
The Regular Programme, whose budget is contributed by
member governments in proportion to their GNP per head as
determined by the UN General Assembly, amounted to US$366.6
million for the 1982-1983 biennium.1 It is made up of
General Policy and Direction, Technical and Economic
Programmes (including Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries),
Development Support Programmes, the Technical Cooperation
Programme and Support Services.
The Field Programme, funded by the UNDP, bilateral and
unilateral Trust Funds, disbursed US$278 million during
1982.16 There is an enormous variety in the scale, content
and implementation mechanisms in the Field Programme. In
early 1982, the FAO was operating 2430 field projects with
a total value of US$1300 million in 147 countries. About
800, or 33%, of these projects had allocations of over
17US$500,000. The great majority of projects cost less than
15. FAQ, "Programme of Work and Budget FOR 1984-1985",
Rome, 1983, p.48.
16. FAQ, "Review of Field Programmes 1982-83", Rome, 1983,
17. i.bid., p.10.
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TABLE 14 ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON FAO FIELD PROGRAMMES
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 11179 1980 1981 1982 1983
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2.1
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6. World Food Prograrme
7. Contributions from Investment.
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79.9 96.9 97.5 99.2 111.9 219.9 194.0 156.4 189.7 221.7 279.8 318.0 278.2 275
8.9 9.6 10.9 10.5 12.3 16.9 16.2 12.4 15.4 18.2 22.6 25.0 19.8
1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.7 4.4 4.7 5.4 6.6 8.0 9.1 9.9
1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.4 3.3 3.1 4.4 4.8 6.2 5.9 6.5
1.4 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.7 4.3 5.3 6.9 7.5 8.7 8.4
12.5 13.9 16.9 17.4 20.4 26.8 27.6 24.5 30.5 36.5 44.3 48.7 44.6
Grand-total 92.4 110.8 114.4 116 S 132.3 246.7 221.6 180.9 220.2 258.2 324.1 366.7 322.8
Source: FAO. Review nf Field ProarAmmAR 19R3-19R3
Rome, 1983.
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TABLE 15
- TRENDS IN THE REAL VOLUME OF FAO'S TECHNICAL COOPERATION
(AT CONSTANT 1975 PRICES)
Million US$
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1/ Excludes development ass.stance under Trust Funds for the Internatinnal
Fertilizer Scheme ( IFS ) and -he Offi ce of Special Relief Operations (OSRO)
- UNDP ALLOCATIONS TO FAO AND FAO/UNDP DELIVERY 1974 -1982
(AT CONSTANT 1975 PRICES)
Millions USS
1983
Source: FAO, Review
Rome, 1983.
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TABLE 16
RBDIONAL DISTRIBUTION OP FAO FIELD PROJOCTS
(as of April 1983)
(a) Number of Projects
1 7 1
Africa 
6y1 322 993
fr
Asia & Pacific
Latin America
Near East
Europe
Interregional
& Global
TOTAL 923 680 1,603 826 2,429
369
-66
116
122
41
9
302
129
83
97
8
61
Source: FAO, Review
Rome, 1983.
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TABLE 17
ESTIMATED EXTRA-BUDGCTARY EXPEDITURES FOR FIELD PROJEC
DELIVERY, 1982-83 1/
Programme Amount Share
(US$ million) (%)
Natural Resources 82 16
Crops 151 29
Livestock 77 15
Research Support 3 1
Rural Development 63 12
Nutrition 4 1.
Agricultural Policy
Analysis 26 5
Forestry 53 10
Fisheries 57 11
516 100
1/ Does not include TCP, project support costs and certain
extra-budgetary expenditures not connected with field
progranMtrs.
Source: FAO, Review of Field Proarammes 4982-1983
Rome, 1983'.
US$500,000 and consist of training, pilot projects,
research programs, institutional strengthening or simply
the provision of an expert in some technology to a
government program. A survey of active field projects in
Kenya, Brazil and Indonesia in May 1984 varied from a
U.S.2.2 million UNDP project for establishing a land
resources evaluation system for the Outer Islands of
Indonesia to a U.S.$11,000 grant from UNDP to developing a
pilot soil and water conservation project. Some projects
consist mainly of equipment or materials, others only
involve the short visit of a consultant. 18
The highest FAO governing body is the Conference, made
up of delegates from all the member governments, with equal
voting powers, which meets every two years to approve the
Budget and Programme, to elect new members and periodically
to elect a new Director-General. The Conference, in
reviewing the Budget and Programme, discusses the
Secretariat's view of the state of food and agriculture,
debates issues or special topics put before it by the
Secretariat, including on occasions aspects of the Field
Programme, passes resolutions or lends support to new
activities and policy initiatives proposed by the
18. See FAO, "Fisheries Department Field Pro jects", Rome,
June 1983; "Forestry Department Project Catalogue", Rome,
September 1963; "AGO Project Catalogue", Rome, Jan. 1984.
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Secretariat, and occasionally urges the Secretariat to
follow a particular policy direction. It also takes
decisions on administrative and constitutional issues.
Below the Conference is the Council, made up of 49 members,
elected by the Conference for 3 year terms on a rotating
basis, which meets at least once a year under an
independent chairman. The Council appoints Committees on
the Programme, Finance, Commodity Problems, Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries which do much of the work of
preparing the Programme and Budget in cooperation with the
relevant divisions of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is
headed by the Director-General who is elected by the
Confere-nce for a six-year term.
The structure of the Secretariat reflects both the
organization of the Regular Programme and the
administration of the Field Programme. Following the Major
Programmess of the Regular Programme, there are Departments
for Economic and Social Policy, Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry. Each of the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Departments has an Operations Division with responsibility
for executing the Field Programme. There is also a
Development Department, which is responsible for overall
19. Phillips, Ralph, FAO :Its Origins. Formation and
Evolution 1945-1981, Rome, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, 1981, pp.19-28.
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administration of the Field Programme, as well as FAO
Representatives, based in the member countries, and the
Investment Centre, which assists member countries in
identifying projects for financing by other donors.
Finally, there are Departments for the Regional and Liason
Offices, Administration and Finance and for General Affairs
and Information.
As I have made clear above, my ultimate concern is with
the operation of the Field Programme and what opportunity
exists for environmental assessment. However I shall
consider the policy making procedures and sources of
accountability for both the Regular Programme and the Field
Programme. It is the Regular Programme that has most
influence over the incentives facing the technical staff,
with the exception of those in the Operations divisions,
and over which the member governments have most control.
Also, it is the same technical staff which administers the
Regular Programme as well as prepares and approves the
technical aspects of field projects.
The Field Programme is often thought of within the
organization as a routine activity - bread and butter for
the organization. Although the funds are independent of
the regular budge t and many technical and most operations
staff members hold the view that in disbursing them the FAD
is simply acting as an agent of the recipient country, the
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organizational and policy context for its implementation
and evaluation cannot truly be separated from the
accountability system governing the Regular Programme.
Accountability or Autonomv?
The Regular Programme.
There are two alternative conceptions of the degree to
which the FAO Regular Programme is accountable to its
member.governments. One is that is that the member
governments direct and control the content of the Programme
and the level of the Budget via the Conference, the
Council, the major Committees and the permanent
delegations. The Secretariat is thereby accountable to the
members for the satisfaction of the Programme objectives
and the allocation of the Budget; members can introduce new
initiatives, require policy changes and review the
performance of particular items of the programme on a
continuing basis.
The other extreme is that for a variety of reasons the
Secretariat is almost autonomous and experiences littlJe
demand for accountability from its members. The factors
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that might explain this autonomy include:
- with universal membership and equal voting, political
control of the organization is diffuse and unwieldy;
- the routine nature of budgetary assessment and the
burden of contributions lying with a few wealthy
nations results in the majority of members having
little interest in controlling the budget strictly;
the majority of funds available to the FAO are
independent of the Regular Budget;
- the Secretariat can control the preparation and review
of- the Programme by the Committees, Council and
Conference;
- the members cannot easily review the detail of the
Programme but rely on the Secretariat to respond to
general directions from the Conference and Council;
- the Secretariat can easily deflect close scrutiny of
the Programme by members and can resist demands by
members for stricter accountability;
- the general area of responsibility of the FAO is
important to all but presents few clear-cut issues
that are controversial;
- the technical activities of the FAQ are hard to
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evaluate, comprising mostly information management,
consultation and policy analysis;
- the Secretariat can draw upon external sources of
policy direction and Programme justification, such as
UN conferences, action plans and resolutions.
It is likely that both these conceptions are too
extreme. I shall consider how accountable the FAQ is in
practice by drawing on the records of recent Conferences
and examples from staff members of how the Secretariat
responds to the members.
It would seem reasonable to expect the members to be
concerned about the Budget. Since the Secretariat is
normally called upon to increase its activities from
biennium to biennium, the Budget has risen accordingly.
Once the Committee on Finance has deliberated on the
appropriate Budget level and reported to the Council that
the Budget is in line with the proposed Programme for the
coming biennium, the Conference has little real opportunity
to influence it. Over the past few years, the Conference
has urged the Secretariat to contain administrative costs
and reduce headquarters posts in favor of decentralized
activities and to emphasize direct operations rather than
consultations, mee tings and publications.
Most of the budge t is provided by a few wealthy
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TABLE 19
THE FAO REGULAR BUDGET US$ millions
BIENNIUM 1974-75 1976-77 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1984-85
APPROVED
BUDGET 106.7
% INCREASE
OVER LAST
BIENNIUM 24
167.8
57
Source: FAO, 'r....Qna-
210.1
25
278.7
32
366.6 451.6
31 23
. Work and Budget, Rome, recent biennia.
TABLE 20
CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES TO FAO REGULAR BUDGET
% share of 1984 Assessment of member states contributing more than 1% of budget
AUSTRALIA
BELGIUM
BRAZIL
CANADA
CHINA
FRANCE
WEST GERMANY
ITALY
JAPAN
1.8
1.5
1.7
3.7
1.0
7.9
10.3
4.5
12.4
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
SAUDI ARABIA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
The remaining 15% is contributed by the other 139 members.
Source: FAO, "Contributions Due to the Budget and Amounts Due as
Advances to the Working Capital Fund", W/R0109/c, Rome 1984.
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1.0
2.1
1.0
2.3
1.6
1.3
5.6
25. 2
nations, whose formal power to contain budget increases is
limited by the voting structure. The majority of poorer
nations have a continuing interest in increasing the amount
of resources available to them from the organization. For
instance in 1979, the Conference Report records that:
"the very great majority of members
considered therefore that the budget level in
relation to the needs of developing countries and
FAO's capability in meeting those needs, should
have been higher. The proposed level had been
considered by the Director-General to provide the
best balance between the various considerations
involved and represented the absolute minimum
required to implement the approved programme."
At the next Conference in 1981, the members were asked
to support an increase of 30% in the budget for the
biennium 1982-1983. The main donor nations objected, having
failed to convince the Director-General to contain the
increase. The Conference Report says:
"Some members, while generally supporting the
objectives and most off the priorities of FAO and
emphasizing the Organization's special place in
the UN system, were unable to support the real
level of increase proposed in the
programme....They pointed out that in recent
years, FAQ's budget had been growing more rapidly
than had their national budgets and economies.
They considered that in the circumstances, it was
reasonable that the whole UN system, including
FAQ, should undergo a period of budgetary
consolidation.....
A few other members, while reserving their
positions on the budge t level, shared most of
these views.
20. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1979", Rome, 1979, p.35.
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The great majority, while recognizing and
respecting the views of all Member Nations,
strongly disagreed with the above
arguments....Some members expressed strong regret
at what they considered the threatening attitude
in this regard which had been adopted by two
delegations. The great majority believed that,
in the light of the Cancun meeting and with the
challenges now facing FAO, they could only regard
the proposed programme and budget as the minimum
needed to enable FAO to play its rightful and
essential part in the increased international
cooperation to which t1 Melbourne and Cancun
summits had referred."
Not only did the donor nations, especially the United
States, take the unusual step of directly opposing the
budget increases, but there was at the time of the 1981
Conference a vigorous press campaign, organized by an
American newspaper published in Rome, "The Daily American",
accusing the FAO management of corruption, waste, and
complete lack of accountability to the donor countries. 2 2
The Director-General still proposed a budget increase
of 23% for 1984-1885, but in the most cautious language.
In his introduction to the 1984-1985 Programme of Work and
Budget, he says:
"I have deliberately chosen a very
circumspect path in formulating my proposals for
the next biennium. The cost of the real
programme increase to the largest contributor
would be US$278,000 per annum: to the smallest
21. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, 1981,
pp. 24-25.
22. "The FAQ Dossier", The D~atIvyAmerican, Rome, 1981.
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contributors US$111 per annum.
... the adverse international economic
situation and its symptoms and repercussions,
make it incumbent on me to seek to limit any
additional financial burden for Member Nations,
both developing and developed.
The proposals for the Programme of Work and
Budget 1984-1985 have thus been framed to respond
to the highest priorities and felt needs of
Member Nations and, at the same time, to limit a
request for additional resources. The path
chosen to accomplish these apparently
contradictory objectives is by stringently
cutting programmes of relatively low priority,
reducing administrative and support costs and
channelling the resources thus freed together
with the minimum net additional resources to the
technical and 1gonomic programmes of the
Organization
The Director-General also mentioned that during the
Council. deliberations on the budget that "a number of
Member Nations expressed the opinion that the budget level
could have been kept down even further, while the vast
majority regretted that it was not much higher." 2 4
In the view of many staff members interviewed, the
members can hold the FAO accountable to the budget level
more easily than any other issue. However, it takes
considerable energy and conflict for the donor members to
exercise any influence over the budget levels The
Director-General enjoys the support of the majority of
23. FAQ, "Programme of Work and Budge t for 1984-1985",
Rome, 1983, p.14
24. iLbJA., p.15.
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developing members, who have little to lose from large
increases, and it is unlikely that a major donor could ever
withdraw support from an organization whose aim is to
prevent hunger and increase levels of nutrition and
agricultural production. (Still, the recent decision of
the U.S. to withdraw from Unesco has probably raised the
possibility in the minds of some governments.) The result
of the strident objections to the increased budget in 1981,
produced little more than a more careful approach and
shifting of the increase to technical programs - which are
easier to justify.
The members, one might expect, should also have some
control over the shape and direction of the Programme.
There have certainly been changes over the last few years
that have been deliberated by the Council and the
Conference, and which the Director-General has reported to
members from biennium to biennium. It is reasonable to
suppose that it would have been difficult to achieve these
changes in the face of concerted opposition from the
majority of members, but it is less easy to tell if the
changes stem directly from the decisions of the members.
For instance, the Programme of Work and Budget for
1978-1979, Presented to the Conference in 1977, recalls
that the Conference in 1975 had unanimously adopted a
resolution (16/75) "which had requested the
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Director-General to review the programmes, structures and
policies of the Organization in the light of the
Conference's deliberations."
"Foremost among the concerns of the
Conference had been the implementation of a New
International Economic Order, the urgent and
concrete requirements of all Member Nations, the
pressing needs of developing countries, steps
towards an appropriate decentralizatio 5of FAQ
and the use of national institutions."
The Director-General's proposals In response to this
resolution included: "a much greater emphasis on
investment, the establishment of a Technical Cooperation
Programme, emphasis on decentralization at the country
level, and the concurrent concentration on practical,
short-term activities and reduction in meetings, documents
and Headquarters posts." 2 6  The Director-General reported
that these proposals had been endorsed by the Regional
Conferences which are regional meetings of the national
delegations before the main Conference, the Council and its
Programme and Finance Committees whose job it is to prepare
the Budget and Programme proposals for submission to the
Conference. These issues were reviewed at the 1979 and 1981
25. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1977", Rome, 1977, p 17.
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Conferences and the efforts of the Secretariat to implement
the appropriate measures were endorsed. 2 7
According to staff members, specific issues concerning
the operations of the Organization such as increased
decentralization or initiating an activity like the
Technical Cooperation Programme tend to be proposed by the
Secretariat in response to general feelings among the
members that, for instance, the FAO was not channelling
sufficient resources into concrete activities of benefit to
developing members. Other issues raised by members tend to
be very general and the Secretariat initiates specific
Resolutions in response to the main concerns that are then
introduced by individual members. Much of the discussion
during the Conference, and the subject of many resolutions,
is global in range and not specifically targeted towards
the Programme. For instance, during the 1983 Conference,
members discussed and adopted resolutions about: the
critical situation of food and agriculture in Africa, world
food security, revision and updating of the guidelines and
targets for international agricultural adjustment, progress
in implementation of the World Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development. More specifically, the
27. FAQ, " Report of the Conference 1979", Rome, 1979,
p.33; FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, 1981,
p. 23.
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developing members adopted an International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources, (with the major donors reserving
their positions).28
The Secretariat, in consolidating the detailed proposed
activities of the technical divisions into the Programme of
Work and Budget for the coming biennium draws legitimacy
for new or extended activities from previous Conference
Resolutions, usually originating with the Secretariat, and
from other major events within the UN system, such as the
United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development, the World Food Conference, the World
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the UN
Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and the
World Conference on Fisheries Management and Development.
Preparing for these Conferences usually has considerable
influence over the specific programme within the FAO and
they normally arrive at a proposed Action Plan, specifying
responsible organizations within the UN system. The
Secretariat reminds the members of the FAO's obligation to
ensure the appropriate follow-up when presenting its
28. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1983", Rome, 1983,
pp.10-50.
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programme, which might entail a new Sub-Programme item,
research, meetings and publications.29
At a more detailed level, the Secretariat remains
relatively autonomous from the members. According to staff
in the Forestry Department, the Committee on Forestry, in
particular the U.S. delegate, recently attempted to exact
greater accountability from the Department by requesting an
independent evaluation of the Forestry programme. But the
Department stalled the Committee and simply hired a
consultant to prepare a more explicit long-term strategy to
present to the next Committee meeting. Also, it is
possible for the Secretariat to ignore Conference
resolutions that it has not originally sponsored. For
example, according to Forestry Department staff, in 1975
several francophone West African governments sponsored a
resolution concerning the conservation of wildlife. The
resolution was not followed up by the appropriate technical
division, which wanted to concentrate its efforts on
increasing production, despite the opportunity to establish
a Sub-Programme in response.
In general, the members only have the opportunity to
29. FAQ, "Report of the World Conference on Agrarian Reform
and Rural Development", Rome, 1979, pp.4-26; FAQ, "Report
of the Conference 1979", Rome, 1979, p.34; FAQ, "Report of
the Conference 1981", Rome, 1981, p.24; FAQ, "Programme of
Work and Budget 1984-1985", Rome, 1983, p.8.
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propose very broad initiatives and can only review the
performance of the Secretariat at a "macro" level. Much of
the direction of the Programme stems from external events
and directives or decisions from within the Secretariat
about how to respond to particular issues or areas of
responsibility. Once the Programme is formulated, it is
the responsibility of the technical divisions to report to
the Director-General on the detailed implementation.
However, the divisions are essentially accountable only for
spending their budget according to the items set out in the
relevant Sub-Programmes.
In conclusion, the accountability of the Secretariat to
its members for the Programme is loose. Owing to the
political structure and the diffuse character of the
Programme content, only the broad strategic issues are
directly influenced by the members and even then the
members tend to acquiesce to the specific proposals and
actions of the Secretariat. The Secretariat tends to be
more responsive at a strategic level to the UN system and
its program of Conferences. In the absence of any tight
accountability from the members, the technical staff
members are sensitive to the reputation of the organization
within the professional community, but are also motivated
by the reward system prevailing within the organization.
There is very lit tle risk of their being held accountable
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for the product of their section of the Programme, but they
can be embarrassed by technical criticism from the
development community and they need to ensure the survival
and extension of their Sub-Programme in competition for
scarce resources with other technical divisions.
The Field Programme.
Depending on their position in the organization, FAO
staff members hold conflicting views about the
accountability of the FAO for the quality of the Field
Programme. The staff of the Operations Divisions, which is
responsible for the implementation of field projects,
emphasize that FAD is simply the servant of its member
governments, executing projects requested by governments
and funded by donors to the best of its technical ability.
The responsibility for project identification, preparation
and approval does not lie with the Operations Divisions.
Staff members in the technical divisions do not fully
share this view. Since they are responsible for reviewing
the proposed projects and providing whatever further
technical input is necessary before indicating their
technical approval to the funding source, they tend to feel
that, if FAD does not hold itself accountable for the
preparation of field projects, no other party will. At
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least at the level of individual staff members and
Darticular technical divisions, it is their reputation that
can be damaged by not trying to ensure technical quality.
The staff of the Field Programme Development Division,
(DDF), in the Development Department, is responsible for
managing the process of receiving, responding to and
executing requests for field projects Thus, it is
concerned about the quality of the Field Programme, but
quick to point out the constraints facing them within the
FAO and the absence of any tight accountability system from
o Ut side.
The incentives and constraints facing FAD staff members
in delivering the Field Programme do appear to be
influenced by the political and financial structure of the
FAQ, but not in a particularly coherent or forceful.
manner. Indeed the impression given by many FAQ staff is
that the external accountability for the Field Programme is
neutral or inconsistent. What remains is something of a
struggle between professional concerns and organizational
interests, as I shall explain below. I shall consider
these different influences on the accountability of FAQ for
the Field Programme in turn.
The charter of the FAQ states that one of the functions
of the organization is "to furnish such technical
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assistance as governments may request".30 The members
expect that the organization remains prepared and competent
for this function and that it does its utmost to ensure
that funds are available for the projects from appropriate
donors. The members, while not contributing directly to
the funds, except for the Technical Cooperation Programme,
expect the Secretariat to promote and administer the Field
Programme for their benefit.
The Secretariat submits a Review of the Field Programme
to the Conference every biennium. This review and the
subsequent discussion of the Field Programme in the
Conference address the following issues. First, the
quantity of official development assistance allocated to
agriculture is of concern to the members. The Secretariat
keeps track of these trends and seeks to serve the
interests of its members in the international community.
In 1981, the Secretariat prepared a report for the members
on Development Assistance for Food Production and Rural
Development in response to a Conference resolution in
1979.31
30. FAQ, "Basic Texts of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations", Vols.I and II, Rome,
1980 edition, p.2.
31. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981," Rome, 1981, p.45.
- 324 -
Second, the Secretariat reports to the members on the
level of resources allocated by UNDP and other major donors
for execution by FAO. Recently the declining share of
agriculture in UNDP allocations and the consequent reduced
role of FAQ as an executing agency for UNDP has worried not
only the members but also the Secretariat which needs the
financial support provided by these funds.32 The
Secretariat has been able to report that these reductions
are partially offset by other sources of funds. However,
the declining total of Field Programme expenditure in real
terms, is worrying for both the members and the
organization. Thus the Secretariat tends to emphasize to
the members the efforts it is making to tap other sources
of funds, but that any necessary reductions of the levels
of field activities and staff are not entirely within its
control.
Third, the Secretariat reports to the members on the
composition and distribution of the Field Programme. Here
the Secretariat is careful to balance the broad policy
objectives concerning the priorities for field activities
that stem from such sources as the World Conference on
Agrarian Reform and World Development or in response to
current urgencies, such as the shortage of food in Africa,
32. WblA., pp.45-46; FAQ, "Review of the Field Programmes
1982-1983", Rome, 1983, pp.3-6.
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with the priorities of recipient governments and
commitments of donors.33 In addition, the Secretariat
reports on specific components of the Field Programme such
as the Investment Centre, technical support for the World
Food Programme and support for Technical Cooperation among
Developing Countries.
Finally, the Secretariat reports to the menmbers the
results of its evaluation of the implementation of the
Field Programme. This consists of direct evaluation at the
country level by FAO Representatives and more detailed
evaluation at the Headquarters level of the results of FAO
Evaluation Service reports. The FAO Representatives are
asked to judge projects according to the following
criteria: clarity of objectives, project design, government
involvement, output, transfer of skills and follow-up
prospects. The coverage of countries and projects is quite
extensive. The evaluation missions are more selective and
more detailed, and tend to concentrate on large-scale,
multi-disciplinary projects and often those that have
encountered difficulties. They cover a comparable set of
factors.34 These reviews provide quite a detailed picture
33. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, p.47; .iden,
Review of Field Programmes 1982-1983", Rome, p.10-16.
34. See FAQ, "Review of Field Programmes 1982-1983", Rome,
1983, PP.23-41.
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of some of the difficulties encountered in the Field
Programme which is duly transmitted to the members, with
the understanding that many of the factors governing the
performance of field projects are beyond the control of the
FAO, and indeed some are the responsibility of the
recipient governments. For instance, the 1982-1983 Review
of Field Programmes reports that project objectives are
sometimes more ambitious than available resources, local
institutional capacity and socio-economic constraints would
justify. In other cases, insufficient time was allowed for
achieving the objectives or institutional mechanisms
necessary for implementation were ignored. Implementation
problems included poor support from governments, delays in
staff recruitment and the provision of equipment. The
Review also concludes that the poor ratings of project
output are highly correlated with poor ratings of project
.35design.
In particular, the Secretariat points out that project
design is sometimes at fault, and there is a case for
greater scrutiny of new proposals prior to implementation
and more rigorous procedures for project preparation
missions. For instance, the FAO Representatives rated
project design as poor (rather than good or satisfactory)
35. ibid., p.33-37.
- 327 -
in 12% of projects reviewed in the biennium 1978-1979 and
9% in biennia 1980-1981 and 1982-1983. Just under half of
the projects examined by the evaluation missions in
1982-1983 suffered from one or more defects in project
design.36 Also, inadequate government support is found to
pose serious difficulties. Finally, there are operational
problems, some within FAO's control and some not. 3 7
The response of many members to this kind of analysis
is indifference. While some of the donor members favor
stricter review and evaluation of the Field Programme, even
suggesting that there should be an external evaluation
process, many developing members are opposed to tighter
control or evaluation of UNDP projects on the grounds that
the responsibility for project preparation, design and
implementation should rest with them to a greater extent
than many donors and the Secretariat would prefer.38 The
recipient members prefer to have greater independence in
how they spend their allocations of UNDP funds, and tend to
regard the executing agency merely as a source of technical
input. Furthermore, many governments are sensitive to the
implications in the evaluation reports that lack of
36. .Ibid ., pp .25, 34 .
37. i.bidL., pp.39-41.
38. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, p.47.
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government support and poor government administration are
the cause of many of the problems. The Secretariat has
noted that the technical quality of the Trust Fund and
Technical Cooperation Programme, where the FAD is more
closely involved in the early stages of project
identification and preparation is higher.3 9
The suggestion that the accountability of the FAD for
the quality of the Field Programme varies according to the
sources of funds was confirmed by interviews with FAO staff
members. In the case of UNDP, the recipient governments
enjoy greater independence for identifying and preparing
projects than in the case of other funding agencies, and
consequently the FAO has less control over the quality of
the proposal before it arrives at FAO, and meets greater
resistance on the part of recipient governments to
significant modifications or closer scrutiny. In the case
of Trust Funds, depending on which donor is concerned,
there is much greater potential for the donor to exercise
control over the technical quality of the projects and to
ensure the satisfaction of certain policy objectives. The
Technical Cooperation Programme is wholly within the
control of the FAQ, and while the FAQ is obliged to respond
quickly to the specific requests of members, it does have
39. .ibi., p. 47.
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more opportunity to ensure adequate technical preparation.
In practically all cases, there is no financial
accountability in the sense of the donors expecting any
measurable return on the funds.
In short, most FAO members expect the Secretariat to
promote the Field Programme and to ensure that sufficient
resources are channeled to food production and
agriculture. Most recipient member governments prefer that
they choose the projects and decide how they are
implemented to as great a degree as possible, and
traditionally this has been most acceptable with respect to
UNDP funds. Donor members are more in favor of greater
scrutiny of project proposals and more objective
evaluation. The organization itself, as will be discussed
below, has some interest in better project design and
implementation, but faces more resistance to this concern
from its members than support and little external
cooperation from the major source of its funds, the UNDP.
In the absence of a strict accountability for the
quality of the Field Programme from the majority of members
and from the major funding source, the incentives and
constraints facing FAO staff members in executing field
projects owe much to the content and administration of the
Field Programme as I shall describe below. in addition,
the FAQ staff feels some measure of a responsibility for
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the quality of the Field Programme to the professional
community in spite of some of constraints on improvement
and the resistance of members to interference.
I have already argued that the political mechanisms for
governing the Regular Programme have partial influence over
the Field Programme. The donors have little direct leverage
over the FAO's administration of UNDP or Technical
Cooperation Programme, being in the minority and having no
direct financial leverage via the biennial Regular Budget.
The recipient members, however, expect the FAO to deliver
the Field Programme and not to impose conditions on its
disbursement. According to the operations staff, they feel
they have a right to receive field projects.
The substantive content and policy orientation of the
Regular Programme also influences the Field Programme.
Since field projects are prepared and technically approved
by the same staff that administer the Regular Programme, it
is likely that priorities, activities and policy
orientations will seep from one to the other, despite the
limited influence that FAO has over the identification of
field projects. Interviews with technical staff members
suggest that through missions and consultations with
officials from member countries, the staff can extend an
emphasis on, for example, be tter control of pesticide use
from regular activities to the content of field projects,
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particularly in projects that consist of training or pilot
schemes.
Many technical staff members express some frustration
over their limited influence over the technical content and
preparation of projects. Both from a professional
standpoint and to avoid the possible damage to their
reputation that a poor project might bring, they are
concerned about getting access to projects early enough and
steering them towards sound design and execution. This, 1
would argue, represents a form of self-imposed
accountability. It corresponds, of course, to the
technical orientation of the particular staff members -
which can be uneven and in some cases conflicting. It
changes with the trends within the Regular Programme and
with changes in staffing. However, it is perhaps the most
coherent source of accountability for the technical quality
of the Field Programme.
This professional concern for the Field Programme is
blunted and often neutralized by a variety of
organizational factors that influence the administration of
the Field Programme. First, there is very limited
procedural control from DDF. According to interviews with
DDF staff, the responsibilities of DDF, which receives and
responds to incoming requests for field projects from
members, are 1 imited to allocating responsibility to a
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technical division to conduct a technical review and
provide whatever input is needed before technical approval
can be granted. There are only the most general and
largely ineffectual guidelines governing this process,
which are primarily aimed at programming missions.40 These
guidelines contain a very brief note on the importance of
environmental protection, amongst several other policy
objectives in a section called "orientation and focus".4
Effectively, all DDF can do is to urge the lead technical
division to cooperate with other technical divisions in
cases where there is an obvious need for inter-disciplinary
analysis or inter-sectoral coordination. This it does by
means of the memo that allocates a project to a particular
lead division and by copying the memo to the other relevant
divisions. 42
There are a number of reasons why DDF's role is so
limited and why project appraisal and approval is so
unsystematic. One is the variety of funding sources which
each have their own different, if inadequate, procedures
40. FAO, "Guidelines for Developing Technical Cooperation
Activities", Rome, 1980.
41. 4bUd., pp.8-10.
42. interviews with DDE staff indicated that DDE is
concerned about this state of affairs and is in the process
of improving the procedures for project appraisal. At
present, even the procedural requirements are not always
enforced.
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for identification and early preparation of project
proposals. Also, for this reason and because of the
variable quality of government agencies in recipient
countries, proposals arrive at FAO in very different states
of preparation and requiring very different treatment by
the technical staff. There is, in addition, an enormous
variety of types of field project ranging from large,
multi-disciplinary development schemes to small inputs to
institutions or programs in the form of a consultant or
some equipment. 4 3
The second organizational factor of importance is the
specialized, input-orientated structure of the Secretariat.
Following the organization of the Regular Programme, the
technical divisions are very specialized and focussed on
individual inputs or elements of agricultural production,
such as fertilizers, mechanization, crop storage,
marketing. Consequently, there is little tradition of the
inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral approach that is more
appropriate to the formulation and appraisal of field
projects.
Thirdly, the technical and operations divisions are
grouped into three departments - agriculture, forestry and
43. See FAQ, "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Environment
and Energy on Environmental Assessment of Field Projects",
Rome, 1953, pp.4-5.
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fisheries. The financial benefits to the departments of
handling the Field Programme are a disincentive to
cooperation and coordination between sectors which is often
detrimental to the technical quality of the projects.
Departments are reluctant to hand over projects to other
departments or cooperate with other departments because
they lose the overhead revenue or have to undertake more
work with less revenue. In addition, the concern of the
operations divisions for efficient and expeditious
preparation and execution of projects makes them less
tolerant of extensive review and redesign of projects.
They also resist the inclusion of multiple objectives in
project. design preferring the most direct and manageable
input as a response to any request.
Finally, the variety and complexity of the Field
Programme and the limited control over the implementation
context places a premium in the course of reviewing the
progress of projects and evaluating their performance on
logistical and managerial factors, not on project
performance. The various project reporting and monitoring
procedures, and the routine evaluations carried out by the
operations division staff and FAO Representatives do little
to tighten up any technical accountability or to feed back
lessons about project design and approval that can be built
into future projects. In the life of a field project, the
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closer it moves towards the recipient government - that is
during the implementation and operation phase, the less
control the FAO has over the quality or impact of the
project.
To sum up, the FAO is barely accountable to members or
external agencies for the quality of field projects, mostly
because the developing members expect the FAO to respond to
project proposals with the minimum of interference and
because the funding sources exercise only very limited
influence over the identification and preparation of
projects. There is some self-imposed accountability that
stems from the professional concerns of the technical staff
and the policy orientations of the Regular Programme.
However this self-imposed accc ntability is largely blunted
by the nature of the Field Programme itself and the
organizational factors that govern the incentives and
constraints facing staff members.
Accountability and Environmental Assessment,
Within the Regular Programme, there is no systematic
resistance to the policy of environmental protection and
natural resource management, even if not all of the
activities of the FAQ are compatible with such a policy and
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its implementation. In other words, the Regular Programme
can easily accommodate both environmental protection
activities and environmentally damaging inputs such as
pesticides, intensive fertilizer use and forest
industries.
The charter of the FAQ states that one of the functions
of the organization is to "promote and, where appropriate,
recommend national and international action with respect to
the conservation of natural resources and the adoption
of improved methods of agricultural production". 44
Within the Regular Programme, there is a Natural
Resourc-es Sub-Programme of the Agriculture Programme -
whose objective is "to manage natural resources for the
sustained improvement of agricultural production while
simultaneously protecting the environment".45 In the
1984-1985 Programme, the Agriculture Programme is
introduced with the following qualification: "Increased
food production must not be achieved at the expense of
damage to the land and water resource base on which it
44. FAO, "Basic Texts of the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations", Rome, 1980 edition,
p.2.
45. FAQ, "Review of the Regular Programme 1980-1981", Rome,
1981, p.2.
46. FAO, "Programme of Work and Budge t 1984-1985", Rome
1983, p.73.
- 337 -
depends".46 There are also Sub-Programmes within the
Forestry and Fisheries Major Programmes relating to "Forest
Resources and the Environment" and "Marine Resources and
Environment ". 47
Staff members report that member governments are
increasingly concerned with resource management issues and
accordingly such issues are reflected in the Programme and
the contributions to Conference discussions from the
appropriate technical divisions. For instance, in 1981
there was a strong emphasis on the environmental problems
within the forestry sector, such as the need to control
deforestation and secure supplies of fuelwood, maintaining
an ecological balance and avoiding soil erosion. 48
TThe influence of the United Nations system provides
additional support for environmental activities within the
Regular Programme. UNEP, in particular, funds and
coordinates much of the environmental activities within
FAO. "During 1982-3 FAO's environmental activities included
25 projects to which UNEP contributed US$4 million. These
activities strengthened FAO's work in areas such as
management of grazing lands, soil conservation,
47. FAQ, "Programme of Work and Budget 1984-1985", Rome,
1983, pp.51-52.
48. FAQ, "Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, 1981,
pp.7-11.
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desertification, integrated pest control, forestry and
wildlife assessment and management, animal and plant
genetic resources, aquatic pollution, marine mammals,
biological nitrogen fixation, food contamination and
guidelines for environmental assessment." 4 9
However much of the FAO's environmental sensitivity
stems from the orientation of some of its staff members -
just as much of its environmentally damaging activities
do. It is reasonable to expect staff of the soil resources
management and conservation service to be sensitive to soil
erosion problems and the need to control agricultural
activities that cause erosion. So, too, the marine
resources service and the forest and wildlands conservation
branch are likely to be concerned about environmental
protection. However, the staff of the plant protection
service, the fertilizer and plant nutrition service, the
agricultural engineering service or the forest industries
division are equally likely to favor environmentally
hazardous interventions traditionally used to increase
agricultural output.
In the absence of a coherent and tight accountability
system surrounding the Regular Programme, it seems clear
49. FAO, "Review of the Regular Programme 1982-1983", Rome,
1983, p.14.
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that environmental activities do not meet significant
resistance and are a useful contribution to the Programme.
The more consistent concern from some members to justify
extending the Programme in this direction and and the more
funds coming from UNEP to support such activities, the
healthier the environmental activities are. There appears
to be no systematic resistance from the members and there
certainly is firm support from some parts of the
Secre tariat.
Within the Field Programme, one is dealing with a
somewhat different accountability system and a policy issue
with different operational implications. Although the
generally positive attitude to environmental activities
spills over from the Regular Programme to a limited extent,
tthe members are more resistant to the policy objectives
governing the shape of the field projects they receive.
Furthermore, it is a far more difficult proposition to
conduct environmental assessments of field projects than to
prepare guidelines or organize meetings.
The initiative for environmental assessment of the
Field Programme emerged from the IDWG on Environment and
Energy, and owes its support to the reasonable health of
environmental activities within the Regular Programme.
However, the resistance to its implementation stems from
the accountability system surrounding the Field Programme.
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First, the recipients of field projects are resistant to
efforts by the executing agency to influence the
identification, preparation and implementation of
projects. In the agriculture, fisheries and forest
sectors, the orientation of the relevant government
agencies tends to be very input-orientated with limited
concern for impacts and interactions. Second, the main
funding agency, the UNDP, and some of the bilaterals have
only the slightest sensitivity to environmental problems
and lack the clout or interest to tighten the
accountability for this issue within their funding
operations. Third, while the organization attempts to hold
itself.accountable for the quality of the field programme,
often to protect its reputation in the face of problems
beyond its direct control, the monitoring and evaluation of
projects offer little opportunity for increasing the
incentive for environmental assessment.
In other words, if technical staff are accountable to
any degree for the environmental effectts of the Field
Programme, it is not because recipients nor donors exact
such accountability, but because of their own professional
and organizational interests.
- 341 -
Barriers to E.nvironmentalAsesmn
The IDWG has investigated the possibility of
introducing an environmental assessment procedure for the
Field Programme. This has not been achieved. I shall
conclude this case by discussing some of the barriers to
environmental assessment and suggesting what would need to
change for these barriers to be reduced.
The first major reason stems from FAO's relation to the
funding process and project cycle. FAO has limited
involvement in the identification and conceptual design of
projects or in the initial discussions with funding
sources. For this reason and because of the variety of
funding sources and levels of recipient technical ability,
the projects arrive at FAO in very different conditions.
They are also very varied in scope, content and mechanism,
some of which would be amenable to an assessment procedure
but many would not because of limited size or scope. The
IDWG report cites two related limitations to environmental
assessment procedures that stem from the external context
within which FAO operates:
- "The extent to which FAO is involved in the early
stages of project identification and formulation is
variable and ad hoc.
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- FAD has limited influence on the orientation and
priorities of member governments, the objectives and
procedures of donors and the dynamics of the
implementation context." 50
The next set of reasons are organizational.
Essentially, it has not proved possible to tighten the
project preparation and approval procedure5 so that
environmental problems can at least be flagged and in
certain cases fully investigated. The division of
technical responsibility within FAD does not favor
inter-sectoral coordination which in the view of the
Environment Office staff is the most serious cause of
environmental impacts within the Field Programme The
importance of the financial benefits to the lead technical
division and operating division from the Field Programme
also encourages a single discipline approach. The IDWG
report puts it as follows:
- "FAO's mandate and Regular Programme requires
specialized, input-orientated structure that has
necessitated special coordination mechanisms, such as
IDWG's, in order to manage the Field Programme.
50. FAQ, "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Group of the IDWG on
Environment and Energy on Environmental Assessment of Field
Projects", Rome, 1983, p.5.
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- In a climate of limited financial resources, there is
some tendency for departments and divisions to compete
for projects and place a premium on their own
specialized orientation.
- The logistics and resource limits of project execution
sometimes makes it difficult to include multiple
objectives and adaptive mechanisms during thee
implementation phase.
- The variety and special characteristics of field
projects, especially in relation to different donors,
sometimes result in incomplete fulfillment of existing
ap.praisal and formulation procedures.
As in most development assistance agencies, it is
difficult to provide real incentives for technical and
operations staff to respond to complex issues such as
environmental impacts." 51
Finally, some of the barriers to environmental
assessment stem from the professional and technical
orientation of FAO staff, just as other staff provide most
of the support. Within some divisions, the technical
emphasis is very input-orientated and performance is
measured only in terms of increasing production without
51. iid.,. p.5.
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concern for more systemic interactions. Some staff
members, who work in divisions responsible for resource
management and conservation, refer to others as "choppers
and sprayers", intent solely on, for instance, wiping out
tsetse flies at the expense of killing or removing vast
areas of vegetation. Similar complaints are voiced by the
more environmentally orientated staff members about the FAO
Representatives in the member countries who are,
apparently, coopted into the thinking and programming of
the national agriculture ministry, whose technical
orientation is likely to be oriented towards
intensification and increased production regardless of
sustainability or inter-sectoral coordination. For these
reasons, some staff suggest, the technical input to field
projects tends to be less "state-of-the-art" than can be
found in the Regular Programme - there is more pressure on
short-term production gains and on specific targets.
For this situation to change, I suggest that there
would need to be a significant realignment of the
accountability system surrounding the Field Programme. Any
of the following would help. First, the donor members and
a significant number of recipient members would have to
insist on greater accountability for the technical quality
and performance of Field Projects in conjunction with a
similar initiative within the UNDP and sources of Trust
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Funds. Once the other main political actors and sources of
funds reinforced FAO's own concern with technical quality,
it should not prove so hard to tighten and enforce the
project cycle with respect to technical issues such as
environmental protection which are already embedded in the
Regular Programme. Second, the recipient countries would
have to shift their priorities in requesting field
projects. If countries requested more natural resource
management and sectoral management projects that had as
their central objective the sustainable utilization of
resources and protection of degraded environments, the
technical framework for administering the Field Programme
would be more compatible with the assessment of input
orientated projects to determine if they are likely to
cause environmental damages. Third, UNEP would have to
channel more of its already scarce funds to activities that
enhanced the role of the Environment Office within the
organization and provided more opportunities to initiate
the environmental planning of field projects. In the
absence of a more positive accountability framework, the
professional concern of the FAO staff is not likely to
sustain an environmental assessment procedure such as has
been considered by the IDWG.
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CHAPTER 8
The Response of Development Assistance Agencies
to Environmental1PPbbdms
Conclusions
Introduction
In the preceding case studies, I have considered the
influence of the political and financial structure of
development assistance agencies on their capacity to
install and implement a procedure for assessing the
environmental effects of their funding programs. In so
doing, I have focussed on how the political and financial
structure shapes the accountability system that the staff
of an agency faces - which creates much of the incentives
and constraints governing the agency's operations.
In this chapter, I shall summarize the main conclusions
from each case, showing how the dominant structural
features of each agency determine the agency's capacity to
respond to a policy initiative that requires the review and
modification, when appropriate, of its regular funding
program. Next, I shall look briefly at some of the other
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development assistance agencies that fall into the main
categories represented by the cases. I shall ask whether
the conclusions reached are supported by what is known
about these other examples. At that point, I shall propose
a general explanation, hinging on their accountability
system, of how development assistance agencies respond to
new policy initiatives of this kind. Finally, I shall
complement my conclusions about how the accountability
system shapes the response of the organization to
environmental assessment policy with a discussion of what
latitude these organizations actually have to pursue this
kind of policy objective.
Conclusions from the Cases
The cases of AID, the World Bank and the FAO are
representative of bilateral development assistance
agencies, multilateral development banks and UN specialized
agencies respectively. The political and financial
structure of these types of development agencies is quite
different from each other and consequently each produces an
accountability system that influences the organizational
incentives and constraints in different ways.
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In the first case, I described how AID is unique among
development assistance agencies in having a mandatory
environmental assessment procedure that, since its
introduction after 1975, has evolved into a well-integrated
environmental planning system. The aspect of AID's
political structure that distinguishes it most from the
other cases is that, like any bilateral agency, it is part
of national governmental machinery. The government, in the
form of the relevant branches and departments, sets the
policies of AID and tries to ensure that these policies are
followed. In so doing, the government, like other
democratic governments, is responsive to the electorate and
public.interests, both through formal mechanisms and
informally.
The most distinctive financial feature of AID is that
its budget comes from the national government and must be
approved by the Congress before it is committed. Also the
funds are disbursed mainly as grants or concessionary loans
which do not have to meet specified rates of return.
Broadly, the implications of the political structure is
that AID's accountability system is dominated by national
policy objectives, including political, economic and
developmental objectives, that the agency must respond to
the priorities, often domestic, of various government
departments and that it is answerable to the Congress,
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through which various pressure groups can lobby and
influence policy, and, finally, is legally responsible for
adherence to regulations or procedures that apply to
federal agencies. The financial structure focusses the
accountability system on the budgeting process, and
therefore on the submission of assistance programs for
approval. There is little incentive for strict appraisal
or evaluation of the ultimate financial or economic
performance of projects.
Within the agency, much of the work of headquarters
staff is concerned with responding to the Congressional
mandate and ensuring that the funds are disbursed. In so
doing, they require mission staff to follow policy
guidelines and procedures when preparing budget requests to
demonstrate adherence to the mandate. To the mission
staff, however, the most important incentive is to extend
and disburse the program with minimum uncertainty and
maximum cooperation from the recipient government. Thus
the effect of the policy guidelines and procedures barely
extends beyond the submission of project proposals for
budget approval.
In order to make AID responsive to a certain policy
issue, first the Congress has to be persuaded either by the
Administration or public lobbying groups to mandate AID to
behave in a certain way; second, the Congress must follow
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up in the course of the budgeting process and third, the
agency must convert the Congressional concern into a change
in priorities, procedures or program. The accountability
system does not always ensure the third step - many aspects
of AID's Congressional mandate do not penetrate far beyond
the budgeting process.
In the case of environmental assessment, Congress was
persuaded to pass legislation, namely NEPA, that required
federal agencies to prepare environmental assessments of
their actions. Although AID, like other federal agencies,
did not comply immediately and resisted the efforts of the
CEQ and environmental lobbies to persuade it to respond,
the agency was finally sued in the Courts and quickly
agreed to a settlement that included installing mandatory
environmental assessment procedures. Subsequently,
environmental lobbies secured a Congressional mandate
specific to the environmental aspects of AID's program and
have continued to press for its implementation.
What is unusual about this sequence of events is that
the environmental policy initiativve, once the courts
insisted on it, changed the responsibilities of the staff.
Its legal status substantively altered the accountability
system forcing the staff to include environmental analysis
in the project preparation process. Thus the incentives
and constraints facing both Washington and mission staff
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members were immediately affected, even if at first the
environmental assessments had little effect on project
design and implementation. Once the accountability system
had been abruptly expanded in this way, it was much easier
for environmental lobbies and the environmental staff hired
to carry out the procedures to broaden the mandate and to
activate the mechanisms for ensuring that the policy did
more than simply add to the project documentation. In this
way, the assessment requirement eventually came to improve
the environmental planning and implementation of projects.
To sum up, domestic legislation and the efforts of
domestic lobbies were able to affect the legal and policy
framework for AID's program. AID is accountable to
national government bodies and processes, mainly for policy
objectives that are most easily satisfied within the
budgeting process and for legal or procedural obligations
that follow from its status as a federal agency.
The second case, the World Bank, revolved around the
financial more than the political structure of multilateral
development banks. I argued that the Bank has above all to
maintain its financial status in its borrowing from the
international capital markets and lending to recipient
governments. Its political structure gives greatest formal
authority to those nations providing the capital of the
Bank, but this authority is in practice concentrated on the
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financial operations of the Bank and is partly neutralized
over political issues by the ideology of multilateral
development funding - namely that the political interests
of individual donors should not govern lending policies.
The accountability system of the Bank, reflecting the
need to maintain the creditworthiness of the Bank in the
eyes of the capital markets, requires that the operations
of the Bank meet two dominant criteria. One is that the
governments borrowing from the Bank are creditworthy with
respect to Bank loans and the other is that the Bank
maintains its reputation for financially sound procedures
and high professional standards. Provided the Bank
continues its near-perfect repayment record and its staff
demonstrates more rigorous financial and economic scrutiny
than other types of development assistance agency, it will
enjoy the approval of donor members and the capital markets
and exercise its considerable influence within the
development assistance system.
The Bank can and does pursue political and
developmental objectives. Some of these stem from the
donors, others from the academic and professional
development community and others from the Bank's management
itself. The accountability system, so well focussed on
financial and economic soundness, does not favor the
implementation of political or developmental objectives
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except those designed to improve the financial policies of
recipients. Directors cannot easily impose their
particular political objectives, and when they do the
decisions affected tend to be very particular, such as
discontinuing lending to a particular country. Since the
directors have little direct influence over the day-to-day
Bank operations, they have limited opportunity to exact
accountability from the organization over its technical
decisions. The management does promote new developmental
policies, often in response to changes in strategy
recommended by the intellectual and professional
development community. But, the accountability system does
little.to overcome the resistance of the project staff to
policy objectives that conflict with reliable and efficient
economic analysis and management nor does it reduce the
staff's independence, provided the financial and economic
objectives of the lending program are satisfied.
When the Bank took environmental protection policy on
board, it seemed to be seriously committed to assessing
proposed projects for their potential environmental effects
and requiring measures for avoiding or mitigating
environmental damages. However, this policy has never been
as comprehensive or as effective as the Bank has claimed.
The main reason is that the project staff which is
responsible for maintaining the financial and economic
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soundness of the lending program is also responsible for
implementing the somewhat weakly defined environmental
policy. from its perspective, environmental assessment and
mitigation do not contribute to the main task except when
the financial soundness of the investment is directly
threatened by environmental problems - and even then it may
prove too difficult to negotiate and secure implementation
of mitigation measures from the borrower. Consequently,
the environmental staff has to do its best with limited
resources and authority to influence the project cycle and
persuade the project staff to respond to potential
environmental problems.
The accountability system is of little help to the
environmental office. The project staff feels most
accountable for financial criteria. Thus it gives less
priority to policy objectives which appear to it to involve
more complex and unreliable analysis, to reduce the
estimated rate of return, and to impose costs in the form
of modifications of implementation plans. Even though the
Bank seems concerned about environmental policy and indeed
is considered a leader in the field, the accountability
system impedes the systematic assessment and modification
of project proposals. As a result, the Bank's
environmental office devotes more at tention to promoting
environmental sector loans, providing environmental
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technical assistance, preparing guidelines and other public
relations materials than trying assess the environmental
effects of the program.
Finally, the FAO, an example of a UN specialized
agency, proved to have a weak accountability system,
compensated for in part by the professional interests of
the staff within a fairly autonomous secretariat. This
accountability system, I argued, was responsible for the
organizational barriers facing the current effort to
install a system of environmental assessment within the
Field Programme.
The FAO, like many UN specialized agencies, lacks
coherent and positive political direction, especially in
relation to the Field Programme. In the first place, the
donor governments are in a minority and can only hold the
organization accountable at the risk of political conflict
and then only about the level of the budget or very broad
aspects of the program. The recipient governments who are
a majority are not in favor of stricter accountability,
especially with respect to the Field Programme, on the
grounds that UN agencies should respond to the priorities
of its members and not impose conditions or set performance
criteria for judging the suitability of a project
The financial structure of the FAO reinforces this
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feature. First, the Regular Budget Is assessed through an
agreed formula that does not allow individual members to
control their contribution easily. It takes political
courage and considerable agreement among donors to exert
any influence over the level of budget increases each
biennium - the recipient members favor increased resources
and the Secretariat is continually extending the programme
either autonomously or at the behest of members and of
other international organizations. Second, the scale of
extra-budgetary funds for technical assistance, from the
UNDP and Trust Funds, increases the autonomy of the
Secretariat overall. In the case of the Field Programme,
the funds come from the UNDP and other donors directly and
therefore the Secretariat is accountable to FAO members
only for maintaining the overall flows and delivery. There
is little sign that the individual donors or the UNDP
attempt to tighten the accountability of the FAO in
executing the Field Programme. As a result, the view
prevails that recipient governments should receive the
resources without conditions.
In the absence of firm political or financial
accountability, the Secretariat generates something of its
own technical accountability system, responding to the
decisions and priorities set by the UN system and to its
own professional interests and reputation. This, however,
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is often neutralized by the organizational incentives and
constraints that are common to many organizations of this
type but which are largely unchecked owing to the absence
of an accountability system. Within the FAO, the very
specialized, input-orientated organizational structure and
the competition between sectors for the financial benefits
of administering the Field Programme make it very difficult
to coordinate the appraisal and execution of field projects
or to ensure a more systematic project cycle.
The current attempt to develop an environmental
assessment system for the Field Programme has made little
progress. The absence of strong accountability to the
donors for the technical quality of field projects, the
insistence by recipients on their priorities and the weak
system within FAQ for coordinating and managing the Field
Programme makes environmental assessment almost impossible
without the the initiative of the technical division
responsible for a particular project. This sometimes
happens and sometimees not depending on the technical or
professional orientation of the dtvision concerned.
While there are no policy barriers to the inclusion of
environmental activities into the Programme, there is
lit tle incentive that can be at tributed to the political
and financial structure of the agency either. When it
comes to the Field Programme, the absence of any
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accountability system that might enforce environmental
assessment makes it almost impossible to overcome the
prevailing organizational incentives and constraints.
Other Development Assistance Agencies
In chapter 4, 1 suggested that one would find broadly
similar relationships between the political and financial
structure of agencies belonging to the same main groups and
their capacity to carry out environmental assessment. In
this section I shall look briefly at some of the relevant
cases.
All bilateral agencies, of course, share the political
and financial structure that I described for AID in that
they are parts of national governmental machinery and are
funded from the national treasury. The mechanisms for
setting and enforcing policy and approving the disbursal of
funds may ve- from donor to donor, which in turn may
generate a slightly different accountability system. But,
what is important is that the capacity for environmental
assessment must in the first place stem from the national
policy making arena and secondly if it is to be implemented
must be positively enforced by the accountability of the
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agency to the government and other political actors.
Among the bilateral agencies that have espoused
environmental policies in recent years, the Federal
Republic of Germany presents the most appropriate test of
the conclusions provided by the AID case. This is because
it has proposed an environmental assessment procedure, at
least for its capital aid program. The German public, at
the elections in 1983, voted several members of the
"Greens", the radical environmental party, into the
Bundestag. The Ministry of Development Cooperation
(Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit -
BMZ) had already been under some pressure from
environmental groups to demonstrate that the German
assistance program was responsive to environmental issues
and had urged the agencies responsible for project loans
and technical assistance to take steps to avoid
environmental damage. After the election, this pressure
was stepped up. The BMZ established a special department
responsible for environmental assessment of financial and
technical cooperation and has set out a system of
classifying proposed projects according to their
environmental impact that both the development bank (the
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau - KfW) and the technical
1. Interview with Herr Xnipschild, environmental officer,
BMZ, 1982.
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assistance agency (Gesellschaft fur Technische
Zusammenarbeit - GTZ) must follow. 2
The response to this policy has differed according to
the financial status of the agencies.3 The KfW had adopted
environmental guidelines as early as 1972 and from 1975 had
been supposed to conform to a non-mandatory Cabinet
resolution "principles for assessing the environmental
is4impact of federal actions". The KfW does require that the
potential environmental effects be included in the project
appraisal.
This has been implemented, to some extent, because the
account-ability system within the KfW is very strict. Being
a development bank it has relatively strict project
appraisal procedures and must ensure the financial and
technical soundness of its operation to the satisfaction of
the government. The KfW must get the project appraisal
checked with the BMZ. It is also audited by an independent
2. Interview with Herr Voelzke, environmental officer, BMZ,
1983. Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, "Guidelines for
Environmental Impact Assessment of Projects Promoted under
Financial Cooperation", Frankfurt, 1983.
3. Hart je, Volkmar, "Umwelt - und Ressourcenschutz in der
Bilateralen Entwicklungschilfe der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland", Berlin, International Institute for
Environment and Socie ty, 1980.
4. Johnson, Brian and Robert Blake, Bilateral Aid and the
Environment, London, International Institute and the
Environment, 1980, pp.9-10.
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agency, both on financial and technical grounds. Finally,
the BMZ carries out ex-Post evaluations of projects at its
discretion and has carried out special studies of whether
the environmental protection measures have been implemented
in the course of KfW projects.5 The new guidelines specify
the responsibility of the KfW to report any potential
environmental impacts to the BMZ during the project cycle.
The response of the GTZ, however, is somewhat
different. Being a technical assistance agency, it lacks
the formal project appraisal procedures and tight
accountability of the KfW. Its perception of its
environmental responsibilities does not concern the
environmental impact of projects so much as the promotion
of environmentally sustainable production systems or
approaches to natural resource management. Until the BMZ
tightened its environmental policies, the GTZ employed no
formal environmental procedures. Subsequently it has
started to develop environmentally sound models for
resource use and rural development to serve as a guide to
its technical assistance activities. Technically the GTZ
is subject to the new BMZ guidelines, but in practice they
are unlikely to be implemented strictly because the
operations of the GTZ are not governed by the same sort of
5. Interview with Prof. Poske, senior environmental advisor
to the Board of Directors, KfW, 1982.
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accountability system. That is not to say that the BMZ
cannot enforce its policy objectives with respect to the
GTZ, but the mechanisms for holding the GTZ accountable do
not affect the preparation and implementation of projects
in the same manner as with the KfW.6
The case of the Federal Republic of Germany is
interesting because the existence of strong domestic
pressure, initially from outside the parliament and finally
from within it, has produced different results within the
various development assistance agencies, depending on the
financial basis of their operations and the accompanying
accountability system The BMZ whose job is to coordinate
and set policy for the operating agencies has to
demonstrate that it is responding to the need for better
environmental policies. The IIED report on bilateral aid
and the environment indicates that the capacity of the
German aid system to shift direction in response to top
level policy pronouncements is higher than in any country
examined, except the U.S. It also says that the German
agencies are more closely watched by the Bundestag than
other agencies are scrutinized by their parliaments, except
6. Interviews with Herren von Bismark, Erbel, Kotchi,
Oswianowski, GTZ, 1982; Interview with Herr Pfuhl,
consultant to GTZ, 1984.
7. Johnson and Blake, op. citL., p.10.
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the U.S. It has established a section responsible for
environmental policy and issued guidelines for the agencies
to follow. In addition it has undertaken other
environmental activities including providing funds to UNEP
for the "clearing house" facility and an international
conference on "Environmental Impact Assessment for
Development".
The KfW, already subject to strict accountability for
the financial and technical quality of its lending program,
is both easier for the BMZ to hold accountable for
environmental effects and also is better geared to
undertake some form of environmental assessment as part of
its existing appraisal system. The GTZ, without the same
financial and technical accountability, is harder for the
BMZ to influence, although there is little doubt that the
GTZ must respond in some way. There is no formal appraisal
procedure that would help make an environmental assessment
process acceptable to the organization.
Other bilateral agencies that have espoused
environmental policies in recent years, such as the
Netherlands and Sweden, have more in common with the GTZ
than with the KfW. In both these countries there have been
strong domestic environmental lobbies and governments theat
are responsive or vulnerable to these lobbies,
notwithstanding changes in governments in both these
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countries in 1982. Consequently there has been pressure on
the development assistance agencies to demonstrate a
greater sensitivity to the environmental aspects of their
programs.
Only a small proportion of the assistance programs of
both these countries consist of capital projects that are
amenable to formal environmental assessment. Much of their
funds are allocated to multilateral organizations and to
technical assistance for what are sometimes described as
non-traditional sectors. Consequently their response to
environmental problems has consisted of allocating
resources to such sectors as forest and soil conservation
in the form of pilot projects, training, research and
institutional support.8 The Dutch Directorate General for
International Cooperation has established a Sector
Management Unit responsible for technical review of
projects, including environmental aspects. The Swedish
International Development Authority has a special budget
line for environmental technical assistance, research and
institutional support in addition to the funds allocated to
environmental sector projects or environmental compoitents
of other projects. In both cases, the nature of their
assistance program - constitutionally and in terms of
8. Johnson and Blake, on i. pp.10-13.
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content - does not favor the adoption of formal
environmental assessment. 9
Multilateral development banks, (the Asian,
Inter-American, African and Carribean Development Banks,
the European Investment Bank and Arab Bank for the Economic
Development of Africa) all share the important political
and financial features that limited the capacity of the
World Bank, in my analysis, to carry out environmental
assessment. They all have to borrow the funds they
disburse and therefore have to take care to maintain the
confidence of the capital markets and their reputation for
sound financial and technical operations. Their politica]
structure varies slightly but the weight of voting power in
each lies with the main contributors - although, in the
case of the African Development Bank, the main contributors
do not include Western donors. If anything the regional
development banks enjoy less latitude for following
developmental policies since they are smaller, possibly
less reliable in the eyes of the capital markets and less
9. Interviews with Mr Harteveld, Secretary to the Dutch
Directorate-General for International Cooperation's
Advisory Commission on Ecology and Development, Amsterdam,
1982; Mr van Vught, Sector Management Unit, Dutch
Directorate-General for International Cooperation, The
Hague, 1982; Mr Per Wrammner, chairman of the Working Group
on Environment and Development, Joint Nordic Commit tee of
Senior Officials for Development Assistance Questions,
Stockholm, 1982..
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eminent as a source of development policies and practice.
Also, being somewhat more politically responsive to the
interests of regional members, they tend to have less
leverage over the borrower's policies than does the World
Bank. Consequently, the accountability system governing
their operations can tolerate less deviation from strict
financial analysis and allows fewer delays or complications
in the disbursement schedule.
The Asian Development Bank established an environmental
unit in 1981 with three objectives: the systematic
environmental review of Bank projects, environmental
institution building in recipient countries and education
and training of the Bank's operations staff. According to
the head of this unit, there is more resistance within the
Bank to the environmental review function than to proposing
environmental sector projects or to undertaking training
exercises. He cites the difficulties of persuading the
project staff to cooperate in addressing possible
environmental issues at different stages in the project
cycle given that the management's main concern is to keep
increasing the level of disbursements. The routine
assessment of projects would make it harder for project
staff members to achieve the operational goals for which
they are held personally accountable.
The head of the environmental unit has described
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various tactics designed to increase his chances of
carrying out a systematic environmental review function.
First, he tries privately to win the support of Executive
Directors from the main donor countries. In the light of
my analysis of the World Bank, this could be interpreted as
an effort to tighten the accountability to the leadership
for implementing the environmental policies. Second, he
has organized training programs for the project staff
designed to demonstrate how environmental analysis can be
integrated with conventional economic appraisal and how the
environmental aspects of projects can significantly affect
their economic rates of return. Again, this appears to
address the source of resistance to environmental review by
demonstrating a convergence of institutional objectives and
a compatibility of method. Finally, he is trying to have
greater involvement in technical assistance activities
prior to project preparation, fact-finding and programming
missions and in evaluation activities. More environmental
analysis at both ends of the project cycle should reduce
the potential conflict between environmental review and
project appraisal and loan agreement. The accountability
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system is most unfavorable to environmental review at the
point where there is most urgency to process and approve
the project.10
The Inter-American Development Bank has never
established an environmental unit but claims that the
economic and technical appraisal of projects takes
environmental effects into consideration as a matter of
course. Its position is that it is the responsibility of
the borrower, with the assistance and, if necessary,
prompting of the Bank, to ensure that projects will not
have undesirable environmental impacts. The Bank itself
devotes more effort to promoting environmental sector
projects and technical assistance for environmental
protection and resource management.'1
Various environmental groups have asserted that the
Inter-American Development Bank has failed to ensure that
10. Interviews with Colin Rees, head of Environmental Unit,
Asian Development Bank, 1983 and 1984; Rees, Colin and
Sermpol Ratasuk, "Report on Review of the Bank's
Environmental Operations", Asian Development Bank, Manila,
1982; Asian Development Bank, "Response to Statements
Submit ted by Environmental Groups to the U.S. Congressional
Commit tee on MDB Environmental Policy", Manila, 1983.
11. Inter-American Development Bank, "The Inter-American
Development Bank and the Environment", Washington D.C.,
1983, pp.1-9.
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all projects are subject to environmental review and claim
that many projects cause environmental damages.12 What is
relevant here is that, despite a specific commitment to
establish an environmental review procedure - the
Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures
Relating to Economic Development - the Inter-American
Development Bank has not taken the necessary steps.
Obviously, this omission does not prove that the political
and financial structure of the Bank creates an
accountability system opposed to such a procedure, but
certainly neither the Inter-American Development Bank, nor
the Carribean and African Development Bank, neither of
which have fulfilled their commitment under the
Declaration, contradict this conclusion.
The European Commission, which administers the European
Development Fund (EDF), is not a multilateral development
bank, but it has signed the same Declaration committing it
to the systematic environmental review of projects that it
funds. Furthermore, in 1983 it commissioned a consultants'
report on how to establish procedures for environmental
assessment. This report identified several aspects of the
political and financial structure governing the
administration of the EDF' that presented barriers to
12. Interview witn Bruce Rich, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Washington D.C., 1983.
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environmental assessment. Since the report was submitted,
the Commission has taken no steps to implement an
environmental assessment procedure - its only environmental
activities consist of disbursing a budget line, independent
of the EDF, for environmental technical assistance and
institution-building.
The report on environmental assessment identified the
following features of the EDF that might influence the
Commission's capacity to implement such a procedure.
First, the constitutional and legal framework governing the
main part of the EDF, namely the Lome convention, is a
negotiated agreement between the EEC contributors and the
recipient states that in effect protects the sovereignty of
the recipients over much of project identification and
implementation.
Second, the political framework surrounding the
administration of the EDF does not ensure very strict
accountability to the EEC member's development assistance
agencies or the domestic interests that support
developmental goals. Bilateral agencies have low priority
within the member governments in seeking accountability
from the Commission via the Council of Ministers. Most
political accountability is focussed on trade, 'oreign
policy and agricultural production. In addition, European
Parliament members and their constituents have limited
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influence over the actions of the Commission.
Third, the Directorate-General for Development, which
is the department of the Commission that is responsible for
the EDF, is relatively autonomous, on a day-to-day basis,
from the Commission leadership or Community-wide policies
proposed by other Directorates-General. It has so far taken
little notice of the third European Community policy and
action plan on the environment which specifically addresses
the need to integrate environmental procedures into the
administration of the EDF.13 Even the articles of the Lome
11 convention that prescribe environmental review have
little effect on the preparation and approval of projects.
The assistance agencies of Community members do review
project appraisal decisions, via the EDF Committee, but any
influence they seek is limited by the equal sovereignty of
EDF recipients that is enshrined in the Lome convention.
Also, there is a lack of financial accountability - the
EDF is allocated mainly in the form of grants in return for
trade and foreign policy advantages negotiated prior to
each Lome convention period. There is little incentive for
the Commission to secure any significant return on
individual disbursals. The pressure within the ComLission
13. Official Journal of the European Communities, C46,
Vol.26, 17 Febuary 1983, p.1.
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is to disburse the funds as quickly as possible and to
overcome the- barriers to effective implementation in
recipient countries. The leedership and management of the
Commission want to know that the disbursal schedule is on
target, not how effective the projects are at achieving
economic or developmental objectives.
The consultants' report did make recommendations about
the specific measures that the the Commission could take to
tighten up the environmental analysis of projects and to
prepare the ground for an environmental review system.
However, the Commission has taken no steps to implement
even the most preliminary step, that of appointing an
environmental officer who would have the responsibility of
establishing some environmental procedures. I would argue
that the accountability system created by the political and
financial structure governing the EDF is most unfavorable
to any improvement in this situation.
Within the UN system, no other specialized agencies
have proposed any form of environmental review process
comparable to that under consideration by the FAO. I would
speculate that the broad accountability system governing
14. Horberry, John and Brian Johnson, "Environmental
Guidelines Survey: Recommendations on the Use of Procedures
and Guidelines for Environmental Planning and Assessment
within the European Development Fund", London, Joint
Environmental Service of lIED and IUCN, 1983.
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the regular budget in organizations such as WHO, Unesco or
UNIDO are similar to that in the FAO. In all these
organizations, there are environmental programs, and WHO,
especially, promotes training and institution-building for
environmental impact assessment in developing countries.
However, there is little incentive, and possibly little
need in most cases, to review their operational or field
activities for environmental effects. They face the same
situation when it comes to implementing UNDP projects as
that described for FAO and would face the same
organizational barriers to any strict project appraisal
system - barriers that stem from similar political and
f inanCi.a l structures. 15
The Determinants of Environmental Assssment Capacity
On the basis of the case studies and the supporting
evidence from other examples of development assistance
agencies making some effort to review the environmental
effects of their funding wrograms, I shall summarize 'he
relationship between the political and financial structure
15. Interviews with Dr Die terich, Director, Environmental
Health Division, WHO, 1984; Mr Batisse, Assistant
Director-General for Natural Resources and Environmental
Science, Unesco, 1982; Mr Carmichael, Environmental
Officer, UNIDO, 1983.
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of these agencies and their capacity for implementing a
procedure for environmental assessment.
The policies of development assistance agencies are
established in part by the political membership of the
organization, meaning in the case of bilateral agencies
that configuration of legislature, executive departments
and other governmental bodies that share a responsibility
for foreign assistance or have the capacity to bend it to
their interests; and medning in the case of international
organizations the configuration of national representatives
to governing bodies, permanent representatives to the
organizations and other intergovernmental bodies that can
influence its operations. The policies of these
organizations are also shaped by the financial basis of
their programs in that the source of their funds, the
mechanisms for allocating and disbursing them, the terms
under which they are disbursed and the conditions attached
to them significantly influence what objectives the
organization can or cannot pursue.
It is also the case that development assistance
agencies are to some degree obliged to follow policies that
respond to the collective interests of recipients or to the
strategies formulated by the professional and academic -
development community. These policies are some times
Pressed on the organizations through political channels and
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sometimes through their own staff or contractors.
How the organizations respond to these policies depends
both on the mechanisms that exist for holding the
organizations accountable to the demands that stem from the
political and financial structure and on the independent
objectives that the staff pursues in order to cope with its
task-environment. An important part of this
task-environment consists of the priorities and capacities
of the recipients.
The focus of my analysis has been on the accountability
system that determines how the staff members in different
parts of the organization respond to the policies that stem
from its political and financial structure. The
accountability system links the policy demands to the
dominant interests perceived by those working within the
organization. These interests have much to do with coping
with its task-environment. In other words, without an
accountability system, the staff of the organization would
be free to pursue its own interests without reference to
specific policy objectives. On the other hand, if the
accountability system is too rigid, the staff members have
difficulty succeeding in relation to their
task-environment. The accountability systems of different
organizations are focussed on different criteria,
controlled by different actors, are more or less strict and
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more or less penetrating. The particular configuration of
an accountability system is a major determinant of the
capacity of the staff of an organization to respond to
policies that require reform of its operating procedures or
decision criteria. The accountability system creates a
pattern of incentives and constraints governing the
organization's efforts to cope with its task-environment
that influences its response to the implementation of any
particular policy objective.
Development assistance agencies have been urged to
adopt procedures for the systematic environmental review of
their funding programs - not a policy one would expect to
be functional for coping with their task-environment. The
accountability systems of these agencies have ensured that
most agencies have agreed to adopt this policy. But the
same accountability systems create the pattern of
incentives and constraiPts within the organizations that
determine whether or how the policy shall be implemented.
I have argued that in the case of bilateral agencies,
the accountability system provides the potential for
effective environmental assessment. The government can
make a certain policy or procedure mandatory if it thinks
fit or domes tic pressure is very strong. However, o ther
aspects of the accountability system, such as the weak
evaluation of economic and technical impact, or the need to
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satisfy domestic political or economic interests tend to
constrain the implementation of environmental assessment.
AID demonstrates that a bilateral agency has the capacity
to make a policy mandatory, but also illustrates how there
needs to be a mechanism for ensuring that the staff is
accountable for performance if the policy is to be
effectively implemented. The accountability system, in
fact, cannot easily alter the strong organizational
interests that have developed within AID's decentralized
stricture for managing and expanding the program. In other
words, only if the failure to systematically assess the
environmental effects of its program should threaten the
legal o.r statutory responsibilities of the agency, and
there are effective mechanisms for auditing or scrutinizing
its performance, will such a policy change the way that the
staff goes about ensuring its own survival and
development.
The financial requirements of multilateral development
banks dominate their accountability system. Owing to their
political and developmental status, they are supposed to
achieve "good" development without being influenced by
individual political interests. This makes it hard for
multi-aterals to deny policies that are designed to achieve
more sus tainable or equitable development pro jects. But,
in practice, their financial status presents a barrier to
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implementation. The World Bank adopts more developmental
policies than other multilaterals but my case showed how
difficult it is to secure implementation within the World
Bank. The accountability system places a premium on
maintaining creditworthiness and a reputation for sound
financial operations. The project officers are likely to
resist any policies that make it harder to satisfy that
criterion or increase the uncertainty of their calculations
- and they enjoy the autonomy to resist unwelcome additions
to their task. There are few cases where the systematic
assessment of the environmental effects 'f project loans
increases the creditworthiness of the recipient or the
organiz.ations reputation for financial soundness.
The particular political structure of UN agencies
creates a weak accountability system with respect to any
individual policy objective. Donors have limited influence
over the broad program objectives and the budget level.
Recipients resist attem-ts to establish criteria for
allocating resources or measuring the performance of
operations. The financial basis of the UN agencies
increases the autonomy of the agencies from their political
membership and makes it harder to pursue a policy objective
within the field operations. A lack of accountability
gives the organization the freedom to pursue its own
ob jectives in relation to its own ask-environment. The
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systematic assessment of the environmental effects of its
operations is unlikely to serve the organizational
interests of a UN agency significantly.
The Latitude-for Environmental Assessment
It would seem from the material presented Above that
environmental assessment is not a policy one would expect
to have much success. But having arrived at this
conclusion, I think it is worth asking how do development
assistance agencies find the latitude in their operations
to purs.ue environmental policies? How is a bilateral
agency able to achieve some level of environmental review
despite its accountability for national political and
economic objectives and the generally unsympathetic
attitude of recipient governments? How does a multilateral
development bank maintain its credibility as a financial
institution and still require some attention to the
consequences of its loans for environmental quality and
resource conservation? How does a UN agency satisfy its
own programmatic and bureaucratic objectives at the same
time as promoting sound environmental planning of its field
operations? By undersa tanding the source of the agercies'
latitude for environmental assessment, one can targe t
efforts to achieve policy reforms accordingly.
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The answers to these questions have all been suggested
in the course of the cases, but I shall summarize the main
points. To the extent that the governments of donor
countries are sensitive to environmental lobbies, whether
domestically or internationally focussed, they can be
persuaded to issue some form of mandate for environmental
policy to the donor agency. To the extent that supporters
of such environmental policies can activate mechanisms for
holding the agencies accountable for compliance with this
policy or can direct the attention of auditors or watchdogs
to this issue, the agency can be persuaded to implement the
policy. Beyond the domestic political process, bilateral
agencies are part of the international development
assistance system. The Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD provides a forum that reviews and
criticizes the performance of bilateral agencies purely on
the basis of developmental criteria. The DAC has in recent
years tried to persuade bilateral agencies to strengthen
and coordinate their policies on environmental review. It
hopes that the agencies will jointly recognize the
developmental benefits to be gained, but it has had little
success in overcoming the priority of national foreign and
economic policy interests
Multilateral development banks can deviate from strict
financial criteria to the extent that their reputation for
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financial performance is not affected. Indeed there is
often considerable pressure on them to respond to
developmental policies and support sectors that are not
financially sound. This they can do, to some extent,
because their governmental borrowers are committed to pay
back their loans regardless of the actual return on that
investment. Similarly the capital markets are more
interested in the overall creditworthiness of borrowing
governments than that of the individual projects. However
the financial structure makes it easier to allocate of
loans to non-financial sectors than to satisfy
developmental objectives which involve uncertain analysis
or reduce the projected rate of return Here the latitude
for environmental assessment depends on whether the project
staff perceives a risk either to the financial performance
of the loan or to its professional reputation from failing
to take into account the environmental effects.
Among multilateral development banks, there is a joint
commitment to environmental policies in the shape of the
Declaration on Environmental Policies and Procedures
relating to Economic Development. The environmental staffs
of the signatories to the Declaration form the Committee of
International Development Institutions on the Environment.
Thus the environmenta] staffs, however reluctantly, are
bound into a mechanism for reviewing the implementation of
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their commitments. In a sense, the multilaterals are
hostage to their joint responsibilities to promote sound
economic development free of individual political
interests. They cannot publically put their financial
interests above the developmental objectives they have come
to be held accountable for. Indeed part of their authority
and influence stems from the perception of their role as
sources of better development strategies and practice.
Whether the management or the project staff like the
consequences, they do have the latitude to ensure that the
kind of development they finance does more than produce an
acceptable rate of re turn.
UN agencies can pursue developmental objectives partly
because that is the nature of the service they are set up
to provide to their members and partly because the
secretariats are more responsive to development strategies
formulated by other international organization or the
professional interests of their staff than to the political
interests of their members. Thus attention to
developmental objectives serves the programmatic interests
of the organization Promoting environmental policies can
provide an opportunity for the organization to enhance its
program and can satisfy the interests of some of its
technical staff. This is less true for theijr field
operations than the regular programs, but there is no
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definite barrier to environmental review provided the
recipients of field projects demonstrate some demand. The
latitude exists but there Is little incentive without the
demand.
Within the UN system, UNEP plays a role in stimulating
a greater sensitivity on the part of the individual
agencies to environmental issues. It allocates funds to
environmentally orientated activities to be carried out by
other agencies and to promote coordination among agencies
in addressing environmental problems. This strengthens the
position of environmental units within the agencies,
provides them with extra-budgetary funds and offers a
source of policy commitment that can be used to influence
the agency's program. Thus UNEP can increase the latitude
for environmental activities, although with more effect on
programs than field operations.
The fate of a developmental policy such as
environmental assessment within a develcpment assistance
agency does, of course, depend on the support the political
leadership and management of that agency - on the grounds
that the policy will improve the developmental output of
the agency. But the political leadership of an agency is
often pre-occupied with the political and financial
objectives of the agency's activities, and obvious
developmental benefits are some times not enough to grab
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their attention and persuade them to steer the agency in
the appropriate direction. But they are sensitive to some
degree to political pressure and to energetic lobbying. In
this way the leadership can be persuaded to adopt a policy
designed to improve the output of the agency.
But a developmental policy initiative also depends on
the reform of decision-making and operating procedures
within the organization - for instance in the form of
environmental assessment procedures - and the likelihood of
the staff members implementing these reforms effectively
But it is clear that organizations have interests of their
own and some degree of autonomy to pursue these interests
The latest reform in their procedures or responsibilitieS
may or may not match the interests perceived by the staff
members. Thus, in order to promote a particular policy,
one also must try to increase the incentives of the staff
to implement it - for instance by providing guidelines -
and try to monitor the results.
I have argued that the political control of the agency,
and hence its policy priorities, is connected with the
incentives within the organization for implementing a
particular policy by the accountability system.
Accountability is the key to how to make uure a policy is
carried out as effectively as the political and financial
s tructure of the agency will allow. It is also the key to
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understanding what limitations are common to different
types of agency. Reforming these agencies and promoting
certain policies should focus on the opportunities for
activating the accountability system around a policy
-initiative or targeting changes at the incentives and
constraints that the staff faces in responding to policy
demands.
- 386 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"A Bank for All Seasons : A Survey of the World Bank", the
£conom.is, Sept. 4th, 1982.
Abel, Nick and Michael Stocking, "The Experience of
Underdeveloped Countries", in T. O'Riordan and W.R.D.
Sewell, eds., Proiect ADpraisAA and PolicvyRewy'., New
York, John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
Adler, J.H., 'The World Bank's Concept of Development - An
In-House Doomengeschichte", in J. Bhagwati and R.
Eckaus, eds., Develonment and Planning, London, Allen
and Unwin, 1972.
Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision ExPlaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1971.
Arnold, Steven, ImDlementina Development Assistance:
European ApDroaches to Basic Needs. Boulder, Westview
Press, 1982.
Asian Development Bank, "Memo on U.S. Congressional
Hearings on MDB Environmental Policy: Request for
Additional Information", Manila, Infrastructure
Department, 10 November, 1983
"Response to Statements Submitted by Environmental
Groups to the U.S. Congressional Committee on MDB
Environmental Policy", Manila, 1983.
Ascher, William, "New Development Approaches and the
Adaptability of International Agencies: the Case of the
World Bank", International Organization, 37:3, 1983.
Ayres, Robert, Banking on the Poor: the World Bank and
WorldPo1erty, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983.
Baum, W., "The Project Cycle", in Finance and Development,
7 (1970) : 2-13.
Bello, W., D. Kinley and E. Elinson, Development Debacle:
the World Bank in the Philioines, San Francisco,
Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982.
Blake, Robert 0., et al., "Aiding the Environment: A Study
of the Environmental Policies, Procedures and
Performance of the United States Agency for
lnternational Development." Washington D.C., Natural
- 387 -
Resources Defense Council, 1980.
Brandt Commission, North-South;_A__Program for Survival,.
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980.
Brown, Lester, Building a-Sustainable Society, New York,
Norton, 1981.
Caporaso, James, ed., "Dependence and Dependency in the
Global System", International Organization, 32 (Winter
1978).
Chenery, Hollis et al., Redistribution with Growth, London,
Oxford University Press, 1974.
Clausen, A.W., "Sustainable Development: the Global
Imperative", the Fairfield Osborn Memorial Lecture,
reprinted in The Environmentalist, 2 (1982) : 23-28.
Commission of the European Communities, "Memorandum on the
Community's Development Policy", COM(82) 640 Final,
Brussels, 5 October, 1982
Congressional Budget Office, Assisting the Developing
Countries: Foreion Aid andfTrade Policies of the United
St'tes, Washington D C., Government Printing Office,
1980.
Cooper, Charles, Economic__Evaluation and theEnv ironment,.
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981.
Cox, Robert and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence
Decision Making in International Organization, New
Haven, Ydle University Press, 1973.
Crane, B. and J. Finkle, "Organizational Impediments to
Development Assistance: the World Bank's Population
Program", World Politics, 33:4 (1981) 516-553.
Dasmann, R., J.P. Milton and P.H. Freeman, Ecological
Principles for Economic Developiment.London, John Wiley
and Sons, 1973.
de Frietas, Maria de Lourdes Davies, and Christine
Smyrski-Shluger, "Br&zil's Carajas Iron Ore Project -
Environmental Aspects", Rio de Janeiro, Companhia Vale
do Rio Doce, 1982.
Dickinson, Joshua, "The Country Environmental Profile
Process and Product", Washington D.C., Agency for
International Development, 1984.
- 388 -
Dworkin, D.M., ed., Environment and Development,
Indianapolis, SCOPE Miscellaneous Publication, 1974.
Eckholm, Eric, Losing Ground, New York, Norton, 1976.
The Picture of Health, New York, Norton, 1977.
Down to Earth: Environment and Human Needs, New
York, Norton, 1982.
European Investment Bank, "Information", No.37, Feb.1984.
FAO, "Effects of Intensive Fertilizer Use on the Human
Environment", Soils Bulletin No 16, Rome, 1972
"Report of the Conference 1977", Rome, 1977.
"Report of the Conference 1979", Rome, 1979.
"Report of the World Conference on Agrarian Reform
and Rural Development", Rome, 1979.
"Basic Texts of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations", Vols.I and II,
Rome, 1980 edition.
"Guidelines for Developing Technical Cooperation
Activities", Rome, 1980.
,"The Environmental Impact of Tsetse Control
Operations", Animal Production and Health Paper No 7,
Rome, 1980.
"Natural Resources and the Human Environment for
Food and Agriculture", FAO Environment Paper 1, Rome,
1980.
"Report of the Conference 1981", Rome, 1981.
"Review of the Regular Programme 1980-1981", Rome,
1981.
"FAO : What it is, How it Works", Rome, 1982.
"The Environmental Impact of Forestry",
Conservation Guide No.7, Rome, 1982.
"Environmental Impact Assessment and Agricultural
Development", Environment Paper No.2, Rome, 1982.
"Report of the Conference 1983", Rome, 1983.
- 389 -
"Report of the Ad-Hoc Sub-Group of the IDWG on
Environment and Energy on Environmental Assessment of
Field Projects", Rome, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, 1983.
1"Review of the Field Programmes 1982-1983", Rome,
1983.
."Review of the Regular Programme 198Z-1983", Rome,
1983.
"Programme of Work and Budget for 1984-1985",
Rome, 1983.
"Fisheries Department Field Projects", Rome, June
1983.
"Forestry Department Project Catalogue", Rome,
September 1983.
"AGO Project Catalogue", Rome, Jan 1984.
"Office Memorandum : FAO/UNEP Projects Progress
Report (October 1983 to March 1984)", Rome, May 1984.
Farvar, M.T., and J.P. Milton, eds., The Careless
Technolovg: Ecology and International Development, New
York, Doubleday, Natural History Press, 1972.
Gannett, Fleming, Corddry and Carpenter, Inc, Assessment of
Environmental Effects of Proposed Developments in the
Seneral River ..Basin , 1981.
Good-land, R., "Are Trade-cffs Admissible?" Informal
comments to the International Rivers Conference,
American Institute of Architects, Washington D.C.,
March 31, 1984.
Goudie, Andrew, The Human._lmpact, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press, 1982.
Grindle, Merilee, "Anticipating Failure: the Implementation
of Rural Development Programs", Public Policy, 29:1
(1981) : 51-74.
aas, E.., levontd the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1964.
Hanson A., "Environmental Considerations in
Foreign-Donor-Supported Projects: Some Experiences in
Indonesia", Research Report 1, East-West Environment
and Policy Institute, 1981.
- 390 -
Hartie, Volkmar, "Umwelt - und Ressourcenschutz in der
Bilateralen Entwicklungschilfe der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland", Berlin, International Institute for
Environment and Society, 1980.
Hayter, Theresa, Aid as Imnerialism, London, Penguin, 1971.
Hirschman, Albert, DeveloomentProiects Observed,
Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1967.
Hoben, Allen, "Agricultural Decision-Making in Foreign
Assistance: An Anthropological Analysis", manuscript,
1980.
Holdgate, Martin, Mohammed Kassas and Gilbert White, The
World Environment 1972-1982. Dublin, Tycooly
International, 1982.
Horberry, John, Environmental Guidelines Survey: An
Analysis of the Environmental Procedures and Guidelines
Governing Development Aid, London, Joint Environmental
Service of IIED and IUC: , 1983
Statement of the Joint Environmental Service of
IIED and IUCN in United States Congress. House.
Subcommittee on International Development Institutions
and Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, Environmental Imoact of Multilateral
Development Bank-Funded Proiects. Hearings, : 97-37. 98
Cong. 1 Sess. Washington, Government Printing Office,
1983.
_3_a_ Status and Anlication of Environmental ImPact
Assessment for Development, (Report to the
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit,
Federal Republic of Germany), Gland, Conservation for
Development Centre, International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1984
"International Organization and EIA in Developing
Countries", Environmental Imvact Assessment Review,
forthcoming.
Horberry, John and Brian Johnson, The Environmental
Performance of Consulting Firms in Development Aid,
International Institute for Environment and
Development, London, 1981.
Horberry, John and Brian Johnson, "Recommendations on the
Use of Procedures and Guidelines for Environmental
Planning and Assessment within the European Development
- 391 -
Fund", London, Joint Environmental Service of IIED and
IUCN, 1983.
Hough, Richard, Economic Assistance and Security:
Rethinking US Policy, Washington D.C., National Defense
University Press, 1982.
Hufschmidt, M., et al., Environment. Natural Systems and
Dev-elopment, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983.
IIED, "Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Aspects of
Environmental and Natural Resource Management in
Developing Countries", (AID/NPS Natural Resources
Project), Washington D.C , International Institute for
Environment and Development, 1981.
IUCN, World Conservation Strategy, Gland, International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
1980.
"National Conservation Strategies: A Report to
Development Assistance Agencies on Progress and
Priorities in Planning for Sustainable Development",
Gland, International Union for Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources, 1983.
Inter-American Development Bank, "The Inter-American
Development Bank and the Environment", Washington D.C.,
1983.
Jacobson, Harold, Networks of Interdependence:
International Organizations and the fGlobal Political
S£stem, New York, Alfred Knopf, 2nd Edition, 1984.
Jacobson, H. K. and D.A. Kay, "The Environmental Protection
Activities of International Organizations: An Appraisal
and Some Suggestions," paper for American Political
Science Association, Sept. 1979.
James, Jeffrey, "Growth, Technology and the Environment in
Less Developed Countries: A Survey", World Development,
6 (1978) : 937-965.
Johnson, Brian and Robert Blake, The Environment and
Bilateral Development Aid, London and Washington D.C.,
International Institute for Environment and
Development, 1980.
Joint Nordic Commit tee of Senior Officials for Development
Assistance Questions, "Miljo och bistand: Ymparis to ja
Kehitysapu", Stockholm, NU 1982:9.
- 392 -
Juda, Lawrence, "International Environmental Concern:
Perspectives of and Implications for Developing
States", in David Orr and Marvin Soroos, eds., Ib±
Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World
Order, Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina
Press, 1979.
Krasner, Stephen, "Power Structures and Regional
Development Banks", in International Organization, 35:2
(Spring 1981) : 303-305.
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, "Guidelines for
Environmental Impact Assessment of Projects Promoted
under Financial Cooperation", Frankfurt, 1983.
Lee, James, "Environmental Considerations in Development
Finance" in David Kay and Eugene Skolnikoff, eds.,
World Eco-Crisis: International Organization in
Rasponse., Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1972,
pp.171-182.
Leonard, H.J., Divesting Nature's Capital: The Political
Economy of Environmental Abuse in the Third World, New
York, Holmes and Meier, 1984.
Le Prestre, P., The Ecoloa of thte World Bank : Uncertainty
Management and Environmental Policv. Ph.D. thesis,
Indiana University, 1982.
Luke, Robert, "The Environmental Practices of the United
Nations Development Programme: Critique and
Recommendations", New York, United Nations Development
Programme, 1980.
MKLH, "Environmental Sector Review", Indonesian State
Ministry of Population and Environment, 1983.
McHale, John and Magda McHale, Basic Human Needs: A
Framework for Action, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction
Books, 1978
McNamara, R., "Address to United Nations Economic and
Social Council", New York, 1970.
"Speech to the UN Conference on the Human
Environment", Stockholm, 1972.
McPherson, Pe ter, "Prepared Statement of the Administrator.
Agency for International Development" in United States
Congress. House. Subcommit tee on Human Rights and
International Organizations of the Commit tee on Foreign
- 393 -
Affairs, Review of the Global Environment 10 Years
after Stockholm. Hearings. 97 Cong. 2nd Sess.
Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982.
Mason, Edward and Robert Asher, The World Bank Since
Bretton__Wo-ocds, Washington D.C. , The Brookings
Institution, 1973.
Mathieson, John, Basic Needs and the New Economic
International Order, Washington D.C., Overseas
Development Council, 1981.
Micklewait, Donald et al., New Directions in Development
A Study of U.S. AiD, Boulder, Westview Press, 1979.
Mitrany, David, A Working Peace System, Chicago,
Quadrangle, 1966.
Morell D., and H.J. Leonard, "Emergence of Environmental
Concern in Developing Countries: A Political
Perspective", Stanford Journal of International Law,
(June 1981) 281-313.
Myers, Norman, ITheSinking Arl, New York, Pergamon, 1979.
* The Conversion of Tropical Moist Forests,
Washington D.C., National Academy of Sciences, 1980.
Myrdal, Gunner, Asian Drama, New York, The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1968.
National Research Council, Ecological Aspects of
Develooment in the Humid Tropics, Washington D.C
National Academy Press, 1982.
Normanton, E.L., "Public Accountability and Audit- A
Reconnaissance", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C Hague, eds.,
The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government:
Independence Versus Control, New York, St.Martin's
Press, 1971.
OECD, Compendium of Aid Procedures: A Review of Current
Practices of Members of the Development Assistance
Committee, Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1981.
______Ecoinomic and Ecological Interdenendence, Paris,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1982.
______Development Cooperation : Efforts and Policies of
the Members of the Develonment Assistance Commit tee.
- 394 -
1983 Review, Paris, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1983.
Official Journal of the European Communities, C46, Vol 26,
17 Febuary 1983.
O'Riordan, Timothy, "Problems Encountered when Linking
Environmental Management to Development Aid", Tht
Environmentalist, 1 (1981) : 15-24.
Panel of Experts on Environmental Management for Vector
Control, "Report of the First Meeting, WHO, Geneva,
1981", Geneva, PEEM Secretariat, World Health
Organization, 1981.
Paver, Cheryl, The World Bank: A Critical Anoraisal, New
York, Monthly Review Press, 1982.
Phillips, Ralph, FAO : Its Origins. Formation and EvoluLion
1945-1281, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, 1981.
Rees, Colin, "Environmental Considerations in Asian
Development Bank Operations", Manila, Asian Development
Bank, 1982.
"Environmental Management in Relation to the
Project Cycle", paper submitted to the Fourth Meeting
of CIDIE, New York, 1983, UNEP/CIDIE/83 3.
Rees, Colin and Sermpol Ratasuk, "Report on Review of the
Bank's Environmental Operations", Asian Development
Bank, Manila, 1982.
Regan, Donald, "Statement of the Honorable Donald T. Regan,
Secretary of the Treasury" in United States Congre5s.
Senate. Subcommittee on Foreign Relations. Committee on
Appropriations. Hearings, March 15, 1984
Rich, Bruce, Testimony to United States Congress. Senate.
Subcommittee on International Foreign Policy of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, 7th U.S Rerlenishment
of the International D3evelopment Association. Hearings,
Washington D.C., 1984.
Rotberg, Eugene, The World Bank: A inancial Anmraisal,
Washington D.C., the World Bank, 1978.
Ruddle, Kenne th and Walther Manshard, Renewabie Natural
Resources and the Environment, Dublin, Tycooly
International, 1981.
- 395 -
Sachs, Ignacy, "Environmental Quality Management and
Development Planning: Some Suggestions for Action", in
Environment-and Develoment: the Founex Report, Paris,
1972.
"Alternative Patterns of Development" in Dworkin,
D.M., ed., Environment and Develooment, Indianapolis,
SCOPE Miscellaneous Publications, 1974.
Sewell, John and the staff of the Overseas Development
Council, The United States and World Development.
Agenda 1980, New York, Praeger, 1980.
Shane, Jeffrey, "Environmental Law in the Developing
Countries of Southeast Asia", in Colin MacAndrews and
Chia Lin Sien, eds., Develooing Economies and the
Environment: The Southeast Asian Experience, Singapore,
McGraw-Hill Southeast Asia Series, 1979.
Skolnikoff, E. B., The International Imperatives of
Technology, Institute of International Studies,
University of California, Berkeley, 1972.
Smith, B.L.R., "Accountability and Independence in the
Contract State," in B.L.R. Smith and D C. Hague, eds.,
The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government:
Independence Versus Control, New York, St.Martin's
Press, 1971.
Stanley Consultants, Environmental Assessment of Greater
Cairo Wastewater System : West Bank, 1982.
Stein, Robert and Brian Johnson, Banking on the Biosphere)
Environmental Practices and Procedures of Nine
Multilateral Development Agencies., Lexington,
Lexington Books, 1979.
Stevens, Christopher, ed., EEC and the Third World :-A
Survey, Vol.!, Overseas Development Institute/Institute
for Development Studies, London, Holmes and Meier,
1981.
ed., EEC and the Third World : A Survey, Vol.2,
Overseas Development Institute/Institute for
Development Studies, London, Holmes and Meier, 1982.
Stree ten, Paul, et al., First Things First: Meeting Basic
Human Needs in the Developina Countries, New York,
Oxford University Press, 1981.
Tendler, J., Inside ForeignL Aid, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975.
- 396 -
"The FAO Dossier", TheDaily America-n, Rome, 1981.
Thompson, James, Organizations in Action, New York, Mcgraw
Hill, 1967.
Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, Environmental Assessment
and Environmental Plan of_ Action: Accelerated Mahaweli
Development Programme, 1981.
Tixhon, J., "The World Bank and the Industrial
Environment", mimeo.
Tolba, Mostafa, "Putting the Principles to Work ; Statement
to 4th meeting of the CIDIE", in United Nations
Environment Programme, Summary Record, 4th meeting of
the Committee of International Development Institutions
on the Environment (OIDIE), UNEP/CIDIE/83.8 (Final),
Nairobi, 1983.
United Nations, "Report of a Panel of Experts Convened by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the
Human Environment", (The Founex Report), Annex I, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.48/10, 1971.
"Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment", U.N. Doc.A/CONF 48/14, 1972.
UNEP, "Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures
Relating to Economic Development", Nairobi,
UNEP/WG.31/2, 1979.
"First Session of the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment: Report of
the Meeting", Nairobi, UNEP/WG.50/1, 1980.
UNEP, "Fourth Meeting of the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment. Summary
Record," Nairobi, UNEP/CIDIE/83.8 (Final), 1983.
United States. Agency for International Development.
"Environmental Procedures", 36 Fed.Rega. 22686, 1971.
"Environmental Policy Determination", PD-63, 1975.
"A Strategy for a More Effective Bilateral
Development Assistance Program: AID Policy Paper",
Washington D.C., March 1978.
''AID Policy on Environment and Natural Resources,"
(May 15, 1978) in AID Handbook No. 1, Supplement A-38,
1978.
- 397 -
"Environmental Procedures", 22 CFR Part 216, 1978.
Environmental and Natural Resource Management in
Developingi Countries : A Reoort to Congress, Volume I:
Report, Washington D.C., 1979.
"Memorandum for the executive staff, mission
directors and environmental officers from Albert
Printz, Jr., Environmental Affairs Coordinator on
Revised Environmental Procedures and Project Design
Criteria", January 22, 1981.
"Environment Sector Strategy Paper", Washington
D C., December 1982.
Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1984. Main
VLaume, Washington D.C., 1983.
"Environmental and Natural Resource Aspects of
Development Assistance", Policy Determination, PD-6,
Washington D C., April 26, 1983.
United States Congress. House. Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Administration of the National
Environmental Policv Act. 1972. Hearincis, 92nd Cong
2nd Sess. 92-25, Washington D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1972
Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Trade,
Productivity and Economic Growth, U.S. Foreign Aid and
the Private Sector: Is PartnershiD Ppssible? Hearings.,
97 Cong. 1st sess., Washington D.C., Government
Printing Office, Oct. 1981.
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Objectives of
U.S. Foreign Assistance; Does Develooment Assistance
Benefit the Poor? Hearings, 97 Cong. 2nd sess.,
Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, Aug. 1982
House. Subcommittee on Legislation and National
Security of the Committee on Government Operations.
AID's Administration andlManagement Problems in
Promoting- Foreicgn Economic Assistance. Hearings, 97
Cong. 1st sess., Washington D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1981.
______House. Commit tee on the Budge t. Task Force on
International Trade and Finance, Export Financing
Issues and Foreign Asststance. Hearings, 98 Cong. 1st
sess., Washington D.C., Government Printing Office,
- 398 -
March 1983.
House. Subcommittee on International Development
Institutions and Finance of the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, Environmental Imoact of
Multilateral DeveloDment Bank-Funded Proiects.
Hearings, 97-37, 98 Cong. 1st sess. Washington D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1983.
United States Treasury Department, U.S. Participation in
the Multilateral Develooment Banks in the 1980's,
Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982.
van der Laar, Aart, The World Bank and the Poor, Boston,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
Ward, Barbara and Rene Dubos, Only Xne Earth, New York,
Norton, 1972.
White, John, Regional Development Banks the Asian.
African and Inter-American Development Banfl, New York,
Praeger, 1972.
White, John, The Politics of Foreign Aid, New York, St.
Martins Press, 1974.
World Bank, "Environment and Development", Washington D.C
Office of Environmental Affairs, 1975.
"Environmental Considerations in the Industrial
Development Sector", Washington D.C., Office of
Environmental Affairs, 1978.
"Project Performance Audit Report. Sri Lanka
Drainage and Land Reclamation Project. Credit 168-CE",
Operations Evaluation Department, Dec. 28, 1979.
"Environment and Development", Washington D.C.,
Office of Environmental Affairs, 1979.
Eighth Annual Review of Proiect Performance Audit
Riesults, Washington D.C., 1982.
"Project Completion Report", Nov. 30, 1982, cited
in "Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy: Response
to Statements of Environmental Organizations Sent by
U.S. Executive Director", Washington D.C., January 11,
1984, Attachment I.
______"Staff Appraisal Report. Northeast Brazil,
Maranhao Rural Development Project", Projects
Department, Latin American and Carribean Region Office,
- 399 -
May 21, 1982.
"Project Performance Audit Report. Brazil Alto
Turi Land Settlement Project. Loan 853-BR", Operations
Evaluation Department, Dec. 29, 1982.
"Progress Report 1981-1982", in UNEP, Summary
Recor, 3rd Meeting of the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment (CIDIE),
UNEP/CIDIE/82.8 (Final), 1982.
"Environmental Requirements of the World Bank",
Washington D.C., Office of Environmental Affairs, 1982.
IDA in Re trospect: The First Two Decades of the
International Development Associ-ation, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1982.
"Tribal Peoples and Economic Development Human
Ecological Considerations", Washington D.C., Office of
Environmental Aifairs, 1982.
"Project Performance Audit Report. Nepal
Settlement Project : Credit 505-NEP", Operations
Evaluation Department, June 20, 1983.
"Progress Report (1982-1983)", in UNEP, Summary
Record, 4th meeting of the Committee of International
Development Institutions on the Environment (CIDIE),
UNEP/CIDIE/83.8 (Final), Nairobi, 1983.
World Bank Annual Report, 1983.
"Wildland Management in World Bank Projects: A
Policy Proposal", Office of Environmental And
Scientific Affairs, Washington D.C., 1984.
"Environment, Public Health and Human Ecology
Considerations for Economic Development", Washington
D.C., Office of Environmental Affairs, 1984.
"Memorandum on Bank Environmental Policy: Response
to Statements of Environmental Organizations Sent by
the U.S Executive Director", Washington D.C, January
11th, 1984.
:Environmental Policies and Procedures of the
World Bank", (public version of Operations Manual
Statement), Washington D.C., Office of Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, May 1, 1984.
WHO, "Environmental Quality Planning and Policy in
- 400 -
Developing Countries: Report on an Interregional
Symposium", Geneva, World Health Organization,
DIS/77.1, 1977.
- 401 -
